Implicit awareness in anosognosia for hemiplegia: unconscious interference without conscious re-representation
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Some patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia, i.e. apparent unawareness of hemiplegia, have been clinically observed to show 'tacit' or 'implicit' awareness of their deficits. Here we have experimentally examined whether implicit and explicit responses to the same deficit-related material can dissociate. Fourteen stroke patients with right hemisphere lesions and contralesional paralysis were tested for implicit and explicit responses to brief sentences with deficit-related themes. These responses were elicited using: (i) a verbal inhibition test in which patients had to inhibit completing each sentence with an automatic response (implicit task) and (ii) a rating procedure in which patients rated the self-relevance of the same sentences (explicit task). A group of anosognosic hemiplegic patients was significantly slower than a control group of aware hemiplegic patients in performing the inhibition task with deficit-related sentences than with other emotionally negative themes (relative to neutral themes). This occurred despite their explicit denial of the self-relevance of the former sentences. Individual patient analysis showed that six of the seven anosognosic patients significantly differed from the control group in this dissociation. Using lesion mapping procedures, we found that the lesions of the anosognosic patients differed from those of the 'aware' controls mainly by involving the anterior parts of the insula, inferior motor areas, basal ganglia structures, limbic structures and deep white matter. In contrast, the anosognosic patient without implicit awareness had more cortical lesions, mostly in frontal areas, including lateral premotor regions, and also in the parietal and occipital lobes. These results provide strong experimental support for a specific dissociation between implicit and explicit awareness of deficits. More generally, the combination of our behavioural and neural findings suggests that an explicit, affectively personalized sensorimotor awareness requires the re-representation of sensorimotor information in the insular cortex, with possible involvement of limbic areas and basal ganglia circuits. The delusional features of anosognosia for hemiplegia can be explained as a failure of this re-representation.
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Citations
Cites
How do you feel — now? The anterior insula and human awareness
(Bud) Craig, A. D. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2555 · Cited by 6,657 · cited 4×
“Finally, our results, as well as those of previous neuroimaging studies on AHP (Berti et al., 2005; Karnath et al., 2005; Baier and Karnath, 2008), do not directly address the potential role of the left insula in body and emotional awareness (see Craig, 2009 for discussion).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialHow do you feel? Interoception: The sense of the physiological condition of the body
Craig, A. D. (2002) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn894 · Cited by 6,006 · cited 1×
“…that includes motor agency (see also Farrer and Frith, 2002; Craig, 2009; Tsakiris et al., 2010), while the posterior insula may be a critical part of the network responsible for more basic interoceptive representation and body ownership (Craig, 2002; Olausson, et al., 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2007).”
BackgroundNeural systems supporting interoceptive awareness
Critchley, H. D., Wiens, S., Rotshtein, P., Öhman, A., & Dolan, R. J. (2004) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn1176 · Cited by 3,406 · cited 2×
“…parts of the insula seem to be responsible for the re-representation of multisensory, motor and interoceptive information that is first processed in other cortical and subcortical areas and converge in the mid-posterior insula (Critchley et al., 2004; for reviews see Craig, 2009; Tsakiris, 2010).”
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VISUAL CAPACITY IN THE HEMIANOPIC FIELD FOLLOWING A RESTRICTED OCCIPITAL ABLATION
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Comparing an Individual's Test Score Against Norms Derived from Small Samples
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“…with AHP differed from those of the hemiplegic controls by involving mainly the anterior parts of RSDT = Revised Standardized Difference Test (Crawford et al., 1998; revised in Crawford and Garthwaite, 2005). a Significant difference between the patient and the control HP group. the insula,…”
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The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions
Bortolotti, L. (2015) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.10.005 · Cited by 136
“The possibility that people may be covertly aware of their impairments has been discussed widely in the empirical and philosophical literature (see, for instance, Fotopoulou, Pernigo, Maeda, Rudd, & Kopelman, 2010; Levy, 2008).”
The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs
Bortolotti, L. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863984.001.0001 · Cited by 127
Buchwitz, T. M., Maier, F., Greuel, A., Thieken, F., Steidel, K., Jakobs, V., & Eggers, C. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.763350 · Cited by 15
Metadata
- Authors
- Fotopoulou, A., Pernigo, S., Maeda, R., Rudd, A., & Kopelman, M. A.
- Venue
- Brain
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-09-07
- Volume
- 133
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 3564-3577
- ISSN
- 0006-8950 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2156
- OpenAlex
- W2124622010
- Cited by
- 156
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 6.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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