Are we ever aware of concepts? A critical question for the Global Neuronal Workspace, Integrated Information, and Attended Intermediate-Level Representation theories of consciousness
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
To locate consciousness in the flow of synaptic activity in the brain, we must first locate it in the flow of information processing in the mind. Two different positions have been debated for centuries. The liberal view maintains that the contents of experience include not only sensory, motor, and affective states, but also concepts and the thoughts they enter into. In contrast, the conservative view maintains that concepts have no intrinsic qualia of their own, and that the contents of experience are therefore restricted to sensory, motor, and affective states. Here I discuss how this long-standing controversy is relevant to several contemporary neuroscientific theories of consciousness. I do so, however, in a manner that is admittedly biased toward the conservative view, since I am among those who believe that it is more consistent than the liberal view with a number of key findings. I focus first on two of the most prominent neuroscientific theories of consciousness-namely, Stanislas Dehaene's Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and Giulio Tononi's Integrated Information Theory. I argue that because both of these approaches assume the liberal view, they are challenged in significant ways by data favoring the competing conservative view. I then turn to a third framework-namely, Jesse Prinz's Attended Intermediate-Level Representation Theory. I contend that because it explicitly endorses the conservative view, it has a unique advantage over the other two approaches. I also point out, however, that it has independent shortcomings that prevent it from achieving adequate explanatory coherence. I conclude by emphasizing that, if the conservative view is in fact correct, a central goal of future research should be to distinguish, at both psychological and neurobiological levels of analysis, between the following two kinds of information processing that often occur simultaneously: first, activation of the modality-specific sensory, motor, and affective representations that constitute the sole ingredients of conscious experiences; and second, activation of the conceptual representations that give those experiences meaning and that may even influence them in a top-down manner, but that never themselves reach awareness.
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Citations
Cites
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924 · cited 2×
“other kinds of prior representational states (Kosslyn, 1994; Friston, 2005; Clark, 2013; Panichello et al., 2013), it is certainly possible that in some situations one’s concept of how a familiar person typically looks does in fact influence one’s conscious experience of seeing them, if only in subtle ways.”
BackgroundOn a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364
Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing
Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J.-P. (2011) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.018 · Cited by 2,573
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
Dehaene, S. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2 · Cited by 2,498 · cited 5×
“…adaptively designed to extract relevant information from a variety of mental systems and make it broadly available for purposes such as linguistic encoding, memory storage, planning, and decision- making (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Dehaene, 2014; Dehaene et al., 2014).”
BackgroundInfluentialRich-club organization of the human connectome
van den Heuvel, M. P., & Sporns, O. (2011) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.3539-11.2011 · Cited by 2,354
“Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap
Levine, J. (1983) · Pacific Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1983.tb00207.x · Cited by 2,150
Invariant visual representation by single neurons in the human brain
Quiroga, R. Q., Reddy, L., Kreiman, G., Koch, C., & Fried, I. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature03687 · Cited by 1,988
Image And Brain: The Resolution of the Imagery Debate
Kosslyn, S. M. (1994) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/3653.001.0001 · Cited by 1,977
An information integration theory of consciousness
Tononi, G. (2004) · BMC Neuroscience · doi:10.1186/1471-2202-5-42 · Cited by 1,958 · cited 5×
“…Theory (GNWT) (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Dehaene, 2014; Dehaene et al., 2014) and the Integrated Information Theory (Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012a, 2012b; Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi and Koch, 2015)—clearly adopt the liberal view, but they do so without overt…”
BackgroundInfluentialTen Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind
Tye, M. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6712.001.0001 · Cited by 1,718
Cited by
On staying grounded and avoiding quixotic dead ends
Barsalou, L. W. (2016) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/s13423-016-1028-3 · Cited by 331
“Several contributors to the special issue point out that once plausible grounded views are adopted, it becomes easy to explain double-dissociations (Kemmerer, 2015a; Martin, 2016; Yee & Thompson-Schill, 2016): When lesion patients have a deficit on one sensory-motor modality, they use another…”
BackgroundInfluentialOn the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of consciousness
Bayne, T. (2018) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niy007 · Cited by 132
Concepts in the Brain: The View From Cross-linguistic Diversity
Kemmerer, D. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190682620.001.0001 · Cited by 42
Self-citationThe No-Report Paradigm: A Revolution in Consciousness Research?
Duman, I., Ehmann, I. S., Gonsalves, A. R., Gültekin, Z., Van den Berckt, J., & van Leeuwen, C. (2022) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2022.861517 · Cited by 24
Lacalli, T. (2021) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2021.697129 · Cited by 11
“…(Block, 1995; Bayne and Montague, 2011), between phenomenal (P) and access (A) consciousness (Block, 1995), or core (CC) vs. extended (EE) phenomenal states in consciousness state space (Berkovich-Obana and Glicksohn, 2014), or through choosing a conservative vs. a liberal stance (Kemmerer, 2015).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Kemmerer, D.
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2015
- Volume
- 2015
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- niv006
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2415790478
- Cited by
- 30
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 1.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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