The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Experts and Peer Disagreement
Abstract
It is often argued that widespread disagreement among epistemic peers in a domain threatens expertise in that domain. This chapter sketches two different conceptions of expertise: the expert-as-authority and the expert-as-advisor models. While it is standard for philosophers to understand expertise as authoritative, such an approach renders the problem posed by widespread peer disagreement intractable. This chapter argues, however, that there are independent reasons to reject both this model of expertise and the central argument offered on its behalf. The chapter then develops an alternative approach—one that understands expertise in terms of advice—that not only avoids the problems afflicting the expert-as-authority model, but also has the resources for a much more satisfying response to the problem of widespread peer disagreement.
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“total evidence views of epistemic authority hold that while authoritative testimony should carry significant epistemic weight, it should not completely replace an agent's independent reasons but rather be integrated as a contributory reason with an agent's own epistemic resources, allowing for aggregation rather than outright replacement of reasons.”
From Epistemic Deference to AI (2026) · cites this paper as Lackey, 2018
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“A second objection to Preemptionism is that it can entrench individuals within irrational or epistemically corrupt communities, making it difficult for them to critically reassess misguided authorities whom they have been conditioned to trust (Lackey, 2018).”
From Epistemic Deference to AI (2026) · cites this paper as Lackey, 2018
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Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?
GOLDMAN, A. I. (2001) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00093.x · Cited by 911
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
Kelly, T. (2005) · Oxford Studies In Epistemology · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199285891.003.0007 · Cited by 598
Research works printed but not linked: 13
- 2016, Expert Opinion and Second-Hand Knowledge., Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- 2007, Moral Expertise and the Credentials Problem., Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- 2007, Reflection and Disagreement., Noûs
- 1985, Epistemic Dependence., The Journal of Philosophy
- 1991, The Role of Trust in Knowledge., The Journal of Philosophy
- 2008, A Concise Introduction to Logic
- 2014, Trust and Belief: A Preemptive Reasons Account., Synthese
- 245Lackey, Jennifer. 2011. “Assertion and Isolated Second-Hand Knowledge.” In Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen, eds, 251–75. Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. · DOI
- McGrath, Sarah. 2008. “Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise.” In Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3: 87–107. Oxford: Oxford University Press. · DOI · Paper page
- 1988, The Morality of Freedom
- 2012, In Defense of Moral Testimony., Philosophical Studies
- 1995, Making Sense of Humanity
- 2012, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief
Cited by
Standpoint Epistemology and Epistemic Peerhood: A Defense of Epistemic Privilege
TOOLE, B. (2024) · Journal of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.1017/apa.2023.6 · Cited by 42
Artificial Epistemic Authorities
Hauswald, R. (2025) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2025.2449602 · Cited by 46
“…Boyd (2022), Constantin and Grundmann (2020), Croce (2018, 2019), Dormandy (2018), Grundmann (2021a, 2021b), Jäger (2016), Keren (2014a, 2014b, 2020), Lackey (2016, 2018, 2021), Leefmann and Lesle (2020), McMyler (2014), Popowicz (2021), Stewart (2020), Ward (2017), Wright (2016), Zagzebski (2016).”
De Cruz, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108557849 · Cited by 24
Lange, B. (2026) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-01377-4_9 · Cited by 12
AI and the Philosophy of Expertise and Epistemic Authority
Hauswald, R. (2025) · A Companion to Applied Philosophy of AI · doi:10.1002/9781394238651.ch5 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Lackey, J.
- Venue
- Knowledge, Belief, and God
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2018-02-22
- Pages
- 228-245
- Cited by
- 61
- References
- 2
- Language
- en
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