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Moral Responsibility of Robots and Hybrid Agents

Hakli, Raul, Mäkelä, Pekka · 2019 · The Monist
Cited by 111

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions of an agent fit to be held morally responsible, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. We employ Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility to argue that even if robots were to have all the capacities required of moral agency, their history would deprive them from autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. We will also study whether humans and technological artifacts like robots can form hybrid collective agents that could be morally responsible for their actions and give an argument against such a possibility.

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 34

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Hakli, R., & Mäkelä, P.
Venue
The Monist
Published
2019-03-09
Volume
102
Issue
2
Pages
259-275
ISSN
  • 0026-9662 (ISSN-L)
  • 2153-3601
OpenAlex
W2920815137
Cited by
111
References
9
FWCI
53.22
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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