Response to Rosenthal and Weisberg
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
I described an incoherence in one form of the higher order thought (HOT) theory that derives from its holding both that an appropriate higher order thought is sufficient for a conscious state and that being the object of an appropriate higher order thought is necessary for a conscious state. A (1) lone and (2) unconscious (i.e. not the object of another HOT) and (3) “empty” (i.e. reference-failing) higher order thought at t determines a conscious state at t, but – contrary to the necessary condition – there is no thought at t about that conscious state – unless the lone thought is about itself. But such self-reference would collapse the HOT theory into the rival same-order theory. As I noted in the article, this incoherence is resolvable by saying, as Weisberg and Rosenthal do, that when I have a lone unconscious empty higher order thought, what is conscious is the non-existent object of the HOT. Any theory can be made coherent by adopting sufficiently implausible views. Even contradiction can be made coherent by adopting Dialetheism and a paraconsistent logic.
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In the citing paper
“On this Blockian diagnosis, what would seem required for the requisite intimacy with our first-order states-to make them conscious-is the removal of one layer of qualitative content, namely that pertaining to the HOT.”
From The merits of higher-order thought theories (2018) · cites this paper as BLOCK, 2011, p. 447
In the citing paper
“In this light it can be seen that the Block-Kriegel line of objection actually begs the question.”
From The merits of higher-order thought theories (2018) · cites this paper as BLOCK, 2011b
Citations
Cites
The Neural Substrate of Human Empathy: Effects of Perspective-taking and Cognitive Appraisal
Lamm, C., Batson, C. D., & Decety, J. (2007) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.2007.19.1.42 · Cited by 1,464 · cited 1×
“…pain with no tissue damage, and this can be at least partially explained by the fact that both components of pain, the sensory and affective components, can be activated without tissue damage when the subject is watching others apparently subjected to nightmarish stimuli (Lamm et al. 2007).”
BackgroundConsciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146
Self-citationPhilosophy of Mind : Classical and Contemporary Readings
Chalmers, D. J. (2021) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 994
Two neural correlates of consciousness
Block, N. (2005) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.006 · Cited by 713 · cited 1×
“I favour a neurally based account of what makes representations conscious (Block 2005, 2009) when they are conscious.”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Intentional Structure of Consciousness
Crane, T. (2003) · Consciousness · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199241286.003.0003 · Cited by 175
A higher order Bayesian decision theory of consciousness
Lau, H. C. (2007) · Progress in Brain Research · doi:10.1016/s0079-6123(07)68004-2 · Cited by 172 · cited 1×
“However, given the problems I have pointed out, those who like the higher order picture should consider the opposite move advocated by Hakwan Lau (2008, 2010) in which a higher order probabilistic 'pointer' that has no content of its own refers to a first order representation.”
BackgroundComparing the Major Theories of Consciousness
Block, N. J. (2009) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/8029.003.0099 · Cited by 126
Self-citationBillock, V. A., Gleason, G. A., & Tsou, B. H.-P. (2001) · Journal of the Optical Society of America A · doi:10.1364/josaa.18.002398 · Cited by 92
Theoretical motivations for investigating the neural correlates of consciousness
Lau, H. (2011) · WIREs Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.93 · Cited by 24
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- 2009, THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES, vol. 4, 1111
- 2007, THE JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, 191, 42
- 2010, WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS COGNITIVE SCIENCE, 21, 1
Cited by
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
Self-citationThe HOROR theory of phenomenal consciousness
Brown, R. (2015) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0388-7 · Cited by 83
“This interpretation of higher-order theories is explicitly endorsed by many fans and critics of the theory alike (Balog 2000; Lycan 2004; Gennaro 2004; Carruther 2008; Mandik 2009; Matey 2011; Block 2011a; Kriegel 2011; Kidd 2011).”
BackgroundHigher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function
Rosenthal, D. (2012) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2011.0353 · Cited by 64
Quotational higher-order thought theory
Coleman, S. (2015) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0441-1 · Cited by 58
“What these accounts share is two levels of qualitative content (cf. Block 2011; Brown 2012), one of which inevitably conflicts with the other, and representation, which creates distance from one’s subject-matter.”
BackgroundConsciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg
Berger, J. (2013) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2013.771241 · Cited by 41
“…HOT cannot make one aware of a first-order state because, again, no such state exists.5 Many have concluded that HOT theory is unworkable (e.g., Block, 2011a; Byrne, 1997; Kriegel, 2003; Levine, 2001; Neander, 1998), but Wilberg argues that there is an underappreciated aspect of the account…”
BackgroundKirkeby-Hinrup, A., Stephens, A., Sjöstrand, A. B., & Overgaard, M. S. (2025) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1633907 · Cited by 25
“The second example concerns the possibility of higher-order misrepresentation, which even if a perennial hot topic (Block, 2011c; Brinck and Kirkeby-Hinrup, 2017; Brown et al., 2019; Gennaro, 2004, 2013; Kirkeby-Hinrup, 2022; Rosenthal, 2011, 2012; Weisberg, 2010, 2011), contains cold cases.”
The Higher-Order Map Theory of Consciousness
Gottlieb, J. (2021) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2020.1861038 · Cited by 20
“© 2021 Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1 I focus on ‘ambitious’ HO theories [Block 2011].”
BackgroundThe merits of higher-order thought theories
Coleman, S. (2018) · Trans/Form/Ação · doi:10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.04.p31 · Cited by 18
“36 Trans/Form/Ação, Marília, v. 41, p. 31-48, 2018, Edição Especial much as existing states (BLOCK, 2011b, p. 444).8 Kriegel (2009, p. 131) attempts to make this complaint more concrete, by offering it as an ‘obvious truism’ that “[t]here’s something it’s like for the subject only if she is in a…”
BackgroundInfluentialA new empirical challenge for local theories of consciousness
Michel, M., & Doerig, A. (2021) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12319 · Cited by 28
“So far the debate has focused on two main issues: determining whether phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive access (Block, 2007, 2011a; Cohen et al., 2016; Knotts et al., 2019; Odegaard et al., 2018), and whether the prefrontal cortex is involved in consciousness of contents (Michel &…”
BackgroundHow Things Seem to Higher-Order Thought Theorists
Berger, J. (2017) · Dialogue · doi:10.1017/s0012217317000440 · Cited by 16
Gottlieb, J. (2016) · Analytic Philosophy · doi:10.1111/phib.12091 · Cited by 8
Misrepresentation and mental appearance
ROSENTHAL, D. M. (2018) · Trans/Form/Ação · doi:10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.05.p49 · Cited by 7
Quantifying empirical support for theories of consciousness: a tentative methodological framework
Kirkeby-Hinrup, A. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1341430 · Cited by 11
Change Blindness and Misrepresentation
Kirkeby-Hinrup, A. (2016) · Disputatio · doi:10.2478/disp-2016-0002 · Cited by 8
The problem of higher-order misrepresentation
Peebles, G. (2021) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2021.2016677 · Cited by 5
“Block argues that the higher-order theory involves a sufficient and a necessary condition. It is sufficient for a first-order state’s being conscious that there be a relevant higher-order state, and necessary for there to be a first-order state that is targeted by the higher-order state. The problem: the sufficient co…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialEpistemic Warrants and Higher‐Order Theories of Conscious Perception
Edwards, J., & Platchias, D. (2016) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/papq.12161 · Cited by 4
Kidd, C. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0389-6 · Cited by 2
“…conceptions of phenomenal consciousness—is the intuition that the distinction between appearance and reality simply gets no grip on phenomenal consciousness, and any attempt to drive the distinction into this domain saddles the view with incoherence (cf., Block 2011; Levine 2001, pp. 108, 168).”
BackgroundCognitive penetration is common but does not challenge the joint
Block, N. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0009 · Cited by 3
Self-citationPerception is iconic; cognition is discursive
Block, N. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0005 · Cited by 1
Self-citationEmpty Higher Order States in Higher Order Theories of Consciousness
Hatipoğlu, S. E. (2022) · Croatian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.52685/cjp.22.64.5 · Cited by 1
A Critical Assessment of the Higher Order Thought Theory of Consciousness
Woolley, D. J. (2014) · University of Hertfordshire Research Archive (University of Hertfordshire) · doi:10.18745/th.15456
The Resilience of a Refined Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness
Sangster, L.-A. T. (2013) · Scholarship@Western (Western University)
Higher-order Theory of Consciousness and the Problem of Misrepresentation
김효은 (2012) · CHUL HAK SA SANG - Journal of Philosophical Ideas · doi:10.15750/chss..46.201211.011
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Block, N. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0008
Self-citationBlock, N. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0011
Self-citationCore cognition and perceptual analogs of concepts
Block, N. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0012
Self-citationBlock, N. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0014
Self-citationNeural evidence that perception is nonconceptual
Block, N. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0007 · Cited by 1
Self-citationMarkers of the perceptual and the cognitive
Block, N. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0002
Self-citationPerception is constitutively nonpropositional and nonconceptual
Block, N. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0004
Self-citationTwo kinds of seeing-as and singular content
Block, N. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0003
Self-citationBlock, N. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0013
Self-citationBlock, N. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.002.0005
Self-citationBlock, N. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.002.0003
Self-citationNonconceptual color perception
Block, N. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0006
Self-citationBlock, N. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.002.0007
Self-citationTop-down effects that are probably not cases of cognitive penetration
Block, N. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0010 · Cited by 1
Self-citationBlock, N. J. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.003.0001
Self-citationHerausforderungen in der aktuellen Philosophie des Selbstbewusstseins – Die Heidelberger Schule
Kreuch, G. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-25097-2_2
On the Intrinsic Value of Consciousness
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A Higher-Order Account of the Phenomenology of Particularity
Berger, J. (2023) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-023-00764-6
“Many critics of HO theories, and HOT theory in particular, have maintained that the possibility of HO misrepresentation is incoherent or somehow undermines the theory (e.g., Block, 2011).”
The Nonrelational Higher-Order Theory of Consciousness Defended
Berger, J., & Gottlieb, J. (2026) · American Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.5406/21521123.63.3.03 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Block, N.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Block, N.
- ORCID
- Block, N.
- Venue
- Analysis
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-05-16
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 443-448
- ISSN
- 0003-2638 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8284
- OpenAlex
- W2134743858
- Cited by
- 42
- References
- 9
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 2.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Analysis (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- higher-order thought theory, consciousness, self-reference, dialetheism, paraconsistent logic, reference failure
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