The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment: When Do Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies?
Abstract
This is the third of three chapters on the implications of electoral politics and the design of political institutions for welfare state adjustment. Kitschelt's main proposition is that the strategic configuration of party systems, net of public opinion on social policy reforms, is a critical force that shapes social policy reform programmes and their implementation. He lays out mechanisms that may induce politicians to pursue often unpopular reforms based on internal opportunities offered by the dynamic of competitive party democracy that have received only scant attention in the comparative political economy and social policy literature. The central guiding proposition of the chapter requires two important qualifications: first, that the dynamic of party competition is only one of several mechanisms that affect social policy retrenchment; and second, that a comparative study of social policy change in the 1980s and 1990s would ideally rely on equivalent measures across a wide range of countries, but cross‐nationally comparable measures are not available. These data limitations currently make it impossible to determine the explanatory power of internal political conditions relative to external demographic and economic changes in accounts of social policy retrenchment, so Kitschelt uses case studies from Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, and Japan to illustrate how mechanisms of party competition impinge on social policy change, and beyond that, attempts to generalize his argument based on a reading of much looser expert judgements about social policy retrenchment in a broader set of countries.
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Citations
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Cited by
Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial Societies
Allan, J. P., & Scruggs, L. (2004) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00083.x · Cited by 791
Welfare-state decommodification in 18 OECD countries: a replication and revision
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The Politics of Welfare State Retrenchment: A Literature Review
Starke, P. (2006) · Social Policy & Administration · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9515.2006.00479.x · Cited by 433
Review Article: Rethinking Party Politics and the Welfare State – Recent Advances in the Literature
Häusermann, S., Picot, G., & Geering, D. (2013) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123412000336 · Cited by 306
Paths and Forks or Chutes and Ladders?: Negative Feedbacks and Policy Regime Change
WEAVER, K. (2010) · Journal of Public Policy · doi:10.1017/s0143814x10000061 · Cited by 300
Metadata
- Authors
- Kitschelt, H.
- Venue
- The New Politics of the Welfare State
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2001-04-05
- Pages
- 265-302
- OpenAlex
- W2486783523
- Cited by
- 203
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 50.82
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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