The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief
Abstract
Experiences and beliefs are different sorts of mental states, and are often taken to belong to very different domains. Experiences are paradigmatically phenomenal, characterized by what it is like to have them. Beliefs are paradigmatically intentional, characterized by their propositional content. But there are a number of crucial points where these domains intersect. One central locus of intersection arises from the existence of phenomenal beliefs: beliefs that are about experiences.
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Cites
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Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?
Chalmers, D. J. (2002) · Conceivability and Possibility · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198250890.003.0004 · Cited by 894
Self-citationV.—Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description
Russell, B. (1911) · Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society · doi:10.1093/aristotelian/11.1.108 · Cited by 799
A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge
Davidson, D. (2001) · Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective · doi:10.1093/0198237537.003.0010 · Cited by 658
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind · doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5 · Cited by 574
Self-citationDoes Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?
Peacocke, C. (2001) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2678383 · Cited by 568
Cited by
The Unreliability of Naive Introspection
Schwitzgebel, E. (2008) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2007-037 · Cited by 658
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind · doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5 · Cited by 574
Self-citation(2017) · Cited by 436
Real Acquaintance and Physicalism
Goff, P. (2015) · Phenomenal Qualities · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.003.0005 · Cited by 79
Unconscious perceptual justification*
Berger, J., Nanay, B., & Quilty-Dunn, J. (2018) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2018.1432413 · Cited by 53
Metadata
- Authors
- Chalmers, D. J.
- Venue
- Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2003-01-23
- Pages
- 220-272
- OpenAlex
- W109001568
- Cited by
- 383
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 23.01
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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