CoChat

Reply: Spontaneous versus deliberate vicarious representations: different routes to empathy in psychopathy and autism

Open access
Keysers, Christian, Meffert, Harma, Gazzola, Valeria · 2014 · Brain
Cited by 21

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Sir, We thank Gillespie et al. (2014) for their letter. They summarize data that suggest that in autism, vicarious activations can be relatively normal under instructions explicitly encouraging vicarious processes, while being abnormal in conditions in which instructions do not. This points to an important opportunity to improve our understanding of empathy—both with regards to deficits in patients and individual differences in the normal population. To date, the ‘cake’ called empathy has been cut in various ways. Some cut it in two pieces, cognitive versus emotional empathy (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004), acknowledging that somewhat separate systems support the capacity to think what another is thinking (cognitive empathy) and to feel what another is feeling (emotional empathy). This has influenced our thinking about individual variability in empathy and psychiatric disorders, with some disorders, like autism, thought to be impaired more in cognitive empathy whereas others, like psychopathy, are impaired more in emotional empathy (Blair, 2005). Based on neuroscience, we have ‘cut’ empathy into four pieces: motor, emotional, tactile and cognitive empathy (Keysers and Gazzola, 2009). Mirror neurons in motor cortices and functional MRI activations in motor cortices during action observation suggest motor empathy: vicariously activating one’s own actions while witnessing the actions of others (Gallese et al., 1996; Gazzola and Keysers, 2009; Keysers, 2009; Caspers et al., 2010). Later, neuroimaging data showed that one also vicariously activate neural substrates involved in one’s own disgust (Wicker et al., 2003) and pain (Lamm et al., 2011) while witnessing the disgust or pain of others, suggesting emotional empathy. Somatosensory brain regions were also found to be vicariously active when viewing the tactile and haptic sensations of others, suggesting somatosensory empathy (Keysers et al., 2004, 2010; Gazzola and Keysers, 2009; Caspers et al., 2010). Finally, reasoning about the beliefs of others vicariously activates ventral medial prefrontal regions involved in reasoning about one’s own beliefs, suggesting cognitive empathy (Mitchell et al., 2006). Because these forms of empathy recruit partially distinct neural substrates, and specific lesions can impair specific domains of empathy (Calder et al., 2000; Pazzaglia et al., 2008), neuroscientific data suggest that empathy is indeed composed of partly separated modalities. What our data (Meffert et al., 2013), and those reviewed by Gillespie et al. (2014), suggest is that the cake of empathy can be cut in another, psychiatrically and neurologically relevant, direction as well: not by domain (motor, emotional, somatosensory or cognitive) but by how deliberately one empathizes. In our psychopathic individuals, we found that spontaneous motor, somatosensory and emotional empathy is reduced while their deliberate counterparts are not (Meffert et al., 2013). The data reviewed by Gillespie et al. (2014) suggest that in autism, deliberate motor empathy might be intact, whereas spontaneous motor empathy might not be. In addition, neurological data suggest, that after lesions to the amygdala, spontaneous emotion processing is compromised, whereas deliberate processing under instructions to look at eye regions might be preserved (Adolphs et al., 2005). From a neurological or psychiatric point of view, the question is then no longer: ‘is that patient’s empathy intact or not?’, instead, one would need to check the four modalities of empathy separately, and entertain the possibility, that for each of these, deliberate and spontaneous empathy might not necessarily be equally functional (Fig. 1). This distinction of deliberate versus spontaneous should not be confused with the cognitive versus affective empathy distinction, although it bears some resemblance. Cognitive empathy, prototyped by false belief tasks, is mainly thought to rely on internal discourses that feel deliberate. In contrast, the pain we feel in our finger when seeing another cut theirs feels spontaneous. However, some forms of cognitive empathy can be spontaneous (German and Cohen, 2012), and emotional empathy can be deliberately up- or downregulated through a variety of processes. For instance, people can actively avoid putting themselves in a situation that would induce empathy (Shaw et al., 1994), and even once they are in an empathy-inducing situation, they can focus attention towards or away from emotional cues and reappraise social stimuli (Ochsner and Gross, 2005), and there is thus also a deliberate side to emotional empathy. Hence, there is a deliberate and a spontaneous side to all four domains of empathy, but the respective size of these slices might differ. If we consider empathy as a ‘cake’, it could be cut, to first approximation, into four domains (rows) and in a deliberate and spontaneous form (columns). Because some domains may have a more spontaneous side to them, and others a more

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/brain/awt376

Cites

13 of 13 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Cited by

See all 21

Metadata

Authors
Keysers, C., Meffert, H., & Gazzola, V.
Venue
Brain
Published
2014-02-05
Volume
137
Issue
4
Pages
e273-e273
ISSN
  • 0006-8950 (ISSN-L)
  • 1460-2156
OpenAlex
W2132990789
Cited by
21
References
13
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.