The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 47 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives
Open accessAbstract
The incredible achievements of modern scientific theories lead most of us to embrace scientific realism: the view that our best theories offer us at least roughly accurate descriptions of otherwise inaccessible parts of the world like genes, atoms, and the big bang. This book argues that careful attention to the history of scientific investigation invites a challenge to this view that is not well represented in contemporary debates about the nature of the scientific enterprise. The historical record of scientific inquiry, the book suggests, is characterized by the problem of unconceived alternatives. Past scientists have routinely failed even to conceive of alternatives to their own theories and lines of theoretical investigation, alternatives that were both well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately accepted by later scientific communities. The book supports this claim with a detailed investigation of the mid-to-late 19th-century theories of inheritance and generation proposed in turn by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. It goes on to argue that this historical pattern strongly suggests that there are equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best theories that remain currently unconceived. Moreover, this challenge is more serious than those rooted in either the so-called pessimistic induction or the underdetermination of theories by evidence, in part because existing realist responses to these latter challenges offer no relief from the problem of unconceived alternatives itself.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition
Kuhn, T. S., & Hacking, I. (2012) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226458144.001.0001 · Cited by 21,170
A treatise on electricity and magnetism
(1954) · Journal of the Franklin Institute · doi:10.1016/0016-0032(54)90053-8 · Cited by 9,077
Fraassen, B. C. V. (1980) · doi:10.1093/0198244274.001.0001 · Cited by 4,682
Nagel, E., & Hawkins, D. (1961) · American Journal of Physics · doi:10.1119/1.1937571 · Cited by 3,667
ALEXANDER, P. (1963) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1963.tb00798.x · Cited by 2,854
The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory
Duhem, P. M. M. (1954) · doi:10.1515/9780691233857 · Cited by 2,128
Hereditary genius: An inquiry into its laws and consequences.
Galton, F. (1869) · Macmillan eBooks · doi:10.1037/13474-000 · Cited by 1,940
(1978) · Journal of Human Evolution · doi:10.1016/s0047-2484(78)80055-4 · Cited by 1,835
Fraassen, B. C. V. (1989) · doi:10.1093/0198248601.001.0001 · Cited by 1,821
Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth
Psillos, S. (1999) · CERN Document Server (European Organization for Nuclear Research) · Cited by 1,704
Cited by
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
De Cruz, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108557849 · Cited by 24
Birch, J. (2024) · The Edge of Sentience · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0003 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Stanford, P. K.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2006-05-01
- OpenAlex
- W2499378688
- Cited by
- 547
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 18.22
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/0195174089.001.0001
- The paper
- Stanford, P. K. (2006). Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195174089.001.0001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.