Morality and Mathematics: The Evolutionary Challenge
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The Evolutionary Challenge for moral realism is, roughly, the challenge to explain our having many true moral beliefs, given that those beliefs are the products of evolutionary forces that would be indifferent to the moral truth. This challenge is widely thought not to apply to mathematical realism. In this article, I argue that it does. Along the way, I substantially clarify the Evolutionary Challenge, discuss its relation to more familiar epistemological challenges, and broach the problem of moral disagreement. I conclude that there may be no epistemological ground on which to be a moral antirealist and a mathematical realist.
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Cites
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value
Street, S. (2006) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-005-1726-6 · Cited by 1,247
Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning
Blackburn, S. (1998) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198247852.001.0001 · Cited by 1,217
Evolution and Normative Scepticism
Schafer, K. (2010) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400903114219 · Cited by 44
Cited by
The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
Cuneo, T., & Shafer-Landau, R. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0277-5 · Cited by 270
“Consider, in this regard, versions of the debunking argument that appeal to claims such as if recreational slaughter of a fellow person were not wrong, then we would still believe that it is wrong (e. g., Clarke-Doane 2012).”
BackgroundClarke-Doane, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823667.001.0001 · Cited by 146
Self-citationSauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72
Metadata
- Authors
- Clarke-Doane, J.
- Venue
- Ethics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2012-01
- Volume
- 122
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 313-340
- ISSN
- 0014-1704 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-297X
- OpenAlex
- W2082913365
- Cited by
- 148
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 54.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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