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Memory-Political Deterrence: Shielding Collective Memory and Ontological Security through Dissuasion

Open access
Gustafsson, Karl, Mälksoo, Maria · 2023 · International Studies Quarterly

Abstract

Traditionally used within the context of hard military power in interstate relations, the concept of deterrence has been progressively extended to non-state actors and new issue areas. While scholarship on the social aspects of deterrence has expanded our understanding of this core international security practice, the focus of existing research has largely remained on physical security. This article argues that there is a phenomenon in international politics that can be called memory-political deterrence. Memory-political deterrence refers to the ways in which states seek to dissuade other political actors from taking actions that threaten the collective memory narratives that underpin the ontological security of the deterring actor. Memory-political deterrence works, for example, through political rhetoric, declarations, diplomatic insults, commemorative practices, and punitive memory laws. We illustrate the article’s arguments through empirical examples from Russia’s and China’s recent memory-political deterrence efforts toward Ukraine and Japan, respectively. In doing so, we elucidate the ways in which memory politics is intertwined with geopolitics, underpinning wider world-ordering aspirations.

Overview

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TL;DR

The article introduces “memory-political deterrence”: states seek to dissuade other political actors from actions that threaten the collective memory narratives underpinning their ontological security, using rhetoric, declarations, commemorative practices, and punitive memory laws. It illustrates the concept with Russia’s efforts toward Ukraine and China’s toward Japan, focusing on adoption rather than success.

Key findings

  • The article conceptualizes memory-political deterrence as an extension of deterrence beyond physical security to ontological and mnemonical security, with analytical distinctions between direct/extended deterrence, deterrence by punishment/denial, general/immediate deterrence, and cumulative deterrence; punitive memory laws are treated as declarative deterrentifications.
  • Russia’s case includes the 2014 Yarovaya Act, which introduced a prison term for denial of facts or dissemination of deliberately false information about the USSR during WWII and veterans (Article 354-1, “Rehabilitation of Nazism”); Article 243.4, introduced in spring 2020, punishes damage to Russian military graves and memorials irrespective of location inside or outside the Russian Federation; and the 2020 constitutional amendment Article 67.1(3), stating that diminishing the significance of the people’s heroism in defending the Fatherland “will not be permitted.” Russia opened a criminal investigation after Czech authorities dismantled the Soviet Marshal Konev statue in Prague in spring 2020 and a felony case after the Zhukov monument was toppled in Kharkiv in April 2022; a bill attaching fines and prison sentences to the 2021 law banning public attempts to equate the USSR and Nazi Germany was introduced two days before the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
  • China’s case centers on Yasukuni Shrine visits: since 1978, fourteen convicted Class A war criminals have been enshrined there along with 2.5 million Japanese war dead. After Nakasone’s official visit on August 15, 1985, China condemned the visit, Nakasone canceled another planned visit, and no Japanese prime minister visited until Hashimoto’s private visit on July 29, 1996; Koizumi visited annually until resigning in 2006 despite Chinese attempts, but the following six prime ministers refrained. After Abe’s December 26, 2013 Yasukuni visit, China escalated with January 2014 ambassador op-eds, a January 29, 2014 UN Security Council open debate with Chinese, South Korean, and North Korean ambassadors, the January 2014 opening of an An Jung-geun memorial hall in Harbin, late February 2014 ratification of two national memorial days (September 3 Victory Day and December 13 Nanjing Massacre Memorial Day), a March 2014 UNESCO Memory of the World nomination inscribed in October 2015, and a September 3, 2015 military parade with 947 soldiers from seventeen countries. Abe never visited Yasukuni again until he resigned in September 2020, and none of his successors restored the practice.
  • The conclusion states that both Russia and China have adopted memory-political deterrence; some empirical analysis suggests the efforts have been at least partly successful, but more in-depth analysis is necessary to clearly establish the extent of success.

Methods

  • Conceptual/theoretical article building on deterrence scholarship in strategic studies and legal/transitional justice studies, ontological security, memory politics, and speech act theory/securitization; it adapts Vuori’s framework for studying deterrentification through questions of who, what, whom, why, effects, and conditions.
  • Empirical illustrations draw on two contexts: Russia’s memory-political deterrence, especially extraterritorial memory laws, most recently toward Ukraine; and China’s memory-political deterrence messaging vis-à-vis Japan, including attempts to establish international memory alliances and an international memory order based on WWII memory.
  • The article follows Lupovici’s suggestion to focus primarily on the adoption rather than the success of deterrence; Russia and China are treated as useful cases because authoritarian states can be assumed to use a wider range of memory-political deterrence measures under lesser constraints than democracies, and both are enduring international rivalries over state-endorsed collective memory.

Limitations

  • Stated: the article brackets domestic memory politics and focuses mainly on the international memory-political deterrence activities of ruling elites, which “undoubtedly simplifies the picture and obfuscates domestic dynamics,” left for future research.
  • Stated: the article focuses on adoption rather than success; while some empirical analysis suggests deterrence efforts have been at least partly successful, more in-depth analysis is necessary to clearly establish the extent of success.
  • Evident: the analysis relies on two authoritarian cases as illustrations rather than systematic comparative tests, and it draws heavily on official statements, news reports, and secondary sources; it does not independently measure target beliefs, credibility, or domestic contestation.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/isq/sqae006

Cites

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 14

  1. Abe, 2006, Utsukushii Kuni e [Towards a Beautiful Country]
  2. Austin, 1962, How to Do Things with Words
  3. Chilton, 1985, Words, Discourse and Metaphors: The Meanings of Deter, Deterrent and Deterrence, 103
  4. Dillon, 1989, Modernity, Discourse, and Deterrence, Current Research on Peace and Violence, 12, 90
  5. George, 1974, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice
  6. Joenniemi, 1989, Deterrence: A Story in Decline?, Current Research on Peace and Violence, 12, 45
  7. Kaufmann, 1956, The Requirements of Deterrence
  8. Luke, 1989, What’s Wrong with Deterrence? A Semiotic Interpretation of National Security Policy, 207
  9. Meral, 2012, A Duty to Remember? Politics and Morality of Remembering Past Atrocities, 29
  10. Putin, 2019, Speech at the Informal CIS Summit
  11. Rumelili, 2015, Conflict Resolution and Ontological Security: Peace Anxieties
  12. Sbisà, 2007, How to Read Austin, Pragmatics, 17, 461
  13. Schelling, 1980, The Strategy of Conflict
  14. Schelling, 2006, Strategies of Commitment, 1

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Gustafsson, K., & Mälksoo, M.
Affiliations
  • Stockholm University (SE)
  • University of Copenhagen (DK)
Corresponding author
Gustafsson, Karl
Venue
International Studies Quarterly
Published
2023-12-28
Volume
68
Issue
1
ISSN
  • 0020-8833 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-2478
OpenAlex
W4392608349
Cited by
21
References
83
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 2
FWCI
10.96
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • International Studies Quarterly (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Research at the University of Copenhagen (University of Copenhagen) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
Volkswagen Foundation
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies
  • Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Memory, Trauma, and Commemoration
Keywords
collective memory, ontological security, dissuasion, memory politics, geopolitical competition, memory practices, memory laws, political rhetoric, Russian-Ukrainian relations, Japan-China relations

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