Avoiding "A Massive Spin-Off Effect in West Africa and Beyond": The Tobacco Industry Stymies Tobacco Control in Nigeria
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BACKGROUND: Nigeria plays important economic and political roles in Africa and is a significant market for the tobacco industry. This study describes the tobacco industry's efforts to block Nigeria's early tobacco control attempts, especially the Tobacco Smoking (Control) Decree 20 of 1990, and efforts to strengthen the Decree in 1995. METHOD: Analysis of documents from the Truth Tobacco Documents Library and other Internet resources related to Nigeria's Decree 20 and earlier tobacco control efforts. RESULTS: The World Conferences on Smoking and Health and World Health Organization in the late 1970s spurred the Nigerian government to take steps towards tobacco regulation. In response, the tobacco industry lobbied government ministries, used front groups and its trade group, the Tobacco Advisory Council of Nigeria, to block and weaken government efforts. The industry obtained a draft of Decree 20 two years before it was enacted, considered the Decree anti-business and proposed language that led to the passage of a weaker Decree in 1990. It also attempted to influence a potential review of the Decree in 1995. CONCLUSION: Decree 20 was a strong law for its time, but was weakened due to tobacco industry interference. Nigeria ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2005, and enacted a comprehensive National Tobacco Control Act (NTCA) in May 2015. Lessons learned from Decree 20's experience should be applied to protect NTCA 2015, and in compliance with WHO FCTC Article 5.3 which require parties to protect tobacco control policies from tobacco industry interference. IMPLICATIONS: This is the first detailed account of tobacco industry interference with tobacco legislation in Africa. The emergence of tobacco control in Nigeria threatened the tobacco industry, which believed that success in Nigeria would have a "domino effect" in Africa. The industry used lobbying and front groups to successfully block and weaken Nigeria's tobacco control, especially the Tobacco Smoking (Control) Decree 20 of 1990 and efforts to strengthen it in 1995. Nigeria and other African countries must learn from this history to protect tobacco control policies from the tobacco industry's vested interests and vigorously implement Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC.
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Nigeria is particularly important to the tobacco industry due to its large population of 170 million and its role as a regional trendsetter.
“Nigeria is particularly important to the tobacco industry due to its large population (170 million) and role as a regional trendsetter.18”
From Role of stakeholders in Nigeria’s tobacco control journey after the FCTC: lessons for tobacco control advocacy in low-income and middle-income countries (2019) · cites this paper as [18]
The Introduction (page unavailable) says Nigeria’s growing population and political influence in West Africa and beyond make it an important market for the tobacco industry. The section on anti-regulation strategies (page unavailable) also describes the industry’s concern that restrictions in Nigeria could have a regional ripple effect. Our copy does not give the claimed population figure of 170 million. (LLM, conf=0.87)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredNigeria enacted its National Tobacco Control Act in 2015, 10 years after ratifying the FCTC and after several failed efforts to enact comprehensive tobacco control legislation.
“Nigeria enacted its National Tobacco Control Act17 (NTCA) in 2015, 10 years after ratifying the FCTC and after several failed efforts to enact comprehensive tobacco control legislation.18,19”
From Role of stakeholders in Nigeria’s tobacco control journey after the FCTC: lessons for tobacco control advocacy in low-income and middle-income countries (2019) · cites this paper as [18]
The Abstract and Discussion state that Nigeria ratified the FCTC in 2005 and enacted the NTCA in 2015. The Results describe a bill defeated in 1982, and the Discussion describes an unsuccessful attempt to review Decree 20 in 1995. They do not establish several failed efforts to enact comprehensive legislation; the Discussion says it found no evidence of other attempts to replace Decree 20 with a stronger law. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe increase in foreign investors included multinational tobacco companies, notably BATN.
“This increase in foreign investors included multinational tobacco companies, notably BATN.”
From Role of stakeholders in Nigeria’s tobacco control journey after the FCTC: lessons for tobacco control advocacy in low-income and middle-income countries (2019) · cites this paper as [18]
The Results (page unavailable) identify British American Tobacco as a major player in Nigeria, owning 60% of the Nigerian Tobacco Company, and note the presence of another multinational tobacco company. They do not establish that the number of foreign investors increased or that tobacco companies were part of such an increase. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredWith the return of democracy in the Third Republic in 1999, the Nigerian government sought foreign direct investment to grow the economy, which had suffered under previous military governments.
“With the return of democracy in the Third Republic in 1999, the Nigerian government sought foreign direct investment (FDI) to grow the economy which had suffered under previous military governments.18”
From Role of stakeholders in Nigeria’s tobacco control journey after the FCTC: lessons for tobacco control advocacy in low-income and middle-income countries (2019) · cites this paper as [18]
The Discussion (page unavailable) describes military governments in Nigeria through 1998, supporting the sentence’s reference to preceding military rule. It does not say that a democratic government sought foreign direct investment in 1999, or that the economy had suffered under those governments. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe tobacco industry has had a strong presence in Nigeria.
“This study explores the role of tobacco control advocates and civil society organisations, including international organisations, in working for comprehensive tobacco control legislation in Nigeria, where the tobacco industry has had a strong presence.1820”
From Role of stakeholders in Nigeria’s tobacco control journey after the FCTC: lessons for tobacco control advocacy in low-income and middle-income countries (2019) · cites this paper as [18]
The activities advocates engage in to counter tobacco industry interference are aligned with those outlined in the literature on countering tobacco industry interference in LMICs, HICs and supranational settings, and directly address some of the main tobacco industry interference tactics, most notably producing and disseminating information, seeking direct access to policymakers and using front g
“The activities are aligned with those outlined in the literature on countering TII in LMICs,16–19 27–30 HICs31 32 and supranational settings,33 and directly addressing some of the main TII tactics, most notably, producing and disseminating information, seeking direct access to policymakers and using front groups and third parties.9 13–15 34”
From Needs of LMIC-based tobacco control advocates to counter tobacco industry policy interference: insights from semi-structured interviews (2020) · cites this paper as [29]
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Cites
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Matthes, B. K., Robertson, L., & Gilmore, A. B. (2020) · BMJ Open · doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2020-044710 · Cited by 32 · see citing works
Egbe, C. O., Bialous, S. A., & Glantz, S. (2019) · Tobacco Control · doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2018-054344 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
Self-citation
- Authors
- Egbe, C. O., Bialous, S. A., & Glantz, S. A.
- Affiliations
- University of California, San Francisco (US)
- Venue
- Nicotine & Tobacco Research
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2017-02-12
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 877-887
- ISSN
- 1462-2203 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-994X
- PMC
- PMC6075084
- OpenAlex
- W2588335289
- Cited by
- 34
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 2
- FWCI
- 5.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Nicotine & Tobacco Research (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Cancer Institute (CA-087472, CA-113710)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Global Public Health Policies and Epidemiology
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Physiology › Smoking Behavior and Cessation
- Life Sciences › Pharmacology, Toxicology and Pharmaceutics › Pharmacology › Pharmaceutical industry and healthcare
- Keywords
- tobacco industry interference, tobacco control, Nigeria, front groups, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Article 5.3, tobacco regulation, West Africa
- MeSH terms
- Smoking Prevention, Humans, Nigeria, World Health Organization, Tobacco Industry
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