The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
For-Profit Welfare: Contracts, Conflicts, and the Performance Paradox
Abstract
This article examines how financial inducements in performance contracts shape the inner workings of a for-profit welfare-to-work training program serving long-term recipients. Our work pays particular attention to how contract requirements shape relationships between manager and line staff and their treatment of clients. We argue that contract design, coupled with bottom-level management efforts to meet contractual obligations, leads to a performance paradox—the same actions taken to achieve contractual results ironically produce negative program practice and poor client outcomes. Thus, rigidly constructed legal agreements between the government and private service providers can distort incentive structures, causing programmatic conflicts between management and staff, and do little to reduce long-term welfare use and diminish recipients' poverty.
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Citations
Cites
The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (2017) · Aldine (Routledge reprint) · doi:10.4324/9780203793206 · Cited by 25,789
Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services
Lipsky, M. (1981) · Michigan Law Review · doi:10.2307/1288305 · Cited by 8,981
Sandfort, J. R. (2000) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024289 · Cited by 320
Cited by
Administrative Burden: Learning, Psychological, and Compliance Costs in Citizen-State Interactions
Moynihan, D., Herd, P., & Harvey, H. (2015) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muu009 · Cited by 1,000
Coping During Public Service Delivery: A Conceptualization and Systematic Review of the Literature
Tummers, L. L. G., Bekkers, V., Vink, E., & Musheno, M. (2015) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muu056 · Cited by 756
The Big Question for Performance Management: Why Do Managers Use Performance Information?
Moynihan, D. P., & Pandey, S. K. (2010) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muq004 · Cited by 662
Reflections on Street‐Level Bureaucracy: Past, Present, and Future
Brodkin, E. Z. (2012) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2012.02657.x · Cited by 453
Deciding to discipline: Race, choice, and punishment at the frontlines of welfare reform.
Schram, S. F., Soss, J., Fording, R. C., & Houser, L. (2009) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/000312240907400304 · Cited by 399
Metadata
- Authors
- Dias, J. J., & Maynard-Moody, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2006-06-07
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 189-211
- ISSN
- 1053-1858 (ISSN-L)
- 1477-9803
- OpenAlex
- W2007355931
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 14.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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