Deepfakes Unmasked: The Effects of Information Priming and Bullshit Receptivity on Deepfake Recognition and Sharing Intention
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The study aims to test whether simple priming of deepfake (DF) information significantly increases users' ability to recognize DF media. Although undoubtedly fascinating from a technological point of view, these highly realistic artificial intelligent (AI)-generated fake videos hold high deceptive potential. Both practitioners and institutions are thus joining forces to develop debunking strategies to counter the spread of such difficult-to-recognize and potentially misleading video content. On this premise, this study addresses the following research questions: does simple priming with the definition of DFs and information about their potentially harmful applications increase users' ability to recognize DFs? Does bullshit receptivity, as an individual tendency to be overly accepting of epistemically suspect beliefs, moderate the relationship between such priming and DF recognition? Results indicate that the development of strategies to counter the deceitfulness of DFs from an educational and cultural perspective might work well, but only for people with a lower susceptibility to believe willfully misleading claims. Finally, through a serial mediation analysis, we show that DF recognition does, in turn, negatively impact users' sharing intention, thus limiting the potential harm of DFs at the very root of one of their strengths: virality. We discuss the implications of our finding that society's defense against DFs could benefit from a simple reasoned digital literacy intervention.
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Citations
Cites
The Persuasion Knowledge Model: How People Cope with Persuasion Attempts
Friestad, M., & Wright, P. (1994) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/209380 · Cited by 3,811 · cited 3×
“Finally, as recognition of disinformation is fundamental for users to activate the coping strategies that allow them to react to DFs, we confirm that information priming elicited higher DF recognition, and this recognition triggered resistance to persuasion in line with the PKM.”
Frankfurt, H. G. (2005) · doi:10.1515/9781400826537 · Cited by 1,175
The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review
Westerlund, M. (2019) · Technology Innovation Management Review · doi:10.22215/timreview/1282 · Cited by 1,138
An overview of online fake news: Characterization, detection, and discussion
Zhang, X., & Ghorbani, A. A. (2020) · Information Processing & Management · doi:10.1016/j.ipm.2019.03.004 · Cited by 997
Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2020) · Journal of Personality · doi:10.1111/jopy.12476 · Cited by 879
The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation
Brundage, M., Avin, S., Clark, J., Toner, H., Eckersley, P., Garfinkel, B., Dafoe, A., Scharre, P., Zeitzoff, T., Filar, B., et al. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1802.07228 · Cited by 849
The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation
Brundage, M., Avin, S., Clark, J., Toner, H., Eckersley, P., Garfinkel, B., Dafoe, A., Scharre, P., Zeitzoff, T., Filar, B., et al. (2018) · Apollo - University of Cambridge Repository · doi:10.17863/cam.22520 · Cited by 849
Jones-Jang, S. M., Mortensen, T., & Liu, J. (2021) · American Behavioral Scientist · doi:10.1177/0002764219869406 · Cited by 685 · cited 5×
“6 The recent uproar over this noxious spread of information is, for many, being framed as an information literacy problem rather than only a technological problem, 7,8 and an urgent call has been raised to equip citizens with the required knowledge and ability to discern facts from fake stories.”
InfluentialOn the reception and detection of pseudo-profound bullshit
Pennycook, G., Allan Cheyne, J., Barr, N., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2015) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500006999 · Cited by 536
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The Web of False Information: Rumors, Fake News, Hoaxes, Clickbait, and Various Other Shenanigans
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Cited by
Fooled twice: People cannot detect deepfakes but think they can
Köbis, N. C., Doležalová, B., & Soraperra, I. (2021) · iScience · doi:10.1016/j.isci.2021.103364 · Cited by 193
Impact of Deepfake Technology on Social Media: Detection, Misinformation and Societal Implications
AL-KHAZRAJI, S. H., SALEH, H. H., KHALID, A. I., & MISHKHAL, I. A. (2023) · The Eurasia Proceedings of Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics · doi:10.55549/epstem.1371792 · Cited by 98
“User reporting can be subjective, leading to potential false positives or false negatives (Iacobucci et al., 2021).”
Lazarus, S., Whittaker, J. M., McGuire, M. R., & Platt, L. (2023) · Journal of Economic Criminology · doi:10.1016/j.jeconc.2023.100013 · Cited by 97
They Would Never Say Anything Like This! Reasons To Doubt Political Deepfakes
Hameleers, M., van der Meer, T. G. L. A., & Dobber, T. (2024) · European Journal of Communication · doi:10.1177/02673231231184703 · Cited by 47
“…political judgements and news credibility (e.g., Schaewitz et al., 2020), we know markedly little about the impact of deepfakes (but see e.g., Barari et al., 2021; Dobber et al., 2020; Hameleers and van der Meer, 2020; Iacobucci et al., 2021; Lee and Shin, 2022; Vaccari and Chadwick, 2020).”
BackgroundFooled twice – people cannot detect deepfakes but think they can
Köbis, N., Doležalová, B., & Soraperra, I. (2021) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3832978 · Cited by 194
Metadata
- Authors
- Iacobucci, S., De Cicco, R., Michetti, F., Palumbo, R., & Pagliaro, S.
- Venue
- Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2021-03-01
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 194-202
- ISSN
- 2152-2715 (ISSN-L)
- 2152-2723
- OpenAlex
- W3134952764
- Cited by
- 60
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 10.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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