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Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment: When Do Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies?

Kitschelt, Herbert · 2001 · The New Politics of the Welfare State

Abstract

This is the third of three chapters on the implications of electoral politics and the design of political institutions for welfare state adjustment. Kitschelt's main proposition is that the strategic configuration of party systems, net of public opinion on social policy reforms, is a critical force that shapes social policy reform programmes and their implementation. He lays out mechanisms that may induce politicians to pursue often unpopular reforms based on internal opportunities offered by the dynamic of competitive party democracy that have received only scant attention in the comparative political economy and social policy literature. The central guiding proposition of the chapter requires two important qualifications: first, that the dynamic of party competition is only one of several mechanisms that affect social policy retrenchment; and second, that a comparative study of social policy change in the 1980s and 1990s would ideally rely on equivalent measures across a wide range of countries, but cross‐nationally comparable measures are not available. These data limitations currently make it impossible to determine the explanatory power of internal political conditions relative to external demographic and economic changes in accounts of social policy retrenchment, so Kitschelt uses case studies from Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, and Japan to illustrate how mechanisms of party competition impinge on social policy change, and beyond that, attempts to generalize his argument based on a reading of much looser expert judgements about social policy retrenchment in a broader set of countries.

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Crossref · 10.1093/0198297564.003.0010

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Metadata

Authors
Kitschelt, H.
Venue
The New Politics of the Welfare State
Published
2001-04-05
Pages
265-302
OpenAlex
W2486783523
Cited by
203
References
20
FWCI
50.82
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment: When Do Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/0198297564.003.0010
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Kitschelt, H. (2001). Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment: When Do Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies? The New Politics of the Welfare State. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198297564.003.0010

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