Are we underestimating the richness of visual experience?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
It has been argued that the bandwidth of perceptual experience is low-that the richness of experience is illusory and that the amount of visual information observers can perceive and remember is extremely limited. However, the evidence suggests that this postulated poverty of experiential content is illusory and that visual phenomenology is immensely rich. To properly estimate perceptual content, experimentalists must move beyond the limitations of binary alternative-forced choice procedures and analyze reports of experience more broadly. This will open our eyes to the true richness of experience and to its neuronal substrates.
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Citations
Cites
Opinion mining and sentiment analysis
Pang, B., & Lee, L. (2008) · Foundations and Trends® in Information Retrieval · doi:10.1561/1500000011 · Cited by 6,372
The information available in brief visual presentations
Sperling, G. (1960) · Psychological Monographs: General and Applied · doi:10.1037/h0093759 · Cited by 4,042
Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems
Koch, C., Massimini, M., Boly, M., & Tononi, G. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.22 · Cited by 1,600 · cited 1×
“odology has led many scientists to identify the neural correlates of consciousness with the neural correlates of reports of simple categories (Tsuchiya et al. 2015; Koch et al., 2016).”
BackgroundSelf-citationFleming, S. M., & Lau, H. C. (2014) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00443 · Cited by 1,408 · cited 1×
“…science has honed this tradition with the goal of separating sensitivity, which can rely entirely on nonconscious processing, from introspective accuracy, using metacognition methods that assess the availability of a perceptual judgment to introspection (Seth et al., 2008; Fleming and Lau, 2014).”
BackgroundConsciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146
Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness
Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009 · Cited by 869 · cited 3×
“Accordingly, various explanations are offered as to why subjects “claim” to experience a colorful periphery: memory or expectation may be “filling in” reports (Cohen et al., 2016) or poor attention may be inflating judgments about peripheral phenomenology (Lau and Rosenthal, 2011).”
BackgroundNo-Report Paradigms: Extracting the True Neural Correlates of Consciousness
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Self-citationMeasuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches
Seth, A. K., Dienes, Z., Cleeremans, A., Overgaard, M., & Pessoa, L. (2008) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.04.008 · Cited by 458 · cited 2×
“…science has honed this tradition with the goal of separating sensitivity, which can rely entirely on nonconscious processing, from introspective accuracy, using metacognition methods that assess the availability of a perceptual judgment to introspection (Seth et al., 2008; Fleming and Lau, 2014).”
BackgroundLarge Capacity of Conscious Access for Incidental Memories in Natural Scenes
Kaunitz, L. N., Rowe, E. G., & Tsuchiya, N. (2016) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797616658869 · Cited by 42 · cited 1×
“Another recent study showed that memory for incidental visual experience of specific, nontarget faces in crowds is far better than a sparse experience account might support, well in line with our intuitions about incidental visual experience (Kaunitz et al., 2016).”
ResultSelf-citation
Cited by
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
Why Does Space Feel the Way it Does? Towards a Principled Account of Spatial Experience
Haun, A., & Tononi, G. (2019) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e21121160 · Cited by 143
Self-citationPitts, M. A., Lutsyshyna, L. A., & Hillyard, S. A. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0348 · Cited by 135
If perception is probabilistic, why does it not seem probabilistic?
Block, N. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0341 · Cited by 91
Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity
Ellia, F., Hendren, J., Grasso, M., Kozma, C., Mindt, G., P. Lang, J., M. Haun, A., Albantakis, L., Boly, M., & Tononi, G. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab032 · Cited by 57
“The kind of evidence just mentioned has recently been questioned by experiments suggesting that subjects’ experiences may be richer than assumed based on standard reporting paradigms (Block 2011, 2014; Haun et al. 2017; Usher et al. 2018; Fu et al. 2021).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Haun, A. M., Tononi, G., Koch, C., & Tsuchiya, N.
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2017-01-01
- Volume
- 2017
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- niw023-niw023
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2583564782
- Cited by
- 90
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 4.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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