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Bayes in the Brain—On Bayesian Modelling in Neuroscience

Colombo, Matteo, Seriès, Peggy · 2012 · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 68 of the 68 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

According to a growing trend in theoretical neuroscience, the human perceptual system is akin to a Bayesian machine. The aim of this article is to clearly articulate the claims that perception can be considered Bayesian inference and that the brain can be considered a Bayesian machine, some of the epistemological challenges to these claims; and some of the implications of these claims. We address two questions: (i) How are Bayesian models used in theoretical neuroscience? (ii) From the use of Bayesian models in theoretical neuroscience, have we learned or can we hope to learn that perception is Bayesian inference or that the brain is a Bayesian machine? From actual practice in theoretical neuroscience, we argue for three claims. First, currently Bayesian models do not provide mechanistic explanations; instead they are useful devices for predicting and systematizing observational statements about people's performances in a variety of perceptual tasks. That is, currently we should have an instrumentalist attitude towards Bayesian models in neuroscience. Second, the inference typically drawn from Bayesian behavioural performance in a variety of perceptual tasks to underlying Bayesian mechanisms should be understood within the three-level framework laid out by David Marr ([1982]). Third, we can hope to learn that perception is Bayesian inference or that the brain is a Bayesian machine to the extent that Bayesian models will prove successful in yielding secure and informative predictions of both subjects' perceptual performance and features of the underlying neural mechanisms. 1 Introduction2 Theoretical Neuroscientists meet Bayes3 Is Perception Bayesian Inference?4 How Should we Understand the Inference from Bayesian Observers to Bayesian Brains?5 How Could we Discover that Brains are Bayesian?6 Conclusion

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1093/bjps/axr043

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Citations

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Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Adams W. J., Prior, 8
  2. Devitt M., S. Psillos and M. Curd (eds), 35
  3. Maloney L. T., Perception and the Physical World: Psychological and Philosophical Issues in Perception, 89
  4. Schrater P., Statistical Theories of the Brain

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Colombo, M., & Seriès, P.
Affiliations
University of Edinburgh (GB)
Venue
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Published
2012-09-01
Volume
63
Issue
3
Pages
697-723
ISSN
  • 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-3537
OpenAlex
W2117986074
Cited by
164
References
68
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 26 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 44 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 3
FWCI
38.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
  • Research portal (Tilburg University) (publishedVersion)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
  • HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • British Society for the Philosophy of Science
  • Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
Bayesian inference, perception, Bayesian brain, theoretical neuroscience, instrumentalism, mechanistic explanation, epistemology of neuroscience, perceptual performance, neural mechanisms, prediction

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Bayes in the Brain—On Bayesian Modelling in Neuroscience. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/bjps/axr043
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Colombo, M., & Seriès, P. (2012). Bayes in the Brain—On Bayesian Modelling in Neuroscience. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axr043

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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