Network topology facilitates internet traffic control in autocracies
Open accessAbstract
Recent years have seen an increase in governmental interference in digital communication. Most research on this topic has focused on the application level, studying how content is manipulated or removed on websites, blogs, or social media. However, in order for governments to obtain and maintain control of digital data flows, they need to secure access to the network infrastructure at the level of Internet service providers. In this paper, we study how the network topology of the Internet varies across different political environments, distinguishing between control at the level of individual Internet users (access) and a higher level in the hierarchy of network carriers (transit). Using a novel method to estimate the structure of the Internet from network measurements, we show that in autocratic countries, state-owned (rather than privately owned) providers have a markedly higher degree of control over transit networks. We also show that state-owned Internet providers often provide Internet access abroad, with a clear focus on other autocratic countries. Together, these results suggest that in autocracies, the network infrastructure is organized in a way that is more susceptible to the monitoring and manipulation of Internet data flows by state-owned providers both domestically and abroad.
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The domestic financial constraints to invest in telecommunications infrastructure in Africa are comparable to other regions in the Global South, notably Latin America.
“At the same time, the domestic financial constraints to invest in telecommunications infrastructure are compar able to other regions in the Global South, notably Latin America. 63”
From Authoritarian collaboration and repression in the digital age: balancing foreign direct investment and control in internet infrastructure (2026) · cites this paper as [63]
The Results passages discuss internet-provider ownership and control of network traffic, including examples in African countries, but do not address financial constraints on telecommunications investment. Searches for domestic financial constraints and for Latin America found no passage comparing Africa with Latin America on those constraints; the paper's full-text copy is not truncated. (LLM, conf=0.76)
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Cites
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Cited by
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Garbe, L., Maerz, S. F., & Freyburg, T. (2026) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2024.2442377 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Lian, B. (2024) · World Journal of Clinical Cases · doi:10.12998/wjcc.v12.i19.3734 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
- Authors
- Keremoğlu, E., Weidmann, N. B., Gamero-Garrido, A., Carisimo, E., Dainotti, A., & Snoeren, A. C.
- Affiliations
- University of Konstanz (DE)
- University of California, Davis (US)
- Northwestern University (US)
- Georgia Institute of Technology (US)
- University of California San Diego (US)
- Corresponding author
- Keremoğlu, Eda
- ORCID
- Venue
- PNAS Nexus
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2024-02-14
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- pgae069-pgae069
- ISSN
- 2752-6542 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC10904286
- OpenAlex
- W4392783967
- Cited by
- 3
- References
- 13
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 2
- FWCI
- 4.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- PNAS Nexus (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- KOPS (University of Konstanz) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- German Research Foundation DFG (#402127652)
- National Science Foundation (CNS-1705024, CNS-2202288)
- Northeastern Future Faculty Fellowship and a Ford Foundation Postdoctoral Fellowship
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Media Technology › ICT Impact and Policies
- Keywords
- Internet topology, authoritarian regimes, state control of the internet, internet service providers, transit networks, network infrastructure, internet access, network measurement
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