The DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; 118 of the 118 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 12 of the 50 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Authoritarian collaboration and repression in the digital age: balancing foreign direct investment and control in internet infrastructure
Open accessAbstract
Controlling the digital public sphere has become an important factor of authoritarianism in the twenty-first century. Authoritarian states are reluctant to accept foreign direct investment (FDI) in their internet infrastructure. However, expanding internet infrastructure is expensive, often necessitating FDI. We argue that investment from other autocracies allows incumbent dictators to provide internet access and use it for repressive purposes. Specifically, we contend that the more repressive an authoritarian regime is offline, the higher the share of FDI from other autocracies; and the more FDI from other autocracies, the less FDI prevents the internet from being used for online repression. We analyse how the level of offline repression predicts different ownership structures of internet service providers (ISPs) in authoritarian African countries, and use a difference-in-differences estimator to test how FDI from autocracies affects online repression. Using data from the Telecommunications Ownership and Control dataset, we find a positive relationship between levels of repression and share of FDI from autocracies; if at least one ISP is owned by a foreign-autocratic investor, authoritarian regimes can expand repression online. Our study provides new insights into how authoritarian collaboration enables autocracies both to accept FDI in internet infrastructure and to leverage it for repressive ends.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper argues that repressive authoritarian regimes strategically prefer foreign direct investment (FDI) from other autocracies in telecommunications because such investors are less likely to obstruct internet-based control. Using data on 44 African authoritarian countries from 2000–2022, the authors find that offline repression is associated with more foreign-autocratic telecom investment, and that foreign-autocratic ISP ownership is linked to higher online repression.
Key findings
- In the first-stage analysis, the expected negative relationship in H1 is not supported: the number of shares held by foreign investors is “not significantly lower, but significantly higher” in more repressive regimes.
- The positive association is driven by foreign-autocratic investors: repression is significantly related to shares held by foreign-autocratic investors, with R² = .69, F(50,535) = 23.57, p = .01; by contrast, the model for foreign-democratic investors is not significant (R² = .8, F(50,535) = 42.11, p = .6).
- In the second-stage analysis, foreign-autocratic investment increases online repression over a period of three years after treatment, supporting H3.
- The paper reports robustness checks using alternative repression measures (Political Terror Scale and V-Dem `v2clkill`), lagged independent variables, alternative matching/refinement methods, and separate online-repression components; the effects are described as “fairly consistent,” though not for internet shutdowns, which are not significant individually.
Methods
- Two-step empirical design on 44 authoritarian African countries / 801 authoritarian country-years between 2000 and 2022.
- Part 1 uses country- and year-fixed OLS regressions with the Telecommunications Ownership and Control (TOSCO 2.0) dataset to measure ISP ownership shares; repression is measured with the inverted Latent Human Rights Protection Score (LHRPS).
- Part 2 uses matching for time-series cross-sectional data with propensity score weighting, combined with a difference-in-differences estimator, to estimate the effect of foreign-autocratic ISP ownership on a composite online-repression index built from V-Dem/Digital Society Project variables: social media monitoring, internet censorship, and internet shutdowns.
Limitations
- The authors state that the research design “does not allow for causal interpretation due to possible endogeneity” and that the findings should not be read causally.
- They note that, because the study focuses exclusively on authoritarian FDI recipients, they cannot examine whether foreign-democratic investors are less willing to invest in highly repressive countries.
- Evident from the text: the analysis cannot control for ISPs’ market position or their place in the infrastructural hierarchy because of data limitations, so the paper cannot distinguish whether investor origin or ownership type is the key mechanism.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
1 Valid · 16 Not valid · 35 Not checked · 74 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“At the same time, 'states in general (and developing countries in particular) prefer to retain ownership and control of critical infrastructure sectors, especially 'strategic' sectors such as energy, water and telecommunications.' 29”
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [29] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The section on preventing access and controlling content says governments can compel telecom companies through state ownership, laws, or orders. It does not address whether states—particularly developing countries—prefer to retain ownership and control of critical infrastructure. Searches for the quoted wording and for energy, water, and telecommunications as strategic sectors found no supporting passage. (LLM, conf=0.76)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“which explains why there is 'still only one international gateway operator-the stateowned Zambia telecommunications Company Ltd. (Zamtel).' 37”
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [37] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 3 describes the TOSCO dataset and notes that some fixed-line operators were state-owned monopolies, but it does not identify Zamtel or discuss Zambia’s international gateways. Searches for “Zamtel,” “Zambia,” and “gateway” found no passage substantiating the quoted claim. (LLM, conf=0.75)
plainSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“The Guinean regime requested all ISPs in Guinea to set up a 'center for control and oversight of traffic (voice and data)' 34 that would direct all data traffic through a central server accessible to the government.”
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [34] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The section on privately owned critical infrastructure discusses government oversight of telecommunications infrastructure, but its examples concern Huawei and foreign-investment restrictions, not Guinea. Searches for the Guinean ISP request and for a government-accessible central server found no passage addressing the claim. (LLM, conf=0.75)
plainSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“Second, African governments have strong incentives to attract FDI in their domestic telecommunications sector to stimulate growth. 62”
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [62] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Infrastructure Layer discusses governments’ control of internet access, and the introduction discusses regulation of telecommunications services, but neither addresses incentives to attract foreign direct investment for growth. Searches for FDI, foreign investment, and telecommunications-sector growth found no passage supporting the claim about African governments. (LLM, conf=0.75)
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“market size alone is not necessarily meaningful, as a small ISP may operate important infrastructure that allows it to control the traffic routed by other ISPs. 94”
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [94] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The passages in IV. Large Investors and VIII. Conclusion discuss control of firms by investors, not control of Internet traffic by ISPs. Searches for ISP infrastructure and traffic routing found no passage in our copy addressing the claim. (LLM, conf=0.78)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
77 more claims · 2 with their cited sources checked
Create a free account to see all 126 claims and every source verdict.
- Probably not a substantial claim. 27
- It may state two separate claims as one. 27
Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- Not confirmedF(50, 535) = 42.11reported p = .6 · recomputed p < .001
“F (50,535) = 42.11, p = .6”
- ConsistentF(50, 535) = 23.57reported p = .01 · recomputed p < .001
“F (50,535) = 23.57, p = .01”
The paper prints p at a floor (such as p < .001)
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Self-check results appear here once an independent check has confirmed them.
Citations
Cites
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset
GLEDITSCH, N. P., WALLENSTEEN, P., ERIKSSON, M., SOLLENBERG, M., & STRAND, H. (2002) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343302039005007 · Cited by 3,846
Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development
Olson, M. (1993) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2938736 · Cited by 3,794
The determinants of Chinese outward foreign direct investment
Buckley, P. J., Clegg, L. J., Cross, A. R., Liu, X., Voss, H., & Zheng, P. (2007) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400277 · Cited by 2,536
How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression
KING, G., PAN, J., & ROBERTS, M. E. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055413000014 · Cited by 2,415
Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa
Aker, J. C., & Mbiti, I. M. (2010) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.24.3.207 · Cited by 2,216
Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. (2011) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00950.x · Cited by 2,131
What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?
Geddes, B. (1999) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115 · Cited by 2,025
Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic Development: A Simultaneous Approach
Röller, L.-H., & Waverman, L. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.4.909 · Cited by 1,815
State Repression and Political Order
Davenport, C. (2007) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.143216 · Cited by 1,564
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Anyanwu, John. “Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Lessons for Economics.” In The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics. Volume 2: Policies and Practices, edited by Célestin Monga, and Justin Yifu Lin, 101–118. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Deibert, Ronald. “The Autocrat in Your IPhone: How Mercenary Spyware Threatens Democracy.” Foreign Affairs 102 (2023): 72–88.
Cited by
How practices of digital authoritarianism harm democracy
Maerz, S. F. (2025) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2025.2553826 · Cited by 18
Self-citationThe rise of authoritarian informationalism: escalating surveillance, manipulation, and control
Garbe, L., & Maerz, S. F. (2026) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2025.2579105 · Cited by 11
Self-citationThe global rise of digital authoritarianism: A longitudinal analysisPreprint
Park, S., Popiel, P., Kim, J., & Sang, Y. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6626079
Metadata
- Authors
- Garbe, L., Maerz, S. F., & Freyburg, T.
- Affiliations
- WZB Berlin Social Science Center (DE)
- The University of Melbourne (AU)
- University of St.Gallen (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Garbe, Lisa
- Venue
- Democratization
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2025-01-13
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 85-108
- ISSN
- 1351-0347 (ISSN-L)
- 1743-890X
- OpenAlex
- W4406335947
- Semantic Scholar
- ea5c1c1d2ae57579042a5038262fa2eba41df9d3
- Cited by
- 8
- References
- 111
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 4
- FWCI
- 7.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Democratization (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion)
- Social Science Open Access Repository (GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Minerva Access (University of Melbourne) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- German Research Foundation
- Swiss Network of International Studies
- University of St. Gallen
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Keywords
- authoritarianism, foreign direct investment, internet infrastructure, internet service providers, digital public sphere, authoritarian regimes, internet access
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Authoritarian collaboration and repression in the digital age: balancing foreign direct investment and control in internet infrastructure. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/13510347.2024.2442377
- The paper
- Garbe, L., Maerz, S. F., & Freyburg, T. (2026). Authoritarian collaboration and repression in the digital age: balancing foreign direct investment and control in internet infrastructure. Democratization. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2024.2442377
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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