Cited by 231Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsEmbodied and Extended Cognition

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 10 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

The Combination Problem for Panpsychism

Chalmers, David J.·2016·Panpsychism

Abstract

This chapter explores the conceptual landscape of the most important, current critique of panpsychism—the combination problem. He sets out from the ‘locus classicus’: William James’s presentation of the combination problem in his 1890 The Principles of Psychology. He discerns three ways of formulating the problem, which evolve around three distinct characteristics of phenomenal states: the subject combination problem, the quality combination problem, and the structural combination problem. Chalmers then turns to seven subversions of these three versions. The first four are connected to the subject combination problem. Subversion five and six are connected to the quality combination problem. And the final explication is connected to the structural combination problem. The chapter closes by presenting various solutions and answers to these explications of the combination problem.

Overview

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Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Chalmers systematically analyzes the combination problem for panpsychism: how microexperiences could constitute macroexperience. He distinguishes subject, quality, and structure versions, turns them into several arguments against constitutive Russellian panpsychism, and surveys noncombinatorial and combinatorial responses, concluding that prospects are difficult and no solution yet commands support.

Key findings

  • The combination problem breaks into at least three subproblems: the subject combination problem (how microsubjects yield macrosubjects), the quality combination problem (how microqualities yield macroqualities), and the structure combination problem (how microphenomenal/microphysical structure yields macrophenomenal structure); related problems include the unity, boundary, awareness, grain, palette, and structural mismatch problems.
  • Chalmers formalizes several arguments against constitutive panpsychism, including the anti-aggregation, subject-summing, conceivability, knowledge, palette, revelation, and structural mismatch arguments; he calls the structural mismatch argument “one of the more powerful arguments against constitutive Russellian versions of panpsychism and panprotopsychism.”
  • Responses divide into noncombinatorial views (emergent panpsychism, autonomous panpsychism, identity panpsychism) and combinatorial views (deflating the subject, combinatorial infusion, phenomenal bonding, deflating awareness, panqualityism); emergent panpsychism avoids the combination problem but inherits mental-causation problems akin to substance dualism, while combinatorial infusion is best understood as identity or emergent panpsychism rather than combinatorial panpsychism.
  • In the conclusion, Chalmers says the most promising avenues are phenomenal bonding or quantum holism for subjects, small qualitative palettes for qualities, principles of informational composition for structure, and a deflationary account of awareness; he compares the Russellian monist’s constraints to “trying to juggle seven balls in the air with both hands tied behind one’s back.”

Methods

  • This is a work of philosophical analysis, not an empirical study; it offers a systematic treatment of the combination problem, distinguishing its aspects and versions.
  • The paper formalizes arguments against pan(proto)psychism, especially constitutive Russellian pan(proto)psychism, and evaluates possible replies.
  • It lays out a taxonomy of responses—noncombinatorial and combinatorial—and examines their advantages and disadvantages, drawing on historical and contemporary sources such as William James, Seager, Goff, Coleman, Rosenberg, and Tononi.

Limitations

  • The author states he cannot say he has either solved the combination problem or proved it unsolvable in the article as it stands.
  • He states that some arguments, especially the knowledge argument, are “highly inconclusive” largely because “we know so little about what microphenomenal or protophenomenal properties are like.”
  • He notes that no proposed solution has yet gained much support and that it is not clear whether the promising ideas can work together to solve all combination problems at once; evident from the text, the discussion relies on conceptual argument and intuition rather than empirical data.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.003.0008

Cites

40 of 40 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

104 Own interpretation · 11 No basis given · 4 Sources not found · 1 No full text of the sources · 1 Not checked yet · 1 Own result

Show all 50 claims

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 57
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 25
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 2
72 of 72
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    There is a vast array of macroqualities, including many different phenomenal colors, shapes, sounds, smells, and tastes.

    “There is a vast array of macroqualities, including many di erent phenomenal colors, shapes, sounds, smells, and tastes.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Macrophysical structure is entirely different from the macrophenomenal structure we experience.

    “Macrophysical structure (in the brain, say) seems entirely di erent from the macrophenomenal structure we experience.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Our macroexperience has a rich structure, involving complex spatial structure, many modalities, and so on.

    “Our macroexperience has a rich structure, involving the complex spatial structure of visual and auditory fields, a division into many di erent modalities, and so on.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Microexperience involves microqualities, which might be primitive analogs of macroqualities.

    “It is natural to suppose that microexperience involves microqualities, which might be primitive analogs of macroqualities.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Microexperiences have subjects.

    “Although microexperiences presumably have subjects, protoexperiences need not.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Microphysics is causally closed.

    “Given that microphysics is causally closed, it is hard to see how macroexperience can be have any causal e ects on it.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Substance dualism faces problems of mental causation.

    “Like substance dualism, emergent panpsychism seems to face an unattractive choice between epiphenomenalism, interactionism, and underdetermination.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    There is a contemporary worldview on which everything depends at least weakly on what is going on in physics.

    “As a result, it is not easy to square the view with a contemporary worldview on which everything depends at least weakly on what is going on in physics, but the view is worthy of some attention.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Subjects that are metaphysically primitive entities cannot be constituted by more basic entities.

    “If subjects were metaphysically primitive entities, they could not be constituted by more basic entities, and combinatorial views would be ruled out.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Phenomenal properties need bearers, which might be subjects.

    “And however they are defined, as properties they presumably need bearers, which might then be taken to be subjects.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Microphysics postulates fundamental monadic properties such as mass and charge, and fundamental relations such as spatiotemporal relations.

    “Microphysics postulates fundamental monadic properties such as mass and charge, but it also postulates fundamental relations such as spatiotemporal relations.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Physics characterizes the mathematical structure of fundamental relations but not their categorical nature.

    “Just as with mass and charge, physics seems to characterize the mathematical structure of these relations but not their categorical nature.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Co-consciousness seems to be transitive.

    “One question for this view and for other phenomenal bonding views is whether the bonding relation is transitive (as co-consciousness seems to be), so that when one microphenomenal state stands in this relation to two other phenomenal states of two other subjects, all three will be jointly experienced by a single subject.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The limited palate of microqualities experienced by microsubjects will also be experienced by macrosubjects.

    “presumably the limited palate of microqualities experienced by microsubjects will also be experienced by macrosubjects, and it is not clear how a rich tapestry of macroqualities will emerge.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    All conscious experience consists in a subject's awareness of qualities.

    “it is arguable that all conscious experience consists in a subject's awareness of qualities.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    There are only a few fundamental microphysical properties and one quiddity for each of these.

    “Given that there are only a few fundamental microphysical properties and one quiddity for each of these”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Physics appears simple, with a small number of fundamental properties and laws.

    “the apparent simplicity of physics (with a small number of fundamental properties and laws)”
17 of 17

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

2 of 2

Citations

Cites

Show all 39 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Go , P. 2006. Experiences don't sum. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):53-61.
  2. Rosenberg, G.H. 1998. The boundary problem for phenomenal individuals. In (Stuart R. Hamero , Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott, eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates .
  3. Rosenberg, G.H. 2014. Causality and the combination problem. In (T. Alter and Y. Nagasawa, eds.) Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism . Oxford University Press.

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Metadata

Authors
Chalmers, D. J.
Corresponding author
Chalmers, David J.
Venue
Panpsychism
Published
2016-12-29
Pages
179-214
OpenAlex
W2535351563
Cited by
231
References
39
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 33 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 5
FWCI
88.17
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
panpsychism, combination problem, William James, Principles of Psychology, phenomenal states, phenomenal consciousness, qualia, David Chalmers

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