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Cited by 54Schizophrenia research and treatmentAction Observation and SynchronizationMental Health and Psychiatry

Mentalizing under influence: abnormal dependence on prior expectations in patients with schizophrenia

Chambon, Valerian, Pacherie, Elisabeth, Barbalat, Guillaume, Jacquet, Pierre, Franck, Nicolas, Farrer, Chlöé·2011·Brain
DOI 10.1093/brain/awr306
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Abstract

An impaired ability to appreciate other people's mental states is a well-established and stable cognitive deficit in schizophrenia, which might explain some aspects of patients' social dysfunction. Yet, despite a wealth of literature on this topic, the basic mechanisms underlying these impairments are still poorly understood, and their links with the clinical dimensions of schizophrenia remain unclear. The present study aimed to investigate the extent to which patients' impaired ability to appreciate other people's intentions (known as mentalizing) may be accounted for by abnormal interaction between the two types of information that contribute to this ability: (i) the sensory evidence conveyed by movement kinematics; and (ii) the observer's prior expectations. We hypothesized that this is not a generalized impairment, but one confined to certain types of intentions. To test this assumption, we designed four tasks in which participants were required to infer either: (i) basic intentions (i.e. the simple goal of a motor act); (ii) superordinate intentions (i.e. the general goal of a sequence of motor acts); (iii) social basic; or (iv) social superordinate intentions (i.e. simple or general goals achieved within the context of a reciprocal interaction). In each of these tasks, both prior expectations and sensory information were manipulated. We found that patients correctly inferred non-social, basic intentions, but experienced difficulties when inferring non-social superordinate intentions and both basic and superordinate social intentions. These poor performances were associated with two abnormal patterns of interaction between prior expectations and sensory evidence. In the non-social superordinate condition, patients relied heavily on their prior expectations, while disregarding sensory evidence. This pattern of interaction predicted the severity of 'positive' symptoms. Social conditions prompted exactly the opposite pattern of interaction: patients exhibited weaker dependence on prior expectations while relying strongly on sensory evidence, and this predicted the severity of 'negative' symptoms. We suggest both these patterns can be accounted for by a disturbance in the Bayesian inferential mechanism that integrates sensory evidence (conveyed by movement kinematics) into prior beliefs (about others' mental states and attitudes) to produce accurate inferences about other people's intentions.

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  • Some authors have argued that excessively precise prior expectations, corresponding to a smaller-than-normal gain for prediction errors, better account for hallucinatory experiences.

    “However, in opposition to a theory of over salient sensory evidence, some authors have argued that excessively precise prior expectations, which correspond to a smaller-than-normal gain for prediction errors, better account for hallucinatory experiences.”

    From What visual illusions teach us about schizophrenia (2014) · cites this paper as Chambon et al., 2011

  • According to the excessively precise prior hypothesis, perception distances itself from sensory stimuli and becomes dependent on prior knowledge, so one would only perceive what one is expecting to perceive.

    “According to this hypothesis, perception distances itself from the sensory stimuli and becomes dependent on prior knowledge of the world (Friston, 2005b; Chambon et al., 2011; Schmack et al., 2013); thus, one would only perceive what one is expecting to perceive.”

    From What visual illusions teach us about schizophrenia (2014) · cites this paper as Chambon et al., 2011

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Authors
Chambon, V., Pacherie, E., Barbalat, G., Jacquet, P., Franck, N., & Farrer, C.
Affiliations
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
ORCID
Venue
Brain
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2011-11-21
Volume
134
Issue
12
Pages
3728-3741
ISSN
  • 0006-8950 (ISSN-L)
  • 1460-2156
DOI
10.1093/brain/awr306
OpenAlex
W2125798490
Cited by
54
References
60
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 3 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 8
FWCI
3.50
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Brain (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion)
  • HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Schizophrenia research and treatment
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Keywords
mentalization, schizophrenia, theory of mind, intention inference, prior expectations, Bayesian inference, movement kinematics, social cognition, positive symptoms, negative symptoms, social interaction
MeSH terms
Adult, Cognition, Female, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Male, Neuropsychological Tests, Reaction Time, Schizophrenia, Schizophrenic Psychology, Social Perception, Antipsychotic Agents, Comprehension, Theory of Mind

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