Panpsychism and the Inner-Outer Gap Problem

The assumption that fundamental consciousness belongs to a perspectival subject lies behind the combination and decombination problems.

“I re-introduce an argument I'd made elsewhere against the first assumption: that it lies behind the well-known combination and decombination problems.”

• Also stated in: § 2. THE PROBLEM WITH CASTING FUNDAMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS · hedged

  “So long as cosmic consciousness is attributed to a perspective-bearing subject, macrosubjects such as ourselves will have trouble being derived intelligibly from cosmic consciousness.”

Mystics' reported experiences are consistent with conveying a metaphysical underlay of aperspectival consciousness whose nature is unbound by space, time, and sensory qualities.

“I have argued that their reported experiences are consistent with conveying a metaphysical underlay of aperspectival consciousness whose nature is unbound by space, time, and sensory qualities.”

• cites Albahari 2019Not checked — no full text of the source

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Mystical reports are evidentially relevant to metaphysics.

Whether of the cosmic or microlevel variety, panpsychist materialism does not close the gap between consciousness and matter.

“Whether of the cosmic or microlevel variety, panpsychist materialism does not close the gap between consciousness and matter.”

Panpsychist materialists go wrong by pinning physical structures directly on experiences that face away from the observing scientist.

“But panpsychist materialists go wrong by pinning these physical structures directly on experiences that face away from the observing scientist.”

Panpsychist materialism fails to close the mind-matter gap.

“before arguing, in section 5, that panpsychist materialism fails to close the mind-matter gap.”

• Also stated in: § 1. INTRODUCTION: SITUATING PERENNIAL IDEALISM IN THE MIND-BODY DEBATE · hedged

  “If the argument works, then it is as serious a problem for panpsychist materialism as the combination and decombination problems.”

The Subject Combination Problem arises from envisaging subjects as encased in observer-independent material bodies that are located in mind-independent space.

“The Subject Combination Problem arises from envisaging subjects as encased in observer-independent material bodies that are located in mind-independent space.”

The imagery that frames a subject's perspective is not made directly from other subjects, whose perspectives are inaccessible, but from the outer appearances of them.

“For the imagery that frames a subject's perspective, making it the thing it is, is not made directly from other subjects, whose perspectives are inaccessible, but from the outer appearances of them.”

Because panpsychist materialism construes physical structures as existing sub specie aeternitatis, independently of observers, it fails to close the mind-matter gap.

“The essence of this problem will be that because panpsychist materialism construes physical structures as existing sub specie aeternitatis, independently of observers, it fails to close the mind-matter gap.”

Perennial Idealism is thoroughly panpsychist.

“This not only staves off solipsism; it renders Perennial Idealism thoroughly panpsychist.”

Goff's transparent cosmopsychism entails incoherently that the cosmos takes incompatible mental states into its perspective.

“Following William James (1909, Lecture V), who launched a similar attack on cosmopsychism's nineteenth-century idealist counterparts, I've argued that this would entail, incoherently, that the cosmos takes into its perspective incompatible mental states.”

• cites William James (1909, Lecture V)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Albahari 2020, 122Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

It is from Jim's experience, not Lucy's, that the abstractions attending Lucy's brain are directly harvested.

“So it is from Jim's experience, not Lucy's, that the abstractions attending Lucy's brain are directly harvested.”

The Inner-Outer Gap Problem is every bit as objectionable as the (de)combination problems.

“This makes the Inner-Outer Gap Problem every bit as objectionable as the (de)combination problems.”

The arising of imagery never occurs in isolation but always comes with a first-person perspective.

“The arising of imagery, on the theory, will never occur in isolation but will always come with a firstperson perspective.”

• Also stated in: § 3. THE CONTOURS OF PERENNIAL IDEALISM · plain

  “There can be no such thing as a headache or the sight of a tree that does not appear to a perspective.”

The set of experiences that are supposed to ground physical structures face the wrong way: inward to the perspective of the subject undergoing the experiences, rather than outward to scientists.

“For a start, the set of experiences that are supposed to ground these physical structures face the wrong way.Rather than facing outwards, to the scientists who are supposed to observe the data and extract the equations, they face inwards, to the perspective of the subject undergoing the relevant experiences.”

If the cosmic subject truly undergoes an experience to its perspective, then it will be available only to the cosmic subject's perspective.

“For if the cosmic subject truly undergoes an experience to its perspective in the normal way that we understand experiences and subjects-albeit on a far more expansive scale than our own-then it will be available only to the cosmic subject's perspective.”

Perennial Idealism is a viable way forward in the mind-body problem.

“In meeting these two criteria, Perennial Idealism (expounded in section 3) will be seen to fit the bill (section 6), rendering it a viable way forward in the mind-body problem.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Consciousness is fundamental.

Tactics like allowing non-experiential spatiotemporal properties do little to close the mind-matter gap.

“But tactics like this do little to close the mind-matter gap.”

Fundamental consciousness is better cast as aperspectival rather than as perspectival.

“panpsychists should, as Perennial Idealism does, leave perspectival subjects as they are and seek instead a resolution that casts foundational consciousness as aperspectival.”

• cites Albahari 2019Not checked — no full text of the source
• cites Albahari 2020Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Mystical reports are evidentially relevant to metaphysics.

On the idealist version the author propounds, the structures ascribed to Lucy's brain are grounded proximally in the observer's conscious field and distally in Lucy's conscious field.

“On the idealist version I propound, the structures ascribed to Lucy's brain are grounded proximally in my conscious field as I observe it and distally in Lucy's conscious field.”

Our experience of being in a spatial world depends on registering imagery such as sights, sounds, proprioception, and cognitions.

“Our experience of being in a spatial world, after all, depends on registering imagery such as sights, sounds, proprioception, and cognitions.”

Rather than saying that aspects of Lucy's inner experience manifest extrinsically as structurally isomorphic observer-independent motions in space and time, the author would say that they are disposed to appear to other humans in that structurally isomorphic way.

“But rather than saying that aspects of Lucy's inner experience manifest extrinsically as structurally isomorphic observer-independent motions in space and time, I would say that they are disposed to appear to other humans in that structurally isomorphic way.”

With an observer-independent rendering of physical roles and structures, it is not immediately obvious that the experiential qualities pinned down by panpsychist materialists are just the kind of things that these physical structures could be the structures of.

“But with an observer-independent rendering of the physical roles and structures, it is not immediately obvious that the experiential qualities pinned down by panpsychist materialists are”

Most brands of cosmopsychism are vulnerable to a decombination problem so long as cosmic consciousness is attributed to a perspective-bearing subject.

“While there is no longer a combination problem, I have argued that most brands of cosmopsychism are vulnerable to a decombination problem.”

• Also stated in: § 2. THE PROBLEM WITH CASTING FUNDAMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS · hedged

  “So long as cosmic consciousness is attributed to a perspective-bearing subject, macrosubjects such as ourselves will have trouble being derived intelligibly from cosmic consciousness.”

If the cosmos is conscious, then it is disposed to appear to humans in its characteristically structured way, just as we are disposed to have it appear to us in that way.

“Likewise, if the cosmos is conscious then it is disposed to appear to humans in its characteristically structured way, just as we are disposed to have it appear to us in that way.”

There is no problematic gap between mind and the physical reality on Shani's idealist position.

“There is no problematic gap between mind and the physical reality.”

It remains a mystery how inner conscious qualities could ground or realise outer physical structures.

“It remains a mystery as to how inner conscious qualities could ground or realise such outer physical structures.”

The excision of all imagery could at least conceivably precipitate an experience of our luminous conscious field as independent of any perspective, space, and passing time.

“The excision of all imagery could at least conceivably precipitate an experience of our luminous conscious field as independent of any perspective, space, and passing timejust as the mystics proclaim.”

Although subjects and their structures still bear an inner and outer aspect, they all manifest within an observer-dependent sphere.

“Although subjects and their structures still bear an inner and outer aspect, they all manifest within an observer-dependent sphere.”

If one takes the panpsychist route, the only way to close the mind-matter gap is to be a panpsychist idealist.

“If one is to go the panpsychist route, which I think is the right route, the only way to close the gap is to be a panpsychist idealist.”

• Also stated in: § 1. INTRODUCTION: SITUATING PERENNIAL IDEALISM IN THE MIND-BODY DEBATE · plain

  “And in accounting for the physical world, panpsychism should not be cast as materialist (section 5) but as idealist (section 6).”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The physical world is backed by conscious subject(s).
• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Consciousness is fundamental.

Chalmers's distinction between realist and anti-realist positions maps onto the distinction the author has in mind between panpsychist materialism and panpsychist idealism.

“While Chalmers (2016) has been amongst those to have used this terminology, he has recently articulated a distinction that does map onto what I have in mind.”

• cites Chalmers (2020)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

The assumption that structures of the physical world are observer-independent leads to the Inner-Outer Gap Problem.

“The assumption that fundamental consciousness is perspectival leads to (de)combination problems, while the assumption that structures of the physical world are observer-independent leads to the Inner-Outer Gap Problem.”

Panpsychist materialism and panpsychist idealism agree that what presents itself as an embodied brain is the outer extrinsic appearance of an intrinsically conscious subject.

“Both brands of panpsychism can agree that what presents itself to me as an embodied brain is the outer extrinsic appearance of an intrinsically conscious subject.”

Panpsychist idealism pins the physical structures right in front of the scientist, inside the organised experiential imagery of their conscious field as they observe the object.

“Panpsychist idealism pins the physical structures right in front of the scientist, where they appear to be, inside the organised experiential imagery of their conscious field as they observe the object.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Experiential qualities are suitable for grounding and realizing the abstract physical structures of the world discoverable by science.

Short of divine intervention, there is no accounting for how the cosmic subject's private inner sphere of experience could get its structures shunted out into open air sub specie aeternitatis.

“Short of divine intervention, there is no accounting for how this vast but private inner sphere of experience could get its structures shunted out into open air sub specie aeternitatis.”

So long as we experience consciousness with perspective-inducing objects, our conscious field will always appear in the dichotomized subject/object format.

“So long as we experience consciousness with perspective-inducing objects, our conscious field will always appear in the dichotomized subject/object format, making it seem perspectival by nature.”

The structures cannot without mystery be embodied in Lucy's experience, because her experience is available only to her perspective, facing the wrong way.

“They can't without mystery be embodied in Lucy's experience, as her experience, we already noted, is available only to her perspective, facing the wrong way.”

To embody the structures in mind-independent stuff facing outwards is to fall right back into standard materialism.

“Yet to embody the structures in mind-independent stuff facing outwards is to fall right back into standard materialism.”

As far as panpsychism goes, the idealist route is the only way forward.

“Regardless of whether panpsychist idealists would wish to develop the position in this way, I hope to have made it clear that as far as panpsychism goes, the idealist route is the only way forward.”

Our conscious field partakes not in that of other subject(s), but in the aperspectival ground of pure consciousness from which subjects arise.

“And our conscious field partakes not in that of other subject(s), which compounds the combination problem, but in the aperspectival ground of pure consciousness from which subjects arise.”

What Jim immediately observes are neural networks that appear as patterns of visual images to his perspective.

“What Jim does immediately observe are neural networks that appear as patterns of visual images to his perspective.”

Like Descartes, one still has to contend with the problematic interface between conscious, nonspatial minds and the material space that houses them.

“For like Descartes, one still has to contend with the problematic interface between two very different modes of being: conscious, nonspatial minds on one hand, and the material space that houses them on the other.”

It is hard to see how, without a common subjective medium linking microlevel entities, any isomorphic spatial or other relationship between them could be grounded in consciousness.

“So it is hard to see how, without a common subjective medium linking them together, any isomorphic spatial (or other) relationship between them could be grounded in consciousness.”

For the panpsychist idealist, a physical object such as an apple depends only partially on its appearance to a human observer.

“For the panpsychist idealist, the apple depends only partially on its appearance to a human observer.”

The inward flow of imagery helps secure a sense of time passing.

“The inward flow of imagery helps secure a sense of time passing.”

There is no less of a mystery with grounding observer-independent material structures in conscious minds than there is in grounding conscious minds in observer-independent material structures.

“To conclude this section, there's no less of a mystery with grounding observerindependent material structures in conscious minds than there is in grounding conscious minds in observer-independent material structures.”

The assumption that fundamental consciousness is perspectival leads to (de)combination problems.

“The assumption that fundamental consciousness is perspectival leads to (de)combination problems, while the assumption that structures of the physical world are observer-independent leads to the Inner-Outer Gap Problem.”

Lucy's enjoyment of chocolate, supposed to be realizing the causal structures in her brain, is available only to Lucy and not to Jim who is examining her brain.

“Take Lucy's enjoyment of chocolate.This experience, that is supposed to be realizing the causal structures in her brain, is available only to Lucy and not to Jim who is examining her brain.”