Cited by 679Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryFeminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology

Abstract

Some of the most interesting work in late-20th-century epistemology reintroduced, from ancient and medieval philosophy, the idea of an intellectual virtue and the related idea of proper epistemic function. But most of that work employed such concepts, with questionable success, in the interest of defining justification, warrant, or knowledge; and little or none of it offered detailed analyses of intellectual virtues. This book proposes and illustrates a different purpose for epistemology, one that we see in early modern thinkers, especially John Locke — namely that of guiding, refining, and informing the epistemic practices of the intellectual segment of the population. One important aspect of the project of such a ‘regulative epistemology’ is the intellectual character of the epistemic agent. For this purpose, fairly detailed sketches of particular intellectual virtues and of virtues' relations to epistemic goods, epistemic faculties, and epistemic practices, gain special importance. An underlying thesis is that a strict dichotomy between the intellectual virtues and the moral virtues is a mistake.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283675.001.0001

Cites

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Virtue responsibilism considers the development of the subjects' cognitive character as an intrinsic good for the contribution it plays to human flourishing, which is valuable for its own sake.

    “As presented in Sect.1.1, virtue responsibilism considers the development of the subjects' cognitive character as an intrinsic good for the contribution it plays to human flourishing, which is valuable for its own sake (Baehr, 2016;Pritchard, 2014;Roberts & Wood, 2007).”

Citations

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Metadata

Authors
Roberts, R. C., & Wood, W. J.
Affiliations
  • Baylor University (US)
  • Wheaton College - Illinois (US)
Published
2007-01-11
OpenAlex
W4245126229
Cited by
679
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 64 · 2025: 108 · 2024: 44 · 2023: 38 · 2022: 45 · 2021: 31 · 2020: 45 · 2019: 94 · 2018: 32 · 2017: 28 · 2016: 29 · 2015: 27 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 19 · 2012: 6
FWCI
26.22
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Digital Access to Libraries (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), l'Université de Namur (UNamur) and the Université Saint-Louis (USL-B)) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
Keywords
intellectual virtues, epistemic practices, epistemic goods, moral virtues, John Locke, early modern epistemology, ancient and medieval philosophy, justification, warrants, knowledge

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review