The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 10 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.
The Combination Problem for Panpsychism
Abstract
This chapter explores the conceptual landscape of the most important, current critique of panpsychism—the combination problem. He sets out from the ‘locus classicus’: William James’s presentation of the combination problem in his 1890 The Principles of Psychology. He discerns three ways of formulating the problem, which evolve around three distinct characteristics of phenomenal states: the subject combination problem, the quality combination problem, and the structural combination problem. Chalmers then turns to seven subversions of these three versions. The first four are connected to the subject combination problem. Subversion five and six are connected to the quality combination problem. And the final explication is connected to the structural combination problem. The chapter closes by presenting various solutions and answers to these explications of the combination problem.
Overview
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
Chalmers systematically analyzes the combination problem for panpsychism: how microexperiences could constitute macroexperience. He distinguishes subject, quality, and structure versions, turns them into several arguments against constitutive Russellian panpsychism, and surveys noncombinatorial and combinatorial responses, concluding that prospects are difficult and no solution yet commands support.
Key findings
- The combination problem breaks into at least three subproblems: the subject combination problem (how microsubjects yield macrosubjects), the quality combination problem (how microqualities yield macroqualities), and the structure combination problem (how microphenomenal/microphysical structure yields macrophenomenal structure); related problems include the unity, boundary, awareness, grain, palette, and structural mismatch problems.
- Chalmers formalizes several arguments against constitutive panpsychism, including the anti-aggregation, subject-summing, conceivability, knowledge, palette, revelation, and structural mismatch arguments; he calls the structural mismatch argument “one of the more powerful arguments against constitutive Russellian versions of panpsychism and panprotopsychism.”
- Responses divide into noncombinatorial views (emergent panpsychism, autonomous panpsychism, identity panpsychism) and combinatorial views (deflating the subject, combinatorial infusion, phenomenal bonding, deflating awareness, panqualityism); emergent panpsychism avoids the combination problem but inherits mental-causation problems akin to substance dualism, while combinatorial infusion is best understood as identity or emergent panpsychism rather than combinatorial panpsychism.
- In the conclusion, Chalmers says the most promising avenues are phenomenal bonding or quantum holism for subjects, small qualitative palettes for qualities, principles of informational composition for structure, and a deflationary account of awareness; he compares the Russellian monist’s constraints to “trying to juggle seven balls in the air with both hands tied behind one’s back.”
Methods
- This is a work of philosophical analysis, not an empirical study; it offers a systematic treatment of the combination problem, distinguishing its aspects and versions.
- The paper formalizes arguments against pan(proto)psychism, especially constitutive Russellian pan(proto)psychism, and evaluates possible replies.
- It lays out a taxonomy of responses—noncombinatorial and combinatorial—and examines their advantages and disadvantages, drawing on historical and contemporary sources such as William James, Seager, Goff, Coleman, Rosenberg, and Tononi.
Limitations
- The author states he cannot say he has either solved the combination problem or proved it unsolvable in the article as it stands.
- He states that some arguments, especially the knowledge argument, are “highly inconclusive” largely because “we know so little about what microphenomenal or protophenomenal properties are like.”
- He notes that no proposed solution has yet gained much support and that it is not clear whether the promising ideas can work together to solve all combination problems at once; evident from the text, the discussion relies on conceptual argument and intuition rather than empirical data.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
104 Own interpretation · 11 No basis given · 4 Sources not found · 1 No full text of the sources · 1 Not checked yet · 1 Own result
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Many of these theorists do not deal directly with the problem of mental causation.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“Rosenberg is an exception: he deals with mental causation by allowing high-level individuals to exert a small amount of downward causation through interaction with the underlying entities.”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Gregg Rosenberg (2004) source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim could be matched to a paper in Crossref, so there is nothing to check it against.
In the paper
“It is fair to say that no proposed solution has yet gained much support, however.”
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Sam Coleman (2012, 2013, this volume)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites Go (2009b, 2011, this volume)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites Gregg Rosenberg (2004, 2014)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Like substance dualism, emergent panpsychism seems to face an unattractive choice between epiphenomenalism, interactionism, and underdetermination.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption: Substance dualism faces problems of mental causation.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“As a result, it is not easy to square the view with a contemporary worldview on which everything depends at least weakly on what is going on in physics, but the view is worthy of some attention.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption: There is a contemporary worldview on which everything depends at least weakly on what is going on in physics.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Many solutions to the combination problem that have been put forward turn out on close examination to be forms of emergent panpsychism.”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Gregg Rosenberg (2004) source
- Not matchedcites Liane Gabora (2002)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites Giulio Tononi's integrated information theory (2008)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“As with emergent panpsychism and substance dualism, these views avoid the combination and decomposition problems (at least in their hardest forms), but they face the problem of mental causation.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption: Microphysics is causally closed.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“As with emergent panpsychism and substance dualism, these views avoid the combination and decomposition problems (at least in their hardest forms), but they face the problem of mental causation.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“These views have to deal with a reverse version of the combination problem, which we might call the decomposition problem.”
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“I think that once it becomes clear that these solutions are subject to the same worries about mental causation as substance dualism, they lose some of their initial attractions.”
plainconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption: Substance dualism faces problems of mental causation.
- Probably not a substantial claim. 57
- It may state two separate claims as one. 25
- The quote only partly states this claim. 2
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It seems introspectively obvious that we are aware of qualities”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Still, nihilist theses of this sort are so widely rejected that they do not have much dialectical force in an argument against panpsychism.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“If so, then no group of microsubjects necessitates the existence of a macrosubject.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Although the structural mismatch argument has received relatively little attention to date, I think it is one of the more powerful arguments against constitutive Russellian versions of panpsychism and panprotopsychism.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Rests on an assumption: Macrophysical structure is entirely different from the macrophenomenal structure we experience.
- Rests on an assumption: Our macroexperience has a rich structure, involving complex spatial structure, many modalities, and so on.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The combination problem can be broken down into at least three subproblems, reflecting three di erent aspects of phenomenal states: their subjective character (they are always had by a subject), their qualitative character (they involve distinctive qualities), and their structural character (they have a certain complex structure).”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It should be stressed that a satisfactory solution to the combination problem must address all of these problems.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“There is presumably only a limited palette of microqualities. Especially if Russellian panpsychism is true, we can expect only a handful of microqualities, corresponding to the handful of fundamental microphysical properties.”
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Microexperience involves microqualities, which might be primitive analogs of macroqualities.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Obvious worries for this view are that it seems to entail that there is only one conscious subject, and that each of us is identical to each other and has the same experiences.”
hedgeddirect- Asserted: fails — The authors may not put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“For a start, the quark is presumably microphysically like other quarks, so it will also be microphenomenally like those quarks, yielding a vast manifold of subjects of experience just like me throughout the brain and throughout the universe.”
hedgeddirect- Asserted: fails — The authors may not put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. The quote only partly states this claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“These problems seem just as hard as the original combination problem.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“But this is at least an argument that panpsychists need to address.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Rests on an assumption: There is a vast array of macroqualities, including many different phenomenal colors, shapes, sounds, smells, and tastes.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Nevertheless, panpsychism is subject to a major challenge: the combination problem.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“I think one can point to special features of the physical that explain the latter gap (the structural nature of physical truths, for example)”
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“I conclude that both panpsychism and panprotopsychism su er from serious combination problems.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“I think that these arguments are highly inconclusive, largely because we know so little about what microphenomenal or protophenomenal properties are like.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“There are obvious worries here about this quark's stability (what happens when it disappears?) and about its causal role (how could its properties play the rich causal role that macroexperiences seem to play?).”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“More generally, given any group of subjects and any further subject, it seems possible in principle for the first group of subjects to exist without the further subject.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Microexperiences presumably have structure closely corresponding to microphysical structure (this is especially clear on a Russellian view)”
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In any case, it is clear that the structural mismatch argument is a significant challenge that all Russellian monists must answer.”
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Furthermore, eliminativism does not really remove all aspects of the subject combination problem. Presumably even an eliminativist will still acknowledge that experiences come in bundles or streams of some sort, so that the experiences previously taken to be mine share a bundle or stream with experiences previously taken to be yours. But now the problem can be reconceived as the bundle combination”
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This view has more attractions than the earlier views, but there are also worries.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The quote only partly states this claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Still, given a Russellian view, it is not easy to see how these structures could be so di erent that they yield the vast di erences between macrophysical and macrophenomenal structure.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“If it is a synchronic relation, then presumably the low-level and high-level subjects exist at the same time, and we have lost the distinctive aspect of this view whereby the high-level subject supersedes the low-level subject.”
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“So a constitutive panpsychist or panprotopsychist may need to deny that it is a primitive relation, and explain how instances of it can be constituted.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the fact that awareness requires subjects might simply suggest that the awareness combination problem is just as hard as the subject combination problem and is subject to the same sort of worries.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“it seems clear that the structure of the visual field corresponds to information structure in the brain and not to spatial or qualitative structure.”
boostedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The overall upshot is that combinatorial infusion is best understood as a version of identity panpsychism or emergent panpsychism (with the associated problems), and not as a version of combinatorial panpsychism.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“A related idea (along the lines of Gregg Rosenberg's 'carrier hypothesis' about causation in A Place for Consciousness ) is that causation (or perhaps nomic necessitation) is a fundamental relation that has a phenomenal relation as an underlying quiddity.”
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Gregg Rosenberg's 'carrier hypothesis'
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
hedged- Asserted: fails — The authors may not put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“if we can explain how microexperiences and microphysics constitute each instance of the awareness relation between subjects and qualities, we will have solved the combination problem.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“But it is not at all clear why or how phenomenal composition could work this way while still being a sort of constitutive composition.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Then a panpsychist can say that premise (3) is true only of broadly macrophysical structure.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“If on the other hand the relation is not transitive and one has distinct subjects for di erent instances of the relation, then one will have far too many subjects and it is hard to see how we will get macrosubjects.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Perhaps the most important version of identity panpsychism is quantum holism .”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“So only a few microqualities can be causally e cacious, and the rest will be epiphenomenal.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It is not obvious that this problem is much easier than the original problem.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“as the view stands, it seems to leave all three main strands of the combination problem open. It is unclear how microqualities can constitute a macrosubject, or how they can constitute macroqualities, or how they can constitute the structure of macroexperience.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“But in general separately instantiated qualities (the redness and whiteness of distinct objects) do not yield a combined quality, and nor do separately instantiated phenomenal qualities.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Still, this sort of deflationism does not make the subject combination problem go away. We still need an account of how a derivative subject of experience can be constituted by microsubjects, or by microphenomenal / protophenomenal properties along with microphysics.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Awareness involves phenomenology, and there are good reasons to think that no mere functional state can constitute phenomenology.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Some related worries are theoretical: On some interpretations of quantum mechanics the locus of entanglement is the whole universe (leading us back to cosmopsychism), on others there is no entanglement at all, and on still others there are regular collapses that tend to destroy this sort of entanglement.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It is not at all clear whether these ideas can work together in such a way that all of the combination problems are solved at once, however.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It is not easy to see how this line can work for a constitutive Russellian panpsychist.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The Russellian panpsychist could exploit this quantum-mechanical merging for their purposes, but the resulting position is a familiar one. It is a version of the quantum holism discussed under identity panpsychism in the previous section. It has the advantages and disadvantages discussed there (notably the worries about stability of entanglement and about structural mismatch), but it is not really”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“There is also a structural mismatch worry: it is hard to see how the universe's experiences (especially given a Russellian views on which these correspond to the universe's physical properties) should have anything like the localized idiosyncratic structure of my experiences.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“On the other hand, premise (2) is true only of narrowly macrophysical structure: the structure of consciousness is not isomorphic to the spatiotemporal and other narrowly macrophysical structure of the brain, but it may well be isomorphic to other sorts of macrophysical structure there.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The challenge for this view is making the case that physics really contains infusion laws that yield infusions of the requisite character and complexity.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“But perhaps the biggest worry is once again a structural mismatch worry. The structure of the quantum state of brain-level systems is quite di erent from the structure of our experience.”
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“A su ciently rich large-palette solution might eliminate the need for quality combination altogether, thereby removing the problem of how quality combination works, or at least reducing it to the issue of how macrosubjects can inherit (awareness of) qualities from microsubjects.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Perhaps there are intermediate options, but it is not at all easy to see how phenomenal bonding will avoid the Scylla of a universal subject and the Charybdis of fragmentary subjects.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“if this approach can show how brains or organisms stand in the awareness relation to qualities, then it will show how brains or organisms can be subjects.”
plaindirect- Asserted: fails — The authors may not put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It is then not out of the question that a certain phenomenal relation could serve as the quiddity underlying spatiotemporal relations.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“If the same object simultaneously instantiated a degree of redness and a degree of whiteness (at the same location), it will instantiate pinkness.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(3) Microphysical structure constitutes only macrophysical structure.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“One might also worry about the quality combination problem. The co-consciousness relation does not seem to help much here: presumably the limited palate of microqualities experienced by microsubjects will also be experienced by macrosubjects, and it is not clear how a rich tapestry of macroqualities will emerge.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Rests on an assumption: The limited palate of microqualities experienced by microsubjects will also be experienced by macrosubjects.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In any case, if we are looking to either solve the combination problem or to prove it unsolvable, I think the structural mismatch problem is a promising place to focus.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The suggestion requires that the apparent simplicity of physics (with a small number of fundamental properties and laws) is in fact concealing a much more complex underlying level with a vast multiplicity of fundamental properties and fundamental laws, all connected in such a way to yield the appearance of simplicity.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
- Rests on an assumption: Physics appears simple, with a small number of fundamental properties and laws.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(1) If Russellian panpsychism is true, microphenomenal structure is isomorphic to microphysical structure.”
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The view does not say much about the quality combination problem: it presupposes qualities rather than explaining them.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(4) If microphenomenal structure is isomorphic to microphysical structure, then any structure constituted by microphenomenal structure (and microphysical structure) is isomorphic to a structure constituted by microphysical structure.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“So wholesale eliminativism about subjects may seem to require eliminativism about phenomenal properties, or at least a reconception of them as properties of quite di erent entities.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Phenomenal properties need bearers, which might be subjects.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Some worries are empirical: it does not seem that there is the sort of stable brain-level entanglement that would be needed for this view to work.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Premise (5) is also highly plausible: the macrophenomenal structure of my visual field is prima facie very di erent from the macrophysical structure of my brain, and it will often (for example in cases of illusion) be quite di erent from the macrophysical structure of other parts of the world.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Still, it remains unclear just why phenomenal microquiddities should give rise to broad phenomenal macroquiddities, and how these broad phenomenal macroquiddities relate to narrow phenomenal macquiddities: in particular how can these macroquiddities stand in the constitutive relation that is plausibly required to avoid causal exclusion worries?”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“On a Russellian view of physics, it is natural to hold that just as there are microquiddities associated with microphysical properties (such as mass), there are macroquiddities associated with narrowly macrophysical properties (such as macroscopic mass).”
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We might expect that on a a constitutive Russellian view, macrophenomenal properties would have this more basic structure rather than the somewhat arbitrary informational structure.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Anything that is aware of a quality is a subject”
plain- Asserted: fails — The authors may not put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“one can conceive of any such functional state in the absence of phenomenology, and in particular in the absence of awareness.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It is also far from clear how phenomenal bonding will help with the structure combination problem. Insofar as our underlying phenomenal relation is the categorical basis of spatiotemporal or causal relations, one would expect it to have the same structure as those relations, and one would expect the bonded systems to have structure isomorphic to the corresponding composite spatiotemporal or causal”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It is quite plausible that principles for combining perceived qualities will play a role in explaining principles for combining phenomenal qualities, but the matter remains open.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“If so, then given the ubiquity of spatiotemporal and causal relations, it looks as if the microphenomenal states throughout the universe may stand in this relation, yielding a single giant subject.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
- Rests on an assumption: Co-consciousness seems to be transitive.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(2) If constitutive panpsychism is true, microphenomenal (and microphysical) structure constitutes macrophenomenal structure.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Most obviously, one can suggest macrophenomenal structure is isomorphic to certain information structure in the brain.”
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
The paper relies on this without support.
There is a vast array of macroqualities, including many different phenomenal colors, shapes, sounds, smells, and tastes.
“There is a vast array of macroqualities, including many di erent phenomenal colors, shapes, sounds, smells, and tastes.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Macrophysical structure is entirely different from the macrophenomenal structure we experience.
“Macrophysical structure (in the brain, say) seems entirely di erent from the macrophenomenal structure we experience.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Our macroexperience has a rich structure, involving complex spatial structure, many modalities, and so on.
“Our macroexperience has a rich structure, involving the complex spatial structure of visual and auditory fields, a division into many di erent modalities, and so on.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Microexperience involves microqualities, which might be primitive analogs of macroqualities.
“It is natural to suppose that microexperience involves microqualities, which might be primitive analogs of macroqualities.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Microexperiences have subjects.
“Although microexperiences presumably have subjects, protoexperiences need not.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Microphysics is causally closed.
“Given that microphysics is causally closed, it is hard to see how macroexperience can be have any causal e ects on it.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Substance dualism faces problems of mental causation.
“Like substance dualism, emergent panpsychism seems to face an unattractive choice between epiphenomenalism, interactionism, and underdetermination.”
The paper relies on this without support.
There is a contemporary worldview on which everything depends at least weakly on what is going on in physics.
“As a result, it is not easy to square the view with a contemporary worldview on which everything depends at least weakly on what is going on in physics, but the view is worthy of some attention.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Subjects that are metaphysically primitive entities cannot be constituted by more basic entities.
“If subjects were metaphysically primitive entities, they could not be constituted by more basic entities, and combinatorial views would be ruled out.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Phenomenal properties need bearers, which might be subjects.
“And however they are defined, as properties they presumably need bearers, which might then be taken to be subjects.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Microphysics postulates fundamental monadic properties such as mass and charge, and fundamental relations such as spatiotemporal relations.
“Microphysics postulates fundamental monadic properties such as mass and charge, but it also postulates fundamental relations such as spatiotemporal relations.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Physics characterizes the mathematical structure of fundamental relations but not their categorical nature.
“Just as with mass and charge, physics seems to characterize the mathematical structure of these relations but not their categorical nature.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Co-consciousness seems to be transitive.
“One question for this view and for other phenomenal bonding views is whether the bonding relation is transitive (as co-consciousness seems to be), so that when one microphenomenal state stands in this relation to two other phenomenal states of two other subjects, all three will be jointly experienced by a single subject.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The limited palate of microqualities experienced by microsubjects will also be experienced by macrosubjects.
“presumably the limited palate of microqualities experienced by microsubjects will also be experienced by macrosubjects, and it is not clear how a rich tapestry of macroqualities will emerge.”
The paper relies on this without support.
All conscious experience consists in a subject's awareness of qualities.
“it is arguable that all conscious experience consists in a subject's awareness of qualities.”
The paper relies on this without support.
There are only a few fundamental microphysical properties and one quiddity for each of these.
“Given that there are only a few fundamental microphysical properties and one quiddity for each of these”
The paper relies on this without support.
Physics appears simple, with a small number of fundamental properties and laws.
“the apparent simplicity of physics (with a small number of fundamental properties and laws)”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 8 The structure combination problem
“On the other hand, premise (2) is true only of narrowly macrophysical structure: the structure of consciousness is not isomorphic to the spatiotemporal and other narrowly macrophysical structure of the brain, but it may well be isomorphic to other sorts of macrophysical structure there.”
§ 8 The structure combination problem
“(2) If constitutive panpsychism is true, microphenomenal (and microphysical) structure constitutes macrophenomenal structure.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 5 Noncombinatorial responses
“This taxonomy divides panpsychist responses to the combination problem into four classes: emergent panpsychism, autonomous panpsychism, identity panpsychism, and combinatorial panpsychism.”
§ 5 Noncombinatorial responses
“The first three are noncombinatorial responses, while the third is a combinatorial response.”
Citations
Cites
Consciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto
Tononi, G. (2008) · The Biological Bulletin · doi:10.2307/25470707 · Cited by 1,529
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind · doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5 · Cited by 574
Self-citationRealistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism
Strawson, G. (2008) · Real Materialism · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0003 · Cited by 558
James, W. (1904) · The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods · doi:10.2307/2011942 · Cited by 519
Russell, B., & Slater, J. G. (2022) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003308898 · Cited by 457
Russell, B., Slater, J. G., & Frohmann, B. (1922) · The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease · doi:10.1097/00005053-192205000-00054 · Cited by 452
Feigl, H. (2010) · University of Minnesota Press eBooks · doi:10.5749/9780816662340 · Cited by 363
Hall, G. S., & James, W. (1990) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1423324 · Cited by 345
Two Conceptions of the Physical
Stoljar, D. (2001) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00056.x · Cited by 326
Chalmers, D. J. (2012) · Cited by 320
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Go , P. 2006. Experiences don't sum. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):53-61.
- Rosenberg, G.H. 1998. The boundary problem for phenomenal individuals. In (Stuart R. Hamero , Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott, eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates .
- Rosenberg, G.H. 2014. Causality and the combination problem. In (T. Alter and Y. Nagasawa, eds.) Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism . Oxford University Press.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Consciousness: here, there and everywhere?
Tononi, G., & Koch, C. (2015) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2014.0167 · Cited by 811
Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness
Doerig, A., Schurger, A., & Herzog, M. H. (2021) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2020.1772214 · Cited by 194
Can the macro beat the micro? Integrated information across spatiotemporal scales
Hoel, E. P., Albantakis, L., Marshall, W., & Tononi, G. (2016) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niw012 · Cited by 140
“Hence, IIT predicts that the PSC must have maximum intrinsic cause–effect power at the level of macro elements and macro intervals, rather than at the level of micro elements and micro intervals (Tononi, 2004; Marom, 2010; Chalmers, 2013).”
BackgroundThe integrated information theory of consciousness: A case of mistaken identity
Merker, B., Williford, K., & Rudrauf, D. (2022) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x21000881 · Cited by 49
If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious
Schwitzgebel, E. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0387-8 · Cited by 148
The Easy Part of the Hard Problem: A Resonance Theory of Consciousness
Hunt, T., & Schooler, J. W. (2019) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2019.00378 · Cited by 134
Beyond Combination: How Cosmic Consciousness Grounds Ordinary Experience
SHANI, I., & KEPPLER, J. (2018) · Journal of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.1017/apa.2018.30 · Cited by 91
Roelofs, L. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190859053.001.0001 · Cited by 100
The First Minds: Caterpillars, Karyotes, and Consciousness
Miller, W. B. (2020) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2020.1849599 · Cited by 76
“Panpsychism offers intriguing arguments on a philosophical level, though the benefit of scientific evidence to support its contentions is absent (Chalmers, 2017).”
BackgroundIs the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?
Mørch, H. H. (2018) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-018-9995-6 · Cited by 71
The unity of consciousness, within subjects and between subjects
Roelofs, L. (2016) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0658-7 · Cited by 55
Swami Vivekananda's Vedāntic Cosmopolitanism
Medhananda, S. (2022) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197624463.001.0001 · Cited by 55
Consciousness as a concrete physical phenomenon
Jylkkä, J., & Railo, H. (2019) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2019.102779 · Cited by 53
Russellian monism and mental causation
Alter, T., & Coleman, S. (2019) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12318 · Cited by 49
Hales, C. G., & Ericson, M. (2022) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2022.836046 · Cited by 49
“However, their intimately nested hierarchical structure raises the possibility that, depending on how layers are organized, fundamental properties of consciousness such as “unity” (Cleeremans and Frith, 2003; Bayne, 2010) or “symbolgrounding” or “binding” or “combination” (Harnad, 1990; Treisman, 1996; Revonsuo and Ne…”
BackgroundConsciousness and topologically structured phenomenal spaces
Prentner, R. (2019) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2019.02.002 · Cited by 44
An Ontological Solution to the Mind-Body Problem
Kastrup, B. (2017) · Philosophies · doi:10.3390/philosophies2020010 · Cited by 38
“By taking complete living beings to be unitary—instead of composite—experiencing subjects (Inference 5), the idealist ontology proposed here avoids the so-called ‘subject combination problem’ that plagues bottom-up panpsychism [11].”
BackgroundAlter, T. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198840459.001.0001 · Cited by 37
Is Consciousness Intrinsic?: A Problem for the Integrated Information Theory
Mørch, H. H. (2019) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 34
Unity Between God and Mind? A Study on the Relationship Between Panpsychism and Pantheism
Leidenhag, J. (2018) · Sophia · doi:10.1007/s11841-018-0688-z · Cited by 35
“This is because without bounded selves the finite individuals, whom both 8 What I call ‘the individuation problem’ has also been referred to as the ‘decombination problem’ by Miri Albahari (forthcoming), the ‘decomposition problem’ by David Chalmers (Chalmers 2015), and the ‘derivation problem’ by Yujin Nagasaw and Kh…”
BackgroundHard Problem and Free Will: An Information-Theoretical Approach
D’Ariano, G. M., & Faggin, F. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-85480-5_5 · Cited by 34
A consciousness-based quantum objective collapse model
Okon, E., & Sebastián, M. Á. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1887-4 · Cited by 33
Deploying Panpsychism for the Demarcation of Panentheism
Leidenhag, J. (2020) · Panentheism and Panpsychism · doi:10.30965/9783957437303_005 · Cited by 27
Panpsychism and Russellian Monism
Alter, T., & Coleman, S. (2019) · The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism · doi:10.4324/9781315717708-20 · Cited by 27
Powers and the Pantheistic Problem of Unity
Bauer, W. A. (2018) · Sophia · doi:10.1007/s11841-018-0654-9 · Cited by 25
Forming a Positive Concept of the Phenomenal Bonding Relation for Constitutive Panpsychism
Miller, G. J. (2017) · dialectica · doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12207 · Cited by 24
Does Dispositionalism Entail Panpsychism?
Mørch, H. H. (2018) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-018-9604-y · Cited by 24
Cosmopsychism, Coherence, and World-Affirming Monism
Shani, I. (2022) · The Monist · doi:10.1093/monist/onab020 · Cited by 23
System, Subsystem, Hive: Boundary Problems in Computational Theories of Consciousness
Fekete, T., van Leeuwen, C., & Edelman, S. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01041 · Cited by 27
The status of consciousness in nature
Brogaard, B. “. (2015) · Advances in consciousness research · doi:10.1075/aicr.92.14bro · Cited by 20
Reasoning about conscious experience with axiomatic and graphical mathematics
Signorelli, C. M., Wang, Q., & Coecke, B. (2021) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103168 · Cited by 23
“These two problems imply the identification of a complete set of fundamental experiences from which other experiences combine, such that the segregation is always regard to this fixed set of experiences Chalmers (2016).”
The Grounding Problem for Panpsychism and the Identity Theory of Powers
Kadić, N. (2017) · Hrčak Portal of scientific journals of Croatia (University Computing Centre) · doi:10.5840/croatjphil20171714 · Cited by 19
Panexperiential materialism: A physical exploration of qualitativeness in the brain
Poznański, R. R., & Brändas, E. (2020) · Advances in quantum chemistry · doi:10.1016/bs.aiq.2020.08.004 · Cited by 18
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness
Mørch, H. H. (2024) · doi:10.1017/9781009317344 · Cited by 18
The merits of higher-order thought theories
Coleman, S. (2018) · Trans/Form/Ação · doi:10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.04.p31 · Cited by 18
Integrated information theory of consciousness is a functionalist emergentism
Cea, I. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02878-8 · Cited by 22
The Combination Problem: Subjects and Unity
Morris, K. F. (2016) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-016-9808-8 · Cited by 15
Idealism and the mind-body problem1
Chalmers, D. J. (2021) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003202851-46 · Cited by 15
Self-citationRevelation and the intuition of dualism
Liu, M. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03299-x · Cited by 12
“After all, many philosophers, including physicalists, explicitly endorse the incompatibility between revelation and physicalism (e.g. Braddon-Mitchell 2007; Chalmers 2016, 2018; Goff 2015, 2017; Hill 2014; Lewis 1995; McLaughlin 2001, 2003; Papineau 2020).”
BackgroundPanpsychism, The Combination Problem, and Plural Collective Properties
Bøhn, E. D. (2018) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2018.1483410 · Cited by 11
A Compositional Model of Consciousness Based on Consciousness-Only
Signorelli, C. M., Wang, Q., & Khan, I. (2021) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e23030308 · Cited by 23
“Nevertheless, an important question remains: How "microphenomenal seeds of consciousness" constitute macrophenomenal conscious experiences as we experience them? —the so-called combination problem for Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism [30].”
BackgroundInfluentialNormativity all the way down: from normative realism to pannormism
Bøhn, E. D. (2017) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1410-3 · Cited by 11
“(Chalmers 2013; Chalmers 2016).20 It seems fair to say that if each one of physical reality’s (possibly more and more) basic objects instantiates consciousness, it is not exactly the same kind of consciousness we composite objects instantiate, but rather some simpler (or perhaps even another) kind…”
BackgroundConsciousness: Here, There but Not EverywherePreprint
Tononi, G., & Koch, C. (2014) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1405.7089 · Cited by 11
“% Later,% Spinoza,% Leibniz,% Schopenhauer% and,% closer% to% modern% times,% James,% Whitehead,% Russell,% and% Teilhard% de% Chardin% espoused% panpsychist% notions% (Skrbina% 2009,% Chalmers% 2013).% Strawson% (2006)%”
Refuting the unfolding-argument on the irrelevance of causal structure to consciousness
Usher, M. (2021) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103212 · Cited by 12
“1 For a discussion of emergent conscious experience, in general, and in IIT in particular, see Chalmers (2017).”
BackgroundConsciousness and Categorical Properties
Brown, C. D. (2021) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-020-00359-5 · Cited by 9
On Invention of Structure in the World: Interfaces and Conscious Agents
Prakash, C. (2019) · Foundations of Science · doi:10.1007/s10699-019-09579-7 · Cited by 10
“…consciousness to microphysical entities: to quote Chalmers, “[The combination problem] is roughly the question: how do the experiences of fundamental physical entities such as quarks and photons combine to yield the familiar sort of human conscious experience that we know and love” (Chalmers 2016).”
BackgroundRussellian physicalism and its dilemma
Chan, L. (2020) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01522-y · Cited by 9
“In fact, this thesis is 2 See also Chalmers (2015) and Maxwell (1978) for brief discussions.”
BackgroundPikkarainen, E. (2021) · Philosophies · doi:10.3390/philosophies6020025 · Cited by 9
“, panprotopsychism [28]) does not entail idealism [29].”
BackgroundNew insights into holonomic brain theory: implications for active consciousness
Aemdar, E. (2023) · Journal of Multiscale Neuroscience · doi:10.56280/1561870661 · Cited by 9
Brüntrup, G., Göcke, B. P., Jaskolla, L. J., Medhananda, S., Pfeifer, K., Walker, T., Oord, T. J., Meixner, U., Goff, P., Clayton, P., et al. (2019) · Brill | mentis eBooks · doi:10.30965/9783957437303 · Cited by 9
Autopoietic Enactivism, Phenomenology, and the Problem of Naturalism: A Neutral Monist Proposal
Giannotta, A. P. (2021) · Husserl Studies · doi:10.1007/s10743-021-09286-x · Cited by 9
Panqualityism, Awareness and the Explanatory Gap
Mihálik, J. (2020) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-020-00256-x · Cited by 8
“Here q-zombies are creatures which instantiate appropriately organised qualities in their brains but lack consciousness because they are not aware of these qualities (Chalmers 2015).”
BackgroundInfluentialConsciousness, Revelation, and Confusion
Roelofs, L. (2020) · dialectica · doi:10.48106/dial.v74.i1.04 · Cited by 8
“In particular, “cosmopsychists” think that the fundamental physical entity is the cosmos as a whole, which is (obviously) bigger than a human being, not smaller (see Gaudry 2008; Jaskolla and Buck 2012; Shani 2015; Nagasawa andWager 2017; Goff 2017).”
BackgroundPessimism About Russellian Monism
Kind, A. (2015) · Cited by 41
Revelation and the Appearance/Reality Distinction
Liu, M. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780198924159.003.0011 · Cited by 7
Eden Benumbed: A Critique of Panqualityism and the Disclosure View of Consciousness
Shani, I. (2021) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-021-00377-9 · Cited by 7
“Several critics have argued that, in all likelihood, it does not (Blamauer, 2013; Chalmers, 2017a, 2017b; Goff, 2017; Wager, 2020).”
BackgroundInfluentialIs the Universe Conscious? Reflexive Monism and the Ground of Being
Velmans, M. (2021) · Goldsmiths Research Online · Cited by 7
Śaṅkaran Monism and the Limits of Thought
Gasparri, L. (2021) · The Monist · doi:10.1093/monist/onab024 · Cited by 6
Holographic Duality and the Physics of Consciousness
Awret, U. (2022) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2022.685699 · Cited by 7
“The first is the “The Structural Mismatch Problem” (SMP), following Chalmers’ (2016) use of the term in the context of the “combination problem” of constitutive Russellian Monism, yet applying it more generally.”
BackgroundThe “Slicing Problem” for Computational Theories of Consciousness
Gómez-Emilsson, A., & Percy, C. (2022) · Open Philosophy · doi:10.1515/opphil-2022-0225 · Cited by 7
Qualitative relationism about subject and object of perception and experience
Giannotta, A. P. (2020) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-020-09710-1 · Cited by 6
“This is the so-called “combination problem” for panqualityism (Chalmers 2016b; Coleman 2016), which is due to the existence of a nonsubject/subject gap (Chalmers 2016a: 38).”
BackgroundInfluentialRickabaugh, B. L. (2018) · doi:10.1002/9781119468004.ch5 · Cited by 6
“Of course, Hasker ’ s view does not face the same combination problem as panpsychism as it does not attribute consciousness to bits of matter (Chalmers 2016).”
BackgroundBodies and minds, heaps and syllables
Goodwyn, E. D. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03184-7 · Cited by 6
“For micropsychisms we have the so-called “combination problem” (Chalmers, 2016, going as far back as James 1981, p. 152): if we grant that all bits of matter have corresponding bits of (proto) phenomenal experience to go with them, how is it that combining them just-so gives us a unified phenomenal…”
BackgroundPanpsychism and AI consciousness
Arvan, M., & Maley, C. J. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03695-x · Cited by 7
“This is the problem of how macroconsciousness can be ‘built out of’ these microphenomenal features of reality (Chalmers 2016).”
BackgroundGómez-Emilsson, A., & Percy, C. (2023) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2023.1233119 · Cited by 9
“Rosenberg (1998) is credited by Chalmers (2016) as the originator of the boundary problem concept, being one of several combination problem issues that Chalmers raises for theories of panpsychism.”
BackgroundGrounding physicalism and ‘Moorean’ connections
Moran, A. (2023) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2023.2253863 · Cited by 5
“Just like Phenomenal Essence, Revelation is widely acknowledged to be prima facie rather plausible (see, for example, Chalmers 2016, 2018; Goff 2015; 2017; Horgan and Tienson 2001; Liu forthcoming; Lewis 1995; Nida-Rümelin 2007, Roelofs 2020; Schroer 2010; Trogdon 2017).”
The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview of Proposed Solutions
Galadí, J. A. (2023) · Logic, argumentation & reasoning · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-46742-4_13 · Cited by 5
Maharaj, A. (2020) · Brill | mentis eBooks · doi:10.30965/9783957437303_015 · Cited by 5
“…02:59:36AM via free access fundamental consciousness of micro-level entities.3 The most formidable problem facing micropsychist views is the »subject combination problem«—the problem of explaining how micro-subjects can combine to form macro-level conscious subjects (Chalmers 2017).”
BackgroundKadić, N. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04464-0 · Cited by 4
“That is, no amalgamation of microsubjects necessitates the coming about of a new subject (Chalmers, 2017 ).”
InfluentialHow to befriend zombies: a guide for physicalists
Saad, B. (2015) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0618-7 · Cited by 4
Siddharth, S. (2021) · European journal of analytic philosophy · doi:10.31820/ejap.17.1.3 · Cited by 4
Suzuki, D. G. (2022) · Biosemiotics · doi:10.1007/s12304-022-09474-y · Cited by 4
“(Chalmers 2016, p. 179).”
Hard problems in the philosophy of mindPreprint
Syrakos, A. (2023) · doi:10.32388/vwplua · Cited by 3
“Missing Entities: Has Panpsychism Lost the Physical World?
Aleksiev, D. (2021) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201.28.9.194 · Cited by 3
“9 For more on the combination problem see Chalmers (2016).”
BackgroundBennett, K. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845850.003.0008 · Cited by 5
Toy Models of Top Down Causation
Kent, A. (2020) · Apollo (University of Cambridge) · doi:10.17863/cam.58956 · Cited by 3
Leidenhag, M. (2021) · European Journal for Philosophy of Religion · doi:10.24204/ejpr.2021.3163 · Cited by 3
Powers and the hard problem of consciousness: conceivability, possibility and powers
Allen, S. R. (2022) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-022-00451-3 · Cited by 3
Material culture and consciousness: a thought experiment
Shapland, M. (2021) · Time and Mind · doi:10.1080/1751696x.2021.1995267 · Cited by 3
“This is known as the ‘combination pro-blem’, and is much contested within the theory of panpsychism as a whole (Seager 1995; Chalmers 2016.).”
BackgroundLi, J. (2025) · Natural Language Processing Journal · doi:10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163 · Cited by 3
“Moreover, IIT alone cannot serve as a definitive criterion, as its panpsychist implications challenge its specificity (Chalmers et al., 2017).”
Wagner‐Altendorf, T. A. (2024) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-024-00584-5 · Cited by 2
“…of microphenomenal truths, in roughly the same sense in which materialists hold that macrophenomenal truths obtain in virtue of micro-physical truths” (Chalmers, 2016b, p. 25), non-constitutive or emergentist panpsychism denies a reducibility of macro-to microexperience and argues that facts…”
InfluentialLiu, Z. (2024) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-024-09968-9 · Cited by 3
Percy, C., & Gómez-Emilsson, A. (2025) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e27040338 · Cited by 3
“Our presentation of the phenomenal binding problem can be mapped to the subject combination problem in [6].”
Russellian monism: ignorance and prospects
Liu, H. (2026) · Asian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s44204-026-00412-0 · Cited by 2
“The problem is that all these proposals may be challenged (Chalmers, 2017).”
What Does It Mean for Qualia to be Intrinsic?
Siddharth, S., & Menon, S. (2017) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-981-10-5777-9_23 · Cited by 2
A Buddhist Response to the Quality-Combination Problem for Panpsychism
Chadha, M. (2021) · The Monist · doi:10.1093/monist/onab027 · Cited by 2
The Quest to Solve Problems That Don’t Exist: Thought Artifacts in Contemporary Ontology
Kastrup, B. (2017) · Studia Humana · doi:10.1515/sh-2017-0026 · Cited by 2
“This is known in contemporary philosophy as the ‘subject combination problem’ [4].”
BackgroundAgainst deflation of the subject
Nešić, J. (2017) · Filozofija i drustvo · doi:10.2298/fid1704102n · Cited by 2
The Role of Mental Powers in Panpsychism
Klinge, F. (2019) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-019-09632-x · Cited by 2
Some Cosmological Implications of Temporal Experience
Dainton, B. (2015) · Boston studies in the philosophy of science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-22590-6_5 · Cited by 3
Panpsychism and the mind-body problem in contemporary analytic philosophy
Holman, E. L. (2023) · Intellectual History Review · doi:10.1080/17496977.2023.2283925 · Cited by 1
Sayapin, V. O. (2025) · Философская мысль · doi:10.25136/2409-8728.2025.10.75533 · Cited by 1
Gauḍīya cosmopsychism: a Gauḍīya Vedāntic approach to the cosmopsychist Individuation Problem
Sharma, K., & Prakash, G. (2026) · Asian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s44204-026-00414-y · Cited by 1
“David Chalmers (2016, 4–5) breaks this into three crucial subproblems: the subject combination problem (how microsubjects combine to form macrosubjects), the quality combination problem (how microqualities combine to create macroquali-ties like phenomenal redness), and the structure combination…”
Review of “The First Minds” by Arthur S. Reber. 2018, OUP Global Press
Jedlička, P. (2019) · BioEssays · doi:10.1002/bies.201900216 · Cited by 1
Dennettian Panpsychism: Multiple Drafts, All of Them Conscious
Roelofs, L. (2021) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-021-00496-8 · Cited by 1
“…thought more attractive if it can be made to work, but to face more serious versions of the ‘combination problem’, the difficulty of making sense of how consciousness combines (cf. Seager, 1995, p.280, Chalmers, 2017, Montero, 2017, Miller, 2017, 2018, Roelofs 2016, 2019, 2020, Mendelovici, 2020).”
BackgroundA Reply to S Siddharth’s ‘Against Phenomenal Bonding’
Miller, G. J. (2022) · European journal of analytic philosophy · doi:10.31820/ejap.18.1.4 · Cited by 1
Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem
(2016) · Bloomsbury Academic eBooks · doi:10.5040/9781501317576.ch-005 · Cited by 1
Alter, T. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198840459.003.0001 · Cited by 1
Emergence, Panpsychism, and Manifestation (Abhivyakti)
Timalsina, S. (2024) · The Journal of Hindu Studies · doi:10.1093/jhs/hiae011 · Cited by 1
How to Understand Russellian Panpsychism
Hashemi, A. (2024) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-024-00877-6 · Cited by 1
“See : Chalmers (2017).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Chalmers, D. J.
- Corresponding author
- Chalmers, David J.
- ORCID
- Chalmers, David J.
- Venue
- Panpsychism
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2016-12-29
- Pages
- 179-214
- OpenAlex
- W2535351563
- Cited by
- 231
- References
- 39
- Citations by year
- 2026: 14 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 33 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 5
- FWCI
- 88.17
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- panpsychism, combination problem, William James, Principles of Psychology, phenomenal states, phenomenal consciousness, qualia, David Chalmers
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-11, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-11 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
