Consciousness matters: phenomenal experience has functional value
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 50 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
‘Why would we do anything at all if the doing was not doing something to us?’ In other words: What is consciousness good for? Here, reversing classical views, according to many of which subjective experience is a mere epiphenomenon that affords no functional advantage, we propose that subject-level experience—‘What it feels like’—is endowed with intrinsic value, and it is precisely the value agents associate with their experiences that explains why they do certain things and avoid others. Because experiences have value and guide behaviour, consciousness has a function. Under this hypothesis of ‘phenomenal worthiness’, we argue that it is only in virtue of the fact that conscious agents ‘experience’ things and ‘care’ about those experiences that they are ‘motivated’ to act in certain ways and that they ‘prefer’ some states of affairs vs. others. Overviewing how the concept of value has been approached in decision-making, emotion research and consciousness research, we argue that phenomenal consciousness has intrinsic value and conclude that if this is indeed the case, then it must have a function. Phenomenal experience might act as a mental currency of sorts, which not only endows conscious mental states with intrinsic value but also makes it possible for conscious agents to compare vastly different experiences in a common subject-centred space—a feature that readily explains the fact that consciousness is ‘unified’. The phenomenal worthiness hypothesis, in turn, makes the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness more tractable, since it can then be reduced to a problem about function.
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Cleeremans, A., & Tallon-Baudry, C.
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2022-01-01
- Volume
- 2022
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- niac007-niac007
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4225502240
- Cited by
- 116
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 14.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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