Bayes in the Brain—On Bayesian Modelling in Neuroscience
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 68 of the 68 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
According to a growing trend in theoretical neuroscience, the human perceptual system is akin to a Bayesian machine. The aim of this article is to clearly articulate the claims that perception can be considered Bayesian inference and that the brain can be considered a Bayesian machine, some of the epistemological challenges to these claims; and some of the implications of these claims. We address two questions: (i) How are Bayesian models used in theoretical neuroscience? (ii) From the use of Bayesian models in theoretical neuroscience, have we learned or can we hope to learn that perception is Bayesian inference or that the brain is a Bayesian machine? From actual practice in theoretical neuroscience, we argue for three claims. First, currently Bayesian models do not provide mechanistic explanations; instead they are useful devices for predicting and systematizing observational statements about people's performances in a variety of perceptual tasks. That is, currently we should have an instrumentalist attitude towards Bayesian models in neuroscience. Second, the inference typically drawn from Bayesian behavioural performance in a variety of perceptual tasks to underlying Bayesian mechanisms should be understood within the three-level framework laid out by David Marr ([1982]). Third, we can hope to learn that perception is Bayesian inference or that the brain is a Bayesian machine to the extent that Bayesian models will prove successful in yielding secure and informative predictions of both subjects' perceptual performance and features of the underlying neural mechanisms. 1 Introduction2 Theoretical Neuroscientists meet Bayes3 Is Perception Bayesian Inference?4 How Should we Understand the Inference from Bayesian Observers to Bayesian Brains?5 How Could we Discover that Brains are Bayesian?6 Conclusion
Overview
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In the citing paper
“However, the meaningfulness of a Bayes-optimal result is questionable [48] and the use of Bayesian modelling is disputed [49–53].”
From A model of cue integration as vector summation in the insect brain (2023) · cites this paper as [53]
In the citing paper
“The Bayesian brain hypothesis frequently operates in an “as-if” mode of explanation: the brain acts as if it were performing Bayesian inference, without claiming that actual Bayesian computations are implemented in neural tissue (Colombo and Seriès 2012; Danks 2014).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Colombo and Seriès 2012
In the citing paper
“Colombo and Seriès (2012) further noted that many such models serve primarily as descriptive tools and lack correspondence with identifiable neural mechanisms, making the inference from Bayesian behavior to Bayesian brains highly tenuous.”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Colombo and Seriès 2012
Citations
Cites
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Humans integrate visual and haptic information in a statistically optimal fashion
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Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/392759 · Cited by 3,179 · cited 1×
“Shimojo and Nakayama [1992]; Maloney [2002]; Fiser et al.”
BackgroundThe Bayesian brain: The role of uncertainty in neural coding and computation
Knill, D. C., & Pouget, A. (2004) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2004.10.007 · Cited by 2,588 · cited 1×
“Granted this goal of theoretically neuroscience, and granted that currently Bayesian models should be understood as no more than toolboxes for making predictions and systematizing data, how can an instrumentalist use of Bayesian models lead to gradually transforming them into mechanistic models so that a realist attit…”
BackgroundNatural Image Statistics and Neural Representation
Simoncelli, E. P., & Olshausen, B. A. (2001) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.24.1.1193 · Cited by 2,460
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von Helmholtz, H., & Southall, P. C. (1962) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 2,196
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Adams W. J., Prior, 8
- Devitt M., S. Psillos and M. Curd (eds), 35
- Maloney L. T., Perception and the Physical World: Psychological and Philosophical Issues in Perception, 89
- Schrater P., Statistical Theories of the Brain
Cited by
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
A predictive coding perspective on autism spectrum disorders
van Boxtel, J. J. A., & Lu, H. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00019 · Cited by 210
“Most prominently, the Bayesian account lacks connections to the neural computation performed by the brain, and does not provide mechanistic explanations for ASD (Rust and Stocker, 2010; Colombo and Series, 2012).”
BackgroundLearning what to expect (in visual perception)
Seriès, P., & Seitz, A. R. (2013) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00668 · Cited by 194
“In parallel to the experimental study of expectations, a growing body of theoretical work suggests that visual perception is akin to Bayesian Inference (e.g. Knill and Pouget 2004; Fiser et al, 2010; Colombo and Seriès, 2012; Friston, 2012).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationCognitive Processes in Decisions Under Risk are not the Same as in Decisions Under Uncertainty
Volz, K. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2012) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2012.00105 · Cited by 190
“In the words of Colombo and Seriès (2012): “that the brain is a Bayesian machine does not follow from the fact that Bayesian models are used to study the brain and the behavior it generates” (p. 2).”
Predictive Processing and the Representation Wars
Williams, D. (2017) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-017-9441-6 · Cited by 181
Metadata
- Authors
- Colombo, M., & Seriès, P.
- Affiliations
- University of Edinburgh (GB)
- Venue
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2012-09-01
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 697-723
- ISSN
- 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3537
- OpenAlex
- W2117986074
- Cited by
- 164
- References
- 68
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 26 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 44 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 38.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
- Research portal (Tilburg University) (publishedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- British Society for the Philosophy of Science
- Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- Bayesian inference, perception, Bayesian brain, theoretical neuroscience, instrumentalism, mechanistic explanation, epistemology of neuroscience, perceptual performance, neural mechanisms, prediction
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.