COVID-19 and welfare state support: the case of universal basic income
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 32 of the 62 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has revived discussions about universal basic income (UBI) as a potential crisis response. Yet despite favorable circumstances, little actual policy change in this area was observed. This article seeks to explain this absence of policy change and to reflect on the prospects for introducing UBI schemes after the pandemic in European democracies. I argue that public opinion on UBI provides few electoral incentives to push for social policy change. Using prepandemic data from 21 European democracies and pandemic data from the UK, I show that political support for UBI has been divided between different groups who advocate conflicting policy goals and who hold divergent views about existing welfare state arrangements. While support for UBI might have increased during the pandemic, the underlying political dividing lines are likely to have remained intact. Due to these enduring divisions and the stable support for existing social policy arrangements over an untested policy, the prospects for introducing UBI schemes in the post-pandemic world remain uncertain.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper argues that COVID-19 did not fundamentally reshape the political coalitions behind universal basic income (UBI), because UBI support was already divided between groups with conflicting views about existing welfare state policies. Despite a pandemic-era increase in UK UBI support, the underlying group divisions remained largely intact, leaving post-pandemic UBI prospects uncertain.
Key findings
- In prepandemic ESS data from 21 European democracies (2016–2017), average support was 53% for UBI, compared with 72% for redistribution and 69% for unemployment benefits.
- UBI support was fragmented: about 21% were “UBI enthusiasts” (support UBI but oppose redistribution and/or unemployment benefits), while 40% were “UBI skeptics” (oppose UBI but support redistribution and/or unemployment benefits). Cross-nationally, enthusiasts ranged from 10% in Spain to about 30% in the Czech Republic or Hungary; skeptics ranged from 18% in Lithuania to 60% in Norway, 53% in Sweden, and 51% in Iceland and Switzerland.
- Older respondents were about 10 percentage points more likely than younger voters to oppose UBI but support other welfare policies; unemployed respondents were more than 7 percentage points more likely than average to support both UBI and welfare policies.
- In UK pandemic data from Nettle et al. (2021), UBI support increased by an average of 14 points on a 0–100 scale (95% CI [12.5, 16.3], p < .001, n = 599), with about 65% of observations above the 45-degree line; increases appeared across age, gender, material position, pandemic impact, and left-right ideology, with all depicted groups predicted to increase by at least 10 points.
Methods
- Prepandemic analysis uses European Social Survey round 8 (2016–2017) in 21 European democracies, with multinomial logistic regression models predicting four categories: welfare state supporters, welfare state opposers, UBI enthusiasts, and UBI skeptics.
- Pandemic analysis uses publicly available replication data from Nettle et al. (2021) for UK respondents, pooling April 2020 (n = 400) and May 2020 (n = 200) for a final n = 599 aged 18 or above; it compares UBI support in “normal times” versus pandemic times and estimates bivariate associations with socio-demographic characteristics.
- UBI support is measured in ESS on a 1–4 scale and in Nettle et al. on a 0–100 slider; explanatory variables include income, education, occupational class, unemployment, age, gender, union membership, left-right self-placement, subjective socioeconomic status, and pandemic impact.
Limitations
- The paper states that Nettle et al.’s pandemic survey is nonrepresentative and not based on random sampling; the sample is much younger (median age 33) and more left-leaning (median 43 on a 0–100 left-right scale) than the general UK population.
- The paper states that comparability between the ESS and Nettle et al. UBI items is not straightforward: the ESS mentions that UBI replaces many other social benefits and is paid for by taxes, while Nettle et al. do not provide a “don’t know” or refuse option.
- The paper states that the pandemic analysis is limited to the UK because the US is not available in the ESS; evident from the text, the prepandemic ESS analysis is cross-sectional and cannot directly show within-person change, and the pandemic analysis cannot establish causal effects.
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Claims the paper makes
21 Valid · 2 Not valid · 17 Not checked · 74 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“As such, UBI supporters are often young and higher educated, i.e., groups that are drawn to support UBI due to its universalistic nature (Dermont & Weisstanner, 2020).”
§ COVID-19 and welfare state support: the case of universal basic income > From aggregate to disaggregated patterns of support
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Dermont & Weisstanner, 2020 matched to “Automation and the future of the welfare state: Basic income as a response to technological change?” (2020) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Conclusion reports that basic income support is particularly pronounced among younger, highly educated citizens. The Introduction proposes that UBI’s universalistic nature appeals to a new-left middle-class constituency, but the paper does not establish that universalism is why younger and highly educated people support it. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“As Figure 4 depicts, UBI support among UK respondents did indeed increase when primed for the pandemic as compared to UBI support in a hypothetical scenario in “normal times.””
- Also stated in: § Discussion-what exactly makes UBI a distinct policy area? · plain
“My analysis of UBI support among UK respondents in April and May 2020, based on data from Nettle et al. (2021), showed a significant increase in UBI support in the context of the pandemic compared to a hypothetical scenario of a UBI in “normal times.””
§ COVID-19 and welfare state support: the case of universal basic income > UBI support during the pandemic
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Nettle et al., 2021 matched to “Why has the COVID-19 pandemic increased support for universal basic income?” (2021) source
The Introduction says respondents were asked how they felt about UBI for pandemic times and how they would have felt in the hypothetical absence of the pandemic. The results under “Characterization of sample and socio-demographics of UBI support” report significantly higher support for pandemic times, including among UK respondents. This was a comparison of self-reported views, not a measured change from a pre-pandemic baseline. (LLM, conf=0.93)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
- Also stated in: § Discussion-what exactly makes UBI a distinct policy area? · plain
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“UBI supporters often seem to share a preference for”
§ COVID-19 and welfare state support: the case of universal basic income > From aggregate to disaggregated patterns of support
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Roosma & van Oorschot, 2020 matched to “Public opinion on basic income: Mapping European support for a radical alternative for welfare provision” (2020) source
In “Effects of individual-level indicators” (page unavailable), the paper reports a strong positive association between basic-income support and support for social-investment arrangements: education for unemployed people and benefits that help combine work and family life. The “Data” section identifies the corresponding survey measures. (LLM, conf=0.93)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Schwander & Vlandas, 2020 matched to “The left and universal basic income: The role of ideology in individual support” (2020) source
hedgedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“However, earlier research has not found strong links between automation-another disruption against which UBI might in principle provide a remedy-and political support for UBI.”
§ COVID-19 and welfare state support: the case of universal basic income > Basic income as a potential crisis response
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Busemeyer & Sahm, 2021 matched to “Social investment, redistribution or basic income? Exploring the association between automation risk and welfare state attitudes in Europe” (2022) source
The Introduction reports no statistically significant overall association between occupational automation risk and support for basic income. The Results: Individual-level determinants describe the association as weak, although the Results: Cross-level interactions find significant associations in some welfare-state contexts. (LLM, conf=0.93)
- Supportedcites Dermont & Weisstanner, 2020 matched to “Automation and the future of the welfare state: Basic income as a response to technological change?” (2020) source
The Conclusion reports no association between job automation and basic income support in the authors’ analysis of 2016–2017 European Social Survey data from 21 countries. The Findings likewise state that people in jobs at risk of automation were not more supportive of basic income. This supports the citing sentence’s characterization that earlier research did not find a strong link. (LLM, conf=0.93)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Characteristics that capture individuals' material self-interest like income or unemployment status are associated with UBI preferences in a very similar way than preferences for redistribution (Dermont & Weisstanner, 2020).”
§ COVID-19 and welfare state support: the case of universal basic income > From aggregate to disaggregated patterns of support
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Dermont & Weisstanner, 2020 matched to “Automation and the future of the welfare state: Basic income as a response to technological change?” (2020) source
The Findings section states that income and unemployment have similar effects on preferences for redistribution and basic income. This directly supports the claim about these material-self-interest characteristics; the paper separately notes that other characteristics, such as age and education, differ. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
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- Supported
54 more claims · 7 with their cited sources checked
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Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated major: it would touch a result — a value a result rests on, reported and recomputed p-values on opposite sides of the significance level, two passages that conflict with no sign which is right, or a cited work retracted before this paper was published.
In the paper
§ COVID-19 and welfare state support: the case of universal basic income > Discussion-what exactly makes UBI a distinct policy area?
“younger respondents, women, and nontertiary educated respondents are particularly likely to prefer UBI over traditional welfare policies and less likely to be UBI skeptic.”
§ COVID-19 and welfare state support: the case of universal basic income > Prepandemic UBI support in Europe
“Tertiary-educated respondents (panel B) are less likely to be UBI skeptic and more likely to support both policies, while nontertiary educated respondents are slightly more likely to be UBI skeptic.”
Rated major: it would touch a result — a value a result rests on, reported and recomputed p-values on opposite sides of the significance level, two passages that conflict with no sign which is right, or a cited work retracted before this paper was published.
In the paper
§ COVID-19 and welfare state support: the case of universal basic income > Discussion-what exactly makes UBI a distinct policy area?
“younger respondents, women, and nontertiary educated respondents are particularly likely to prefer UBI over traditional welfare policies and less likely to be UBI skeptic.”
§ COVID-19 and welfare state support: the case of universal basic income > Prepandemic UBI support in Europe
“Women are significantly more likely than men to oppose UBI but not other welfare programs, and vice versa, men are significantly more likely to support UBI but not other welfare programs, although the effect sizes are not very large.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Weisstanner, D.
- Affiliations
- Aarhus University (DK)
- Corresponding author
- Weisstanner, David
- ORCID
- Weisstanner, David
- Venue
- Policy and Society
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2022-01-20
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 96-110
- ISSN
- 1449-4035 (ISSN-L)
- 1839-3373
- OpenAlex
- W4206440986
- Cited by
- 40
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 3
- FWCI
- 29.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Policy and Society (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Social Policy and Reform Studies
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Keywords
- universal basic income, COVID-19 pandemic, welfare state, public opinion, social policy change, policy change, political support, crisis response, European democracy, social policy attitudes
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