Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge

There are warranted moral beliefs that are unlikely to be adaptive, such as those counseling impartial benevolence, compassion for vulnerable strangers, kindness to small animals, concern for distant peoples and future generations, and speaking truth to power.

“But there do seem to be some that appear anything but adaptive.Among many possibilities: those that counsel impartial benevolence, compassion for vulnerable strangers, kindness to small animals, concern for distant peoples and future generations, and speaking truth to power.”

Most of our moral beliefs do not have necessarily true propositions as their contents.

“First, most of our moral beliefs do not have necessarily true propositions as their contents”

No matter one's metaethic, our moral beliefs represent only a tiny fraction of those that are psychologically possible.

“No matter one's metaethic, it is true that our moral beliefs represent only a tiny fraction of those that are psychologically possible.”

At this point, we do not have warranted confidence in all of the premises of the Darwinian Argument.

“At this point, we do not.”

Debunkers are very far from having provided an indirect explanation of the origins of every moral belief that is both highly presumptively warranted and apparently maladaptive.

“But in order to entirely fend off the Natural Reply, debunkers must provide an indirect explanation of the origins of every moral belief that is both highly presumptively warranted and apparently maladaptive.Debunkers are very far from having done this.”

There is a parity between realism and constructivism that supports the tu quoque response.

“In either case, there is a parity between realism and constructivism that supports the tu quoque response.”

Huemer's influence-free formal moral beliefs are not sufficient, either by themselves or with nonmoral claims, to warrant any specific substantive moral beliefs over others.

“The problem with Huemer's line of argument is that even if he is right in his choice of influence-free beliefs, such beliefs do not seem, either by themselves or in conjunction with nonmoral claims, sufficient to warrant any specific, substantive moral beliefs over others.”

We can develop the Natural Reply by using apparently maladaptive moral beliefs as secure points from which to rebuild our stock of credible moral commitments.

“and we can develop the Natural Reply by using those beliefs as secure points from which to rebuild our stock of credible moral commitments.”

The contamination of our moral thinking by evolutionary pressures would be local rather than global.

“The contamination of our moral thinking would be local rather than global.”

D5 is far from well confirmed.

“D5 is far from well confirmed.”

We recognize cases in which agents have been able to correct for very substantial distorting pressures on their moral faculties.

“But we do recognize cases in which agents have been able to correct for very substantial distorting pressures on their moral faculties.”

Such warrant is not defeated until we have warranted confidence in all of the premises of the Darwinian Argument.

“Such warrant is not defeated until we have warranted confidence in all of the premises of the Darwinian Argument.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: If there is decisive reason to believe that our moral faculties are unreliable, and if those reasons are accessible to us, then this defeats any warrant we might have for our moral beliefs.

For those moral beliefs they affect, evolutionary pressures supply affective and cognitive dispositions that in many cases only incline us in certain doxastic directions, without entirely fixing the content of our beliefs.

“Instead, such pressures supply us with affective and cognitive dispositions that in many cases only incline us in certain doxastic directions, without entirely fixing the content of our beliefs.”

We cannot establish an agent's epistemic sensitivity simply by showing that the contents of her beliefs are metaphysically necessary truths.

“Second, we cannot establish an agent's epistemic sensitivity simply by showing that the contents of her beliefs are metaphysically necessary truths.”

It has not yet been shown that it is highly likely that all or even most presumptively warranted moral beliefs have insensitive evolutionary origins.

“So even if evolutionary doxastic origins are insensitive to moral truth, realistically construed, it has not yet been shown that it is highly likely that all or even most presumptively warranted moral beliefs have such origins.”

The absence of any evidence of adaptiveness for particular moral beliefs implies a limitation on the scope of justified debunking efforts.

“The absence of any evidence of this sort for particular moral beliefs implies a limitation on the scope of justified debunking efforts.”

Moral realism and evolutionary influence together create a reasonable chance of moral unreliability just because that combination would make the reliability of our moral faculties a massive coincidence.

“Moral realism and evolutionary influence together create a reasonable chance of moral unreliability just because that combination would make the reliability of our moral faculties a massive coincidence.”

Assuming that skepticism is erroneous, Joyce's line of reasoning will fail.

“Assuming that such skepticism is erroneous -and also assuming that debunkers are trying to identify something especially worrisome about moral knowledge, rather than developing an argument for global skepticism -this line of reasoning will fail.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Skepticism about nearly everything is erroneous.
• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Debunkers are trying to identify something especially worrisome about moral knowledge, rather than developing an argument for global skepticism.

Beliefs that emerge from such a process can be well grounded.

“Beliefs that emerge from such a process can be well grounded.”

Any success constructivists may have in obtaining moral knowledge can, at least in principle, be replicated by the realist.

“Still, any success that constructivists may have in obtaining moral knowledge can, at least in principle, be replicated by the realist.”

Debunkers have failed to show that evolutionary pressures have had a complete, thoroughgoing influence on our moral faculties.

“But debunkers have failed to show that evolutionary pressures have had a complete, thoroughgoing influence on our moral faculties.”

Evolutionary influences may affect only a subset of our moral beliefs.

“Such influences may affect only a subset of our moral beliefs.”

If debunkers claim that it is likely, perhaps even highly likely, that all of our presumptively warranted moral beliefs have insensitive origins, then that claim is unsubstantiated.

“But if this is the relevant claim, then it is unsubstantiated.”

It is implausible to suppose that all presumptively warranted moral beliefs are the direct product of evolutionary forces.

“So it is implausible to suppose that all such moral beliefs are the direct product of evolutionary forces.”

If there are warranted moral beliefs that are unlikely to be adaptive, then, by the standards of those positing evolutionary origins, we have excellent reason to think we have located moral beliefs with origins elsewhere.

“So if there are warranted moral beliefs that are unlikely to be adaptive, then, by the standards that obtain among those seeking to posit such evolutionary origins, we have excellent reason to think that we have located moral beliefs that have their origins elsewhere.”

The line of reasoning supporting premise P1 of the Probability Argument would prove too much.

“The line of reasoning that supports P1 would prove too much.”

So long as evolutionary forces are not the sole cause of our presumptively warranted moral beliefs, there is the possibility that other doxastic operations can compensate for the distortions and lead us to the moral truth.

“Yet so long as such forces are not the sole cause of our presumptively warranted moral beliefs, then even if evolutionary pressures are distorting ones, there is the possibility that other doxastic operations can compensate for the distortions and lead us to the moral truth in ways that are perfectly familiar from other instances in which we have corrected for distorting doxastic influences.”

Evolutionary critics of morality are not leveling the knowledge-based genealogical critique.

“Evolutionary critics of morality are not leveling this kind of critique.”

In the absence of specific and substantiated indirect explanations, we lack reason to doubt the credibility of apparently maladaptive moral beliefs.

“In the absence of specific and substantiated indirect explanations, we lack reason to doubt the credibility of these apparently maladaptive moral beliefs”

Debunkers have fallen far short of defending the claim that all of our presumptively warranted moral beliefs are products, even indirectly, of selective pressures.

“debunkers have fallen far short of defending the claim that all of our presumptively warranted moral beliefs are products (even indirectly) of selective pressures.”

Evolutionary arguments against moral realism are instances of a general kind of epistemological objection-the genealogical critique.

“Evolutionary arguments against moral realism are instances of a general kind of epistemological objection -that of the genealogical critique.”

Evolutionary influences are at best only indirectly efficacious in causing us to have the specific moral beliefs we do.

“But so far as we know, evolutionary influences are at best only indirectly efficacious in causing us to have the specific moral beliefs we do.”

If debunkers insist that there must be an evolutionary genealogy that can best explain the origins of apparently maladaptive but highly presumptively warranted moral beliefs, then their view threatens to become untestable.

“If, in order to resist this move, debunkers nevertheless insist that there must be an evolutionary genealogy that can best explain the origins of apparently maladaptive (though highly presumptively warranted) moral beliefs, then their view threatens to become untestable.”

If we grant that evolutionary pressures have greatly narrowed the scope of doxastic possibilities in the moral realm, this is not by itself any evidence that they have done so in a way that has led us away from moral truths, realistically construed.

“The important point here is that if we grant that evolutionary pressures have greatly narrowed the scope of doxastic possibilities in the moral realm, this is not by itself any evidence that they have done so in a way that has led us away from moral truths, realistically construed.”

There is a standing problem for classical foundationalism: having too few privileged beliefs from which to derive the wide variety of beliefs we intuitively regard as highly justified.

“Here we are up against a standing problem for classical foundationalism: that of having too few privileged beliefs from which to derive the wide variety of beliefs we intuitively regard as highly justified.”

Debunkers have failed to show that we are incapable of critically stepping back from whatever doxastic inclinations have been implanted in us by selective pressures.

“They have failed to show that we are incapable of critically stepping back from whatever doxastic inclinations have been implanted in us by selective pressures.”

We as yet lack reason to think that all or most presumptively warranted beliefs are formed in ways that are alethically insensitive.

“And so we as yet lack reason to think that all or most presumptively warranted beliefs are formed in ways that are alethically insensitive.”

Not all presumptively warranted moral beliefs are adaptive.

“Not all presumptively warranted moral beliefs are adaptive.”

The recent genealogical critiques offered by moral antirealists are of the agnostic sort.

“The recent genealogical critiques offered by moral antirealists are of this second sort.”

There is no compelling reason to suppose that realists are unable to supply reference-fixing standards of their own for moral concepts.

“But there is no compelling reason to suppose that realists are unable to supply reference-fixing standards of their own for moral concepts.”

Insensitive belief-forming methods or processes can be reliable.

“Insensitive belief-forming methods or processes can be reliable.”

The low-odds conception of the relevant coincidence is subject to a tu quoque argument that will beset every non-error-theoretic proponent of an antirealist genealogical critique.

“The low-odds conception of the relevant coincidence is subject to a tu quoque argument that will beset every non-error-theoretic proponent of an antirealist genealogical critique.”

The contamination of our moral thinking would be local rather than global.

“The contamination of our moral thinking would be local rather than global.”

Causal sufficiency does not entail causal completeness because of the possibility of causation by supervenient facts.

“That is because of the possibility of causation by supervenient facts.”

It is no coincidence that those who adequately understand a priori propositions and form their beliefs on the basis of that understanding are reliably in touch with the truth.

“But it is no coincidence that those who adequately understand a priori propositions and form their beliefs on the basis of that understanding are reliably in touch with the truth.”

In the third scenario, where we are unsure of the power of the genealogical critique, it would be illicit to introduce moral beliefs to bolster our confidence in our moral faculties, because any doubts about the faculties themselves ought to be transmitted to the beliefs they generate.

“It would be illicit at that point to introduce moral beliefs to bolster our confidence in our moral faculties, as any doubts about the faculties themselves ought to be transmitted to the beliefs they generate.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: We must trace the warrant of our moral beliefs to the exercise of our moral faculties.

Debunkers have failed to provide anything like a complete nonmoral causal story of the workings of our moral faculties.

“Despite a variety of nonmoral causes impinging on our moral faculties, debunkers have failed to provide anything like a complete nonmoral causal story of the workings of our moral faculties.”

The fact that empirical investigation does not imply the reliability of normative faculties fails by itself to indict the reliability of those faculties.

“Thus the fact that empirical investigation does not imply the reliability of normative faculties fails by itself to indict the reliability of those faculties.”

Even if our capacities of a priori apprehension and rational insight have been subject to nonmoral forces, including physical determination, this should not undermine our confidence in their reliability, even if the facts they discern are causally impotent and best construed realistically.

“It is certainly plausible that our capacities of a priori apprehension and rational insight have themselves been subject to a variety of nonmoral forces -perhaps even to physical determination by physical laws.But this should not undermine our confidence in their reliability, even on the assumption that the facts they discern are causally impotent and best construed realistically.”

The truth of E2 would prove too much.

“Another reason to doubt E2 is that its truth would prove too much.”

Moral realists who are also ethical naturalists will reject C2.

“Moral realists who are also ethical naturalists will reject C2.”

In the second scenario, once the putative genealogical defeater has itself been defeated, we are within our epistemic rights to invoke substantive moral claims to bolster the impression of the reliability of our moral faculties.

“Once the putative genealogical defeater has itself been defeated, we are certainly within our epistemic rights to invoke substantive moral claims to bolster the impression of the reliability of our moral faculties.”

The absence of compelling reasons to accept (2) should not yield a state of aporia; rather, it should leave us with a set of highly presumptively warranted moral beliefs whose positive epistemic status is thus far undefeated.

“The absence of compelling reasons to accept (2) should not yield a state of aporia.Rather, it should leave us where we began -with a set of highly presumptively warranted moral beliefs whose positive epistemic status is thus far undefeated.”

The Darwinian Argument can undermine the initial positive epistemic status of moral beliefs only if we have an extremely high degree of warranted confidence in each of its premises.

“The Darwinian Argument is intended to undermine this status.It can do so only if we have an extremely high degree of warranted confidence in each of its premises.”

A successful formal strategy of faculty vindication would solve the problem of restoring warranted confidence in our moral faculties once we become aware of a criticism that causes us to worry about their reliability.

“The success of any version of this strategy would solve the problem of restoring warranted confidence in our moral faculties once we become aware of a criticism that causes us to worry about their reliability.”

Debunkers are very far from having shown that selective pressures have actually exercised such a thoroughgoing influence.

“As the discussion of D5 indicated, debunkers are very far from having done that.”

Modal facts, numerical facts and philosophical facts are all such that they do not directly cause anything other than beliefs with such facts as their contents.

“Modal facts, numerical facts and philosophical facts are all such that they do not directly cause anything other than beliefs with such facts as their contents.”

We are rightly confident that we have some knowledge in the domains of modal, numerical and philosophical facts.

“Still, we are rightly confident that we have some knowledge in these domains.”

If the mental causation example is plausible, then moral facts might causally explain our moral beliefs even if there is full causal determination by natural forces and even if moral facts are neither type- nor token-identical to natural ones.

“If this is plausible, then moral facts might causally explain our moral beliefs, even if there is full causal determination by natural forces of our moral beliefs, and even if, as nonnaturalists claim, moral facts are neither typeidentical nor token-identical to natural ones.”

The mere possibility that selective pressures have thoroughly saturated our moral faculties in doxastically discriminating ways does not justify skepticism.

“But this possibility alone does not justify skepticism.”

The antecedent of C1 does not entail its consequent.

“The antecedent of C1 does not entail its consequent.”

We assign causal power to sets of supervening facts all the time, even while recognizing the causal potency of their subvening facts.

“We assign causal power to sets of supervening facts all the time, even while recognizing the causal potency of their subvening facts.”

To the extent that doubts have been raised about the crucial premises of the Darwinian Argument, we lack compelling reasons to accept (2).

“To the extent that I have succeeded in raising doubts about the crucial premises of the Darwinian Argument, we lack compelling reasons to accept (2).”

We cannot secure (1) because assuming the truth of substantive moral claims is precisely what agnostic genealogical critiques forbid.

“But we can't, since assuming the truth of such substantive claims is precisely what agnostic genealogical critiques forbid.”

An empirical account of certain doxastic origins may be the best-confirmed among all competitors and still fail to be evidentially compelling.

“An empirical account of certain doxastic origins may be the best-confirmed among all competitors and still fail to be evidentially compelling.”

Debunkers have offered no good reason to suppose that our epistemic capacities, reliable in many other contexts, are broken when their target propositions have moral content.

“Debunkers have offered no good reason to suppose that these epistemic capacities, reliable in many other contexts, are broken when their target propositions have moral content.”

If we are able to identify claims that enjoy immunity to genealogical critiques, then realists are in the clear and have all they need to vindicate the Natural Reply.

“And yet if we are able to identify claims that enjoy such immunity, then realists are in the clear.They would have all they need to vindicate the Natural Reply.”

We are rightly confident in a variety of beliefs in a priori propositions, including synthetic a priori propositions, even if there are wholly physicalistic etiologies of the episodes in which we gain the relevant understanding.

“That is because we are rightly confident in a variety of beliefs in a priori propositions -indeed, synthetic a priori propositions 33 -even if there are wholly physicalistic etiologies of the episodes in which we gain the relevant understanding.”

We can vindicate the likely reliability of doxastic origins in a given domain only by utilizing standards of critical assessment appropriate for that domain.

“As a general matter, and setting formal strategies aside for the moment, we can vindicate the likely reliability of doxastic origins in a given domain only by utilizing standards of critical assessment appropriate for that domain.”

If we are convinced by evolutionary critiques, then realists are saddled with moral skepticism.

“If we are convinced by evolutionary critiques, then the realists among us are saddled with moral skepticism.”

It is highly implausible that every instance of grasping an a priori truth is miraculous.

“But that is highly implausible.”

Causal sufficiency does not entail causal completeness.

“In other words, causal sufficiency does not entail causal completeness.”

The Doxastic Effect Argument will overgeneralize to all domains of inquiry that are construed realistically and are relevantly autonomous.

“The Doxastic Effect Argument will overgeneralize to all domains of inquiry that are construed realistically and are relevantly autonomous, i.e., such that claims within that domain can be ratified only by assuming the truth of at least some other claims within it.”

There is noncausal knowledge.

“And so there is noncausal knowledge.”

So long as a priori knowledge generally is something within our grasp, then, for all debunkers have shown, a priori moral knowledge is also within our grasp.

“So long as a priori knowledge generally is something within our grasp, then, for all debunkers have shown, a priori moral knowledge is also within our grasp.”

We have lots of examples in which we have warranted confidence in our conditional beliefs, even though the facts represented by such beliefs have not caused us to hold them.

“The essential point is that we have lots of examples in which we have warranted confidence in our conditional beliefs, even though (we are supposing) the facts represented by such beliefs have not caused us to hold them.”

In the first scenario, where we are convinced of the soundness of the Darwinian Argument, realists are rationally required to suspend judgment about all moral claims.

“In that situation, realists are rationally required to suspend judgment about all moral claims.”

Unless natural facts are just identified as those that are causally efficacious, nonnaturalists are not per se barred from endorsing the causal efficacy of moral facts.

“Unless natural facts are just identified as those that are causally efficacious -not a very attractive way of drawing up the taxonomy, I think 30 -then nonnaturalists are not per se barred from endorsing the causal efficacy of moral facts.”

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The likeliest candidate to serve as the basis of a successful formal strategy for our moral faculties is the faculty of generating a priori beliefs.

“When it comes to our moral faculties, the likeliest candidate to serve as the basis of a successful formal strategy is the faculty of generating a priori beliefs.”

The success of any indirect tracking hypothesis relies on enlisting at least one substantive moral or evaluative claim.

“The success of any indirect tracking hypothesis relies on enlisting at least one substantive moral or evaluative claim.”

Even Darwinian critics begin with a recognition that paradigmatic, uncontroversial moral beliefs are strongly presumptively warranted.

“Even Darwinian critics begin with a recognition that (at least) paradigmatic, uncontroversial moral beliefs are strongly presumptively warranted.”

If moral facts are causally inert, then so too are modal, numerical and philosophical facts.

“If moral facts are causally inert, then so too are modal, numerical and philosophical facts.”

Even on the assumption that our modal conditional beliefs are not caused by conditional facts, our knowledge of their truth need not be coincidental.

“Second, even on the assumption that our modal conditional beliefs are not caused by conditional facts, our knowledge of their truth need not be coincidental.”

The best-confirmed empirical account of the origins of our philosophical faculties does not imply their reliability.

“The best-confirmed empirical account of the origins of our philosophical faculties does not imply their reliability.”

Evolutionary (and psychological, historical, etc.) forces may heavily influence our moral faculties without providing a complete causal explanation of their origins and workings.

“First, and a familiar point by now: Evolutionary (and psychological, historical, etc.) forces may heavily influence our moral faculties without providing a complete causal explanation of their origins and workings.”

The confirmed doxastic effect of selective pressures on our moral faculties is the inculcation of adaptive doxastic dispositions.

“The confirmed doxastic effect of selective pressures is the inculcation of adaptive doxastic dispositions.”

The beliefs generated by our moral (or other normative) faculties are not the sort of beliefs that are likely to be subject to empirical confirmation.

“Similarly, the beliefs generated by our moral (or other normative) faculties are not the sort of beliefs that are likely to be subject to empirical confirmation.”

We believe moral propositions because they are true, meaning the moral facts themselves have caused us to have beliefs with those propositions as contents.

“We believe them because they are true -where this is shorthand for the idea that the moral facts themselves have caused us (in combination, of course, with our appropriate doxastic receptivity) to have beliefs with the propositions representing those facts as contents.”

The confirmed doxastic effect of selective pressures on our moral faculties is not the inculcation of truth-tracking doxastic dispositions.

“It is not the inculcation of truth-tracking doxastic dispositions.”

We can sometimes know that modal conditionals are true.

“And yet we can sometimes know that they are true.”

The second premise of the Empiricist Argument (E2) is probably false.

“But its second is probably false.”

The wholly nonmoral set of causes that explains the origins of our moral faculties cannot plausibly be exhausted by evolutionary forces.

“The wholly nonmoral set of causes that explains the origins of our moral faculties cannot plausibly be exhausted by evolutionary forces.”

We are able to know whether the beliefs caused by adaptive moral faculties are likely to be true only by utilizing the standards of critical assessment appropriate to the moral domain.

“So we are able to know whether the beliefs caused by adaptive moral faculties are likely to be true only by utilizing the standards of critical assessment appropriate to the moral domain.”

Given the truth of any plausible inference barrier from is to ought, we will have to rely on substantive moral or evaluative claims in order to positively establish the existence of a correlation between selective pressures and the reliability of our moral faculties.

“Indeed, given the truth of any plausible inference barrier from is to ought, we will have to rely on substantive moral or evaluative claims in order to positively establish the existence of a correlation between selective pressures and the reliability of our moral faculties.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is an inference barrier from is to ought.

Until better arguments for the central premises of the Darwinian Argument come along, or an entirely different form of antirealist genealogical critique makes its appearance, we are right to regard moral realism as perfectly compatible with moral knowledge and warranted moral belief.

“Until better arguments for the central premises of the Darwinian Argument come along, or an entirely different form of antirealist genealogical critique makes its appearance, we are right to regard moral realism as perfectly compatible with moral knowledge and warranted moral belief.”