Designing Online Marketplaces: Trust and Reputation Mechanisms
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Online marketplaces have proliferated over the past decade, creating new markets where none existed. By reducing transaction costs, online marketplaces facilitate transactions that otherwise would not have occurred and enable easier entry of small sellers. One central challenge faced by designers of online marketplaces is how to build enough trust to facilitate transactions between strangers. This paper provides an economist’s tool kit for designing online marketplaces, focusing on trust and reputation mechanisms.
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“Moreover, even after establishing a transaction, the review systems can produce biases in reviews, such as participants trying to game the system by pressuring their counterparts into inflated ratings (Dellarocas, 2010; Luca, 2017) and the extent to which ratings influence search results (EU Commission, 2017).”
From The Consequences of Participating in the Sharing Economy: A Transparency-Based Sharing Framework (2021) · cites this paper as Luca, 2017
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Cited works that were retracted
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In the paper
“10.1073/pnas.1209746109”
Cited work 10.1073/pnas.1209746109 · retracted 2021-09-13 · notice 10.1073/pnas.2115397118 · this paper published 2017-01
Citations
Cites
1 retracted
Shu, L. L., Mazar, N., Gino, F., Ariely, D., & Bazerman, M. H. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1209746109 · Cited by 336
RetractedBertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828042002561 · Cited by 4,504
(2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.7.i · Cited by 2,733
Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians
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Self-Selection and Information Role of Online Product Reviews
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Promotional Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review Manipulation
Mayzlin, D., Dover, Y., & Chevalier, J. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.8.2421 · Cited by 937
Einav, L., Farronato, C., & Levin, J. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015334 · Cited by 553
What's in a Picture?: Evidence of Discrimination from Prosper.com
Pope, D. G., & Sydnor, J. R. (2011) · Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.1353/jhr.2011.0025 · Cited by 490
Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information
Bolton, G., Greiner, B., & Ockenfels, A. (2013) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1609 · Cited by 429
Research works printed but not linked: 10
- Akoglu L., R., The 7th International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media.
- Ayres Ian, 1995, American Economic Review, 85, 304
- Ayres Ian, 2005, Yale Law Journal, 114, 1613
- Dai Weijia, Working Paper no. 18567, NBER
- Edelman Benjamin, 2016, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics (forthcoming).
- Fradkin Andrey, Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC ’15)
- Hall Jonathan, IRS Working Paper no. 587, Industrial Relations Section
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- Masterov Dimitriy, Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. doi: 10
Cited by
Items 101–107 of 107
Platform Information Provision : Evidence from an Online Auction PlatformPreprint
Pape, L.-D., & Darlas, P.-F. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4917801
Biases in online reputation systems: a survey of the empirical literature
Sterner, M. (2026) · Electronic Commerce Research · doi:10.1007/s10660-026-10176-7 · Cited by 1
Is Transparency Enough? The Effect of Historical Pay Information on NegotiationsPreprint
Long, X., Dai, H., & Zhang, D. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3805864
Safety Reviews on Airbnb: An Information TalePreprint
Culotta, A., Jin, G. Z., Sun, Y., & Wagman, L. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4620568 · Cited by 3
Safety Reviews on Airbnb: An Information TalePreprint
Culotta, A., Jin, G. Z., Sun, Y., & Wagman, L. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4631020 · Cited by 1
“This explains why nearly all digital platforms gather consumer feedback in a standardized format, make it available globally, and aggregate it in a way that is salient and easy to digest and search if they so choose (see reviews by Einav et al. 2016, Tadelis 2016, and Luca 2017).”
Digital Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence, Policy, and Feature Analysis
Tushev, M. (2022) · Louisiana State University · doi:10.31390/gradschool_dissertations.5760
Metadata
- Authors
- Luca, M.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Luca, Michael
- ORCID
- Luca, Michael
- Venue
- Innovation Policy and the Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2017-01
- Volume
- 17
- Pages
- 77-93
- ISSN
- 1531-3468 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-2618
- OpenAlex
- W2345905356
- Cited by
- 105
- References
- 18
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 2
- FWCI
- 20.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Innovation Policy and the Economy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Access Control and Trust
- Keywords
- online marketplaces, trust, reputation mechanism, transaction costs, platform design, e-commerce, online auctions, buyer-seller relationships
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