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Vice Epistemology
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Vice epistemology is the philosophical study of the nature, identity, and epistemological significance of intellectual vices. Such vices include gullibility, dogmatism, prejudice, closed-mindedness, and negligence. These are intellectual character vices, that is, intellectual vices that are also character traits. I ask how the notion of an intellectual character vice should be understood, whether such vices exist, and how they might be epistemologically significant. The proposal is that intellectual character vices are intellectual character traits that impede effective and responsible inquiry. I argue that situationist critiques of virtue epistemology pose no significant threat to this proposal. Studies by social psychologists of belief in conspiracy theories suggest that it is sometimes appropriate to explain questionable beliefs by reference to intellectual character vices. Neither ‘regulative’ nor ‘analytic’ epistemology has any good reason to question the epistemological significance of such vices.
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Citations
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Cited by
ECHO CHAMBERS AND EPISTEMIC BUBBLES
Nguyen, C. T. (2020) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2018.32 · Cited by 1,115
EPISTEMIC CORRUPTION AND EDUCATION
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For A Service Conception of Epistemic Authority: A Collective Approach
Croce, M. (2019) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2019.1577511 · Cited by 27
AI’s Epistemic Harm: Reinforcement Learning, Collective Bias, and the New AI Culture War
Humphreys, D. (2025) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-025-00928-y · Cited by 26
“When I categories these models as being epistemic tools, I am taking the con - ception of “inquiry epistemology” which looks at how we gain knowledge (Alfano, 2012 ; Cassam, 2016 ).”
Intellectually Humble, but Prejudiced People. A Paradox of Intellectual Virtue
Colombo, M., Strangmann, K., Houkes, L., Kostadinova, Z., & Brandt, M. J. (2021) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-020-00496-4 · Cited by 19
Metadata
- Authors
- Cassam, Q.
- Venue
- The Monist
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2016-03-21
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 159-180
- ISSN
- 0026-9662 (ISSN-L)
- 2153-3601
- OpenAlex
- W4235900841
- Cited by
- 273
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 82.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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