Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments
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Moral debunking arguments are meant to show that, by realist lights, moral beliefs are not explained by moral facts, which in turn is meant to show that they lack some significant counterfactual connection to the moral facts (e.g. safety, sensitivity, reliability). The dominant, “minimalist” response to the arguments—sometimes defended under the heading of “third-factors” or “pre-established harmonies”—involves affirming that moral beliefs enjoy the relevant counterfactual connection while granting that these beliefs are not explained by the moral facts. The authors argue that the minimalist gambit rests on a controversial thesis about epistemic priority: that explanatory concessions derive their epistemic import from what they reveal about counterfactual connections. They then challenge this epistemic priority thesis, which undermines the minimalist response to debunking arguments (both in ethics and elsewhere).
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If that demanding epistemic principle is correct, it is hard to see how our beliefs in any domain can escape skepticism.
“The problem is that it is hard to see how our beliefs in any domain can escape skepticism if this idea is correct”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Korman and Locke 2020
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Tersman, F., & Risberg, O. (2022) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-022-10275-y · Cited by 2 · see citing works
- Authors
- Korman, D. Z., & Locke, D.
- Venue
- Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2020-07-23
- Pages
- 309-332
- OpenAlex
- W3080782676
- Cited by
- 58
- References
- 3
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 7
- FWCI
- 90.41
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- philarchive.org
- Locations
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
- Keywords
- moral realism, moral facts, moral beliefs, epistemic priority, pre-established harmony, moral knowledge, moral sensitivity
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