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Cited by 301

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

“Last-Place Aversion”: Evidence and Redistributive Implications *

Kuziemko, Ilyana, Buell, Ryan W., Reich, Taly, Norton, Michael I.·2014·The Quarterly Journal of Economics
DOI 10.1093/qje/qjt035
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Abstract

We present evidence from laboratory experiments showing that individuals are “last-place averse.” Participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution. In modified dictator games, participants randomly placed in second-to-last place are the most likely to give money to the person one rank above them instead of the person one rank below. Last-place aversion suggests that low-income individuals might oppose redistribution because it could differentially help the group just beneath them. Using survey data, we show that individuals making just above the minimum wage are the most likely to oppose its increase. Similarly, in the General Social Survey, those above poverty but below median income support redistribution significantly less than their background characteristics would predict.

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Metadata

Authors
Kuziemko, I., Buell, R. W., Reich, T., & Norton, M. I.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2014-01-10
Volume
129
Issue
1
Pages
105-149
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
DOI
10.1093/qje/qjt035
OpenAlex
W2111994306
Cited by
301
References
6
FWCI
36.42
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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