Who’s afraid of response bias?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Response bias (or criterion) contamination is insidious in studies of consciousness: that observers report they do not see a stimulus may not mean they have absolutely no subjective experience; they may be giving such reports in relative terms in the context of other stimuli. Bias-free signal detection theoretic measures provide an excellent method for avoiding response bias confounds, and many researchers correctly adopt this approach. However, here we discuss how a fixation on avoiding criterion effects can also be misleading and detrimental to fruitful inquiry. In a recent paper, Balsdon and Azzopardi (Absolute and relative blindsight. Consciousness and Cognition 2015; 32:79–91.) claimed that contamination by response bias led to flawed findings in a previous report of “relative blindsight”. We argue that their criticisms are unfounded. They mistakenly assumed that others were trying (and failing) to apply their preferred methods to remove bias, when there was no such intention. They also dismissed meaningful findings because of their dependence on criterion, but such dismissal is problematic: many real effects necessarily depend on criterion. Unfortunately, these issues are technically tedious, and we discuss how they may have confused others to misapply psychophysical metrics and to draw questionable conclusions about the nature of TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation)-induced blindsight. We conclude by discussing the conceptual importance of criterion effects in studies of conscious awareness: we need to treat them carefully, but not to avoid them without thinking.
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Citations
Cites
Suñé, P., Suñé, J. M., & Montoro, J. B. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054583 · Cited by 1,687
Fleming, S. M., & Lau, H. C. (2014) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00443 · Cited by 1,408 · cited 2×
“We conclude by discussing the conceptual importance of criterion effects in studies of conscious awareness: we need to treat them carefully, but not to avoid them without thinking.”
BackgroundSelf-citationMacmillan, N. A., & Creelman, C. D. (2004) · doi:10.4324/9781410611147 · Cited by 1,269
Shams, L., Kamitani, Y., & Shimojo, S. (2000) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35048669 · Cited by 1,262
Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness
Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009 · Cited by 869 · cited 3×
“dissociation allows us to avoid confounding awareness with just basic perceptual processing, and thereby to address the phenomenon of conscious awareness in a conceptually meaningful way (Lau, 2008; Lau and Rosenthal, 2011).”
BackgroundSelf-citationRelative blindsight in normal observers and the neural correlate of visual consciousness
Lau, H. C., & Passingham, R. E. (2006) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0607716103 · Cited by 518 · cited 17×
“Yet it is worth noting that Balsdon and Azzopardi (2015) seem to be so concerned about response biases that they misread Lau and Passingham (2006), and so incorrectly reported Lau and Passingham’s (2006) conclusions.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationRounis, E., Maniscalco, B., Rothwell, J. C., Passingham, R. E., & Lau, H. (2010) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588921003632529 · Cited by 407 · cited 1×
“…research, mainly because the observed experimental effect was small (though replicable; Maniscalco and Lau, 2010; Maniscalco et al., 2016) and there are likely better experimental paradigms to probe the same conceptual questions (e.g. Rounis et al., 2010; Rahnev et al., 2011; Koizumi et al., 2015).”
BackgroundSelf-citationGalvin, S. J., Podd, J. V., Drga, V., & Whitmore, J. (2003) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03196546 · Cited by 405
Attention without awareness in blindsight
Kentridge, R. W., Heywood, C. A., & Weiskrantz, L. (1999) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.1999.0850 · Cited by 362 · cited 2×
“Bias-free signal detection theoretic measures provide an excellent method for avoiding response bias confounds, and many researchers correctly adopt this approach.”
BackgroundMethodConfidence and accuracy of near-threshold discrimination responses
Kunimoto, C., Miller, J., & Pashler, H. (2001) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1006/ccog.2000.0494 · Cited by 291
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Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
Conscious access in the near absence of attention: critical extensions on the dual-task paradigm
Matthews, J., Schröder, P., Kaunitz, L., van Boxtel, J. J. A., & Tsuchiya, N. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0352 · Cited by 64
Birch, J. (2024) · The Edge of Sentience · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0003 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Peters, M. A. K., Ro, T., & Lau, H.
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2016
- Volume
- 2016
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- niw001
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2326506044
- Cited by
- 85
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 3.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- Peters, M. A. K., Ro, T., & Lau, H. (2016). Who’s afraid of response bias? Neuroscience of Consciousness. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niw001
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