The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The Oxford Handbook of Rationality is a reference to the current state of play in the vital and interdisciplinary area of the study of rationality. Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines, including economics, psychology, and law. Twenty-two articles provide an overview of the prominent views on rationality, with each article also developing a unique and distinctive argument. The book consists of two main parts. The first examines the nature of rationality broadly understood. The second explores rationality's role in and relation to other domains of enquiry: psychology, gender, personhood, language, science, economics, law, and evolution.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
The case for motivated reasoning.
Kunda, Z. (1990) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480 · Cited by 9,022
“Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms.”
Ellsberg, D. (1961) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884324 · Cited by 7,891
On the psychology of prediction.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0034747 · Cited by 6,202
Fraassen, B. C. V. (1980) · doi:10.1093/0198244274.001.0001 · Cited by 4,682
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
Quine, W. V. (1969) · doi:10.7312/quin92204 · Cited by 3,593
Language identification in the limit
Gold, E. M. (1967) · Information and Control · doi:10.1016/s0019-9958(67)91165-5 · Cited by 3,572
JAMES, W. (1884) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/os-ix.34.188 · Cited by 3,446
Cited by
The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2011) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/s13421-011-0104-1 · Cited by 1,047
On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.4.672 · Cited by 840
West, R. F., Toplak, M. E., & Stanovich, K. E. (2008) · Journal of Educational Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0012842 · Cited by 416
Stanovich, K. E., West, R. F., & Toplak, M. E. (2011) · The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511977244.040 · Cited by 77
Metadata
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2004-02-05
- OpenAlex
- W14346497
- Cited by
- 102
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 9.62
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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