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Cited by 178Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationFiscal Policies and Political EconomyGlobal trade and economics

How Legislators Respond to Localized Economic Shocks: Evidence from Chinese Import Competition

Feigenbaum, James J., Hall, Andrew B.·2015·The Journal of Politics
DOI 10.1086/682151
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Abstract

We explore the effects of localized economic shocks from trade on roll-call behavior and electoral outcomes in the US House, 1990–2010. We demonstrate that economic shocks from Chinese import competition—first studied by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson—cause legislators to vote in a more protectionist direction on trade bills but cause no change in their voting on all other bills. At the same time, these shocks have no effect on the reelection rates of incumbents, the probability an incumbent faces a primary challenge, or the partisan control of the district. Though changes in economic conditions are likely to cause electoral turnover in many cases, incumbents exposed to negative economic shocks from trade appear able to fend off these effects in equilibrium by taking strategic positions on foreign-trade bills. In line with this view, we find that the effect on roll-call voting is strongest in districts where incumbents are most threatened electorally. Taken together, these results paint a picture of responsive incumbents who tailor their roll-call positions on trade bills to the economic conditions in their districts.

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Crossref · 10.1086/682151

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  • Support for protectionism is pervasive in trade-exposed districts, irrespective of party.

    “One resolution is found in the Feigenbaum and Hall (2015) result that support for protectionism is pervasive in trade-exposed districts, irrespective of party.”

    From Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure (2020) · cites this paper as Feigenbaum and Hall 2015

  • Import competition raises support for protectionist trade bills by an equal extent in safe Democratic and safe Republican districts, and about twice as much in competitive districts.

    “They estimate that import competition raises support for protectionist trade bills by an equal extent in safe Democratic and safe Republican districts, and about twice as much in competitive districts.”

    From Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure (2020) · cites this paper as Feigenbaum and Hall 2015

  • Both the Gennaioli-Tabellini and Grossman-Helpman frameworks predict that trade shocks increase support for protectionism, an implication strongly confirmed by Feigenbaum and Hall (2015).

    “Although we cannot definitively separate resource-based versus identity-based explanations for the political outcomes we observe, both the Gennaioli-Tabellini and Grossman-Helpman frameworks make a prediction that is not directly addressed by resource-based approaches, which is that trade shocks increase support for protectionism, an implication strongly confirmed by Feigenbaum and Hall (2015).”

    From Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure (2020) · cites this paper as Feigenbaum and Hall 2015

  • The contribution of trade shocks to GOP electoral odds did not manifest during the 2002 to 2008 period.

    “we find that the contribution of trade shocks to GOP electoral odds did not manifest during the 2002 to 2008 period.”

    From Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure (2020) · cites this paper as Feigenbaum and Hall (2015)

  • Elected legislators did not systematically adjust their voting behavior in Congress apart from greater support for protectionist bills.

    “the authors observe that elected legislators did not systematically adjust their voting behavior in Congress apart from greater support for protectionist bills.”

    From Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure (2020) · cites this paper as Feigenbaum and Hall 2015

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Authors
Feigenbaum, J. J., & Hall, A. B.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • Stanford University (US)
ORCID
Venue
The Journal of Politics
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Published
2015-10
Volume
77
Issue
4
Pages
1012-1030
ISSN
  • 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-2508
DOI
10.1086/682151
OpenAlex
W2298353726
Cited by
178
References
44
Citations by year
2026: 12 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 20 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 2 · 2013: 1
FWCI
69.35
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Journal of Politics (publishedVersion)
  • OpenBU (Boston University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Global trade and economics
Keywords
roll-call voting, Chinese import competition, protectionism, United States House of Representatives, incumbent firms, re-election, primary elections, partisan control, trade bills, legislator responsiveness, electoral turnover

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