Do the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs undermine moral knowledge?
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Third-factor accounts appeal to an external factor taken both to causally help explain the belief that a given action is right and to metaphysically explain that the action is in fact right.
“What is characteristic of those accounts is that they appeal to an external,”
From Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join Forces (2022) · cites this paper as Brosnan 2011
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- Authors
- Brosnan, K.
- Affiliations
- University of Cambridge (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Brosnan, Kevin
- Venue
- Biology & Philosophy
- Published
- 2010-11-17
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 51-64
- ISSN
- 0169-3867 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8404
- OpenAlex
- W2007759113
- Cited by
- 69
- References
- 26
- Citations by year
- 2024: 3 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 16.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Biology & Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Keywords
- moral knowledge, evolution of morality, natural selection, moral facts, moral epistemology, evolutionary ethics, moral beliefs
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