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Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will
Abstract
PERSONS AND CAUSES investigates the nature of freedom of action, or ‘metaphysical’ freedom, which is generally supposed to be a necessary condition on moral responsibility. The author develops a version of the Consequence Argument for the incompatibility of freedom with causal determinism. The bulk of the work is then devoted to giving a philosophical analysis of what must be true for human agents to act freely. He defends the coherence of the notion of agent causation, a metaphysically primitive form of causality uniquely exercised by persons, alternately drawing upon and criticizing earlier versions of the agent‐causationist account (particularly, Reid, Taylor, and Chisholm). He then provides an original account of the way reasons can explain agent‐causal activity—an account that gives a prominent place to intentions‐in‐action whose contents refer to the reason that explains the action. Finally, the author considers the objection that his account conflicts with the requirements of metaphysical Naturalism. He argues that insofar as this thesis can be made clear and is well motivated, it is consistent with the present account, given the possibility that metaphysically primitive causal capacities might emerge from fundamental physical capacities organized within certain complex systems.
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Citations
Cites
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Frankfurt, H. G. (1971) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024717 · Cited by 4,663
Dretske, F. I. (1977) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/288741 · Cited by 973
Cited by
Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility
Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2005) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080500264180 · Cited by 526
Self-regulated learning, social cognitive theory, and agency
Martin, J. (2004) · Educational Psychologist · doi:10.1207/s15326985ep3902_4 · Cited by 345
NAHMIAS, E., MORRIS, S. G., NADELHOFFER, T., & TURNER, J. (2006) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.x · Cited by 328
Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility
Roskies, A. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.07.011 · Cited by 284
The free will inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility
Nadelhoffer, T., Shepard, J., Nahmias, E., Sripada, C., & Ross, L. T. (2014) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.01.006 · Cited by 219
Metadata
- Authors
- O'Connor, T.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2002-11-28
- OpenAlex
- W1487091670
- Cited by
- 229
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 0.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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