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Cited by 186

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

For-Profit Welfare: Contracts, Conflicts, and the Performance Paradox

Dias, J. J., Maynard-Moody, S.·2006·Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Abstract

This article examines how financial inducements in performance contracts shape the inner workings of a for-profit welfare-to-work training program serving long-term recipients. Our work pays particular attention to how contract requirements shape relationships between manager and line staff and their treatment of clients. We argue that contract design, coupled with bottom-level management efforts to meet contractual obligations, leads to a performance paradox—the same actions taken to achieve contractual results ironically produce negative program practice and poor client outcomes. Thus, rigidly constructed legal agreements between the government and private service providers can distort incentive structures, causing programmatic conflicts between management and staff, and do little to reduce long-term welfare use and diminish recipients' poverty.

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Crossref · 10.1093/jopart/mul002

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Metadata

Authors
Dias, J. J., & Maynard-Moody, S.
Venue
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Published
2006-06-07
Volume
17
Issue
2
Pages
189-211
ISSN
  • 1053-1858 (ISSN-L)
  • 1477-9803
OpenAlex
W2007355931
Cited by
186
References
3
FWCI
14.61
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: For-Profit Welfare: Contracts, Conflicts, and the Performance Paradox. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/jopart/mul002
The paper
Dias, J. J., & Maynard-Moody, S. (2006). For-Profit Welfare: Contracts, Conflicts, and the Performance Paradox. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mul002

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.