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Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking
Abstract
Students of politics have identified a variety of actors who appear to influence the federal bureaucracy's implementation of public policy, including Congress, the president, and interest groups. These lines of research, however, have often portrayed interest groups as actors with indirect influence (who, for example, work through or with Congress), rather than assessing the direct influence of interest groups on bureaucratic policy outputs. I conduct a test of direct interest group influence by analyzing an original data set composed of 1,444 interest group comments in reaction to forty federal agency rules. I find, contrary to the expectations of the extant literature, that the formal participation of interest groups during rulemaking can, and often does, alter the content of policy within the “fourth branch” of government. I conclude that those who voice their preferences during the notice and comment period rulemaking are often able to change government policy outputs to better match their preferences.
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Cited by
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Whose voice counts? The role of large language models in public commenting
Arsenault, A. C., & Kreps, S. (2026) · Big Data & Society · doi:10.1177/20539517261419341 · Cited by 2
“Second, in political science and public administration, the results align with evidence that participation is shaped less by apathy than by information costs, which restrict both who takes part and the weight agencies can reasonably assign to submissions (Coglianese, 2006; West, 2004; Yackee, 2006).”
Influential
Metadata
- Authors
- Yackee, S. W.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2005-03-17
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 103-124
- ISSN
- 1053-1858 (ISSN-L)
- 1477-9803
- OpenAlex
- W2022289351
- Cited by
- 309
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 17.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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