CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 209Hong Kong and Taiwan PoliticsExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesPolitical Conflict and Governance

Protests as Strategic Games: Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong's Antiauthoritarian Movement*

Open access
Cantoni, Davide, Yang, David Y, Yuchtman, Noam, Zhang, Y Jane·2019·The Quarterly Journal of Economics
DOI 10.1093/qje/qjz002
Open this paper in CoChat — free accountOpen PDF

Abstract

Social scientists have long viewed the decision to protest as strategic, with an individual's participation a function of their beliefs about others' turnout.We conduct a framed field experiment that recalibrates individuals' beliefs about others' protest participation, in the context of Hong Kong's ongoing antiauthoritarian movement.We elicit subjects' planned participation in an upcoming protest and their prior beliefs about others' participation, in an incentivized manner.One day before the protest, we randomly provide a subset of subjects with truthful information about others' protest plans and elicit posterior beliefs about protest turnout, again in an incentivized manner.After the protest, we elicit subjects' actual participation.This allows us to identify the causal effects of positively and negatively updated beliefs about others' protest participation on subjects' own turnout.In contrast with the assumptions of many recent models of protest participation, we consistently find evidence of strategic substitutability.We provide guidance regarding plausible sources of strategic substitutability that can be incorporated into theoretical models of protests.

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/qje/qjz002

Cites

7 of 7 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 44

  1. Aidt and Franck 2012, 2015). REFERENCES · DOI
  2. Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson, "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (2000), 1167-1199. · DOI
  3. ---, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
  4. Aidt, Toke S., and Raphaël Franck, "How to Get the Snowball Rolling and Extend the Franchise: Voting on the Great Reform Act of 1832," Public Choice, 155 (2012), 229-250.
  5. ---, "Democratization under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence from the Great Reform Act of 1832," Econometrica, 83 (2015), 505-547.
  6. Barber à, Salvador, and Matthew O. Jackson, "A Model of Protests, Rev- olution, and Information," Working Paper, Stanford University, 2018, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732864.
  7. Bates, Robert H., Ghada Fayad, and Anke Hoeffler, "The State of Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa," International Area Studies Review, 15 (2012), 323-338
  8. Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, "Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs," American Political Science Review, 104 (2010), 446-466.
  9. Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, "Communication and Coordination in Social Net- works," Review of Economic Studies, 67 (2000), 1-16.
  10. Croson, Rachel, "Theories of Commitment, Altruism and Reciprocity: Evi- dence from Linear Public Goods Games," Economic Inquiry, 45 (2007), 199-216.
  11. Deaton, Angus, and Nancy Cartwright, "Understanding and Misunderstanding Randomized Controlled Trials," Social Science & Medicine, 210 (2018), 2-21.
  12. DellaVigna, Stefano, Ruben Enikolopov, Vera Mironova, Maria Petrova, and Eka- terina Zhuravskaya, "Cross-Border Media and Nationalism: Evidence from Serbian Radio in Croatia," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 6 (2014), 103-132.
  13. DellaVigna, Stefano, and Matthew Gentzkow, "Persuasion: Empirical Evidence," Annual Review of Economics, 2 (2010), 643-669.
  14. DeLong, J. Bradford, and Andrei Shleifer, "Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution," Journal of Law and Economics, 36 (1993), 671-702.
  15. Fearon, James D., "Self-Enforcing Democracy," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126 (2011), 1661-1708.
  16. Fischbacher, Urs, Simon G ächter, and Ernst Fehr, "Are People Conditionally Co- operative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment," Economics Letters, 71 (2001), 397-404.
  17. Gehlbach, Scott, Konstantin Sonin, and Milan W. Svolik, "Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics," Annual Review of Political Science, 19 (2016), 565-584.
  18. Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green, "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment," American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 653-663.
  19. Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, Conor M. Dowling, Connor Raso, and Shang E. Ha, "Personality Traits and Participation in Political Processes," Journal of Politics, 73 (2011), 692-706.
  20. Gerring, John, Philip Bond, William Barndt, and Carola Moreno, "Democracy and Growth: A Historical Perspective," World Politics, 57 (2005), 323-364.
  21. Granovetter, Mark, "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior," American Journal of Sociology, 83 (1978), 489-515.
  22. Hobbs, William, and Margaret E. Roberts, "How Sudden Censorship Can Increase Access to Information," American Political Science Review, 112 (2018), 621- 636.
  23. ---, "The East European Revolution of 1989: Is it Surprising that We Were Surprised?," American Economic Review, 81 (1991), 121-125.
  24. ---, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsifi- cation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
  25. Lizzeri, Alessandro, and Nicola Persico, "Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's 'Age of Reform'," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (2004), 707-765.
  26. Llavador, Humberto, and Robert J. Oxoby, "Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120 (2005), 1155-1189.
  27. Lohmann, Susanne, "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91," World Politics, 47 (1994), 42-101.
  28. Lorentzen, Peter, "Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authori- tarian Regime," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 8 (2013), 127-158.
  29. Madestam, Andreas, Daniel Shoag, Stan Veuger, and David Yanagizawa-Drott, "Do Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement," Quar- terly Journal of Economics, 128 (2013), 1633-1685.
  30. Manacorda, Marco, and Andrea Tesei, "Liberation Technology: Mobile Phones and Political Mobilization in Africa," Working Paper, Queen Mary University of London, 2016. · DOI
  31. Myatt, David P., "A Theory of Protest Voting," The Economic Journal, 127 (2017), 1527-1567.
  32. Palfrey, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal, "Participation and the Provision of Dis- crete Public Goods: A Strategic Analysis," Journal of Public Economics, 24 (1984), 171-193.
  33. Papaioannou, Elias, and Gregorios Siourounis, "Democratisation and Growth," Economic Journal, 118 (2008), 1520-1551.
  34. Passarelli, Francesco, and Guido Tabellini, "Emotions and Political Unrest," Jour- nal of Political Economy, 125 (2017), 903-946.
  35. Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini, "Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details," American Economic Review, 96 (2006), 319-324.
  36. ---, "The Growth Effect of Democracy: Is it Heterogenous and How Can It Be Estimated?," In Institutions and Economic Performance, Elhanan Helpman, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
  37. Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
  38. Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7 (1993), 51-69.
  39. Raghavarao, Damaraju, and Walter T. Federer, "Block Total Response as an Alter- native to the Randomized Response Method in Surveys," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 41 (1979), 40-45.
  40. Reny, Marie-Eve, "Authoritarianism as a Research Constraint: Political Scientists in China," Social Science Quarterly, 97 (2016), 909-922.
  41. Rodrik, Dani, and Romain Wacziarg, "Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic Outcomes?," American Economic Review, 95 (2005), 50-55.
  42. Shadmehr, Mehdi, and Dan Bernhardt, "Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs: Coordination, Public Signals and Punishment Dilemmas," American Political Science Review, 105 (2011), 829-851.
  43. Tullock, Gordon, "The Paradox of Revolution," Public Choice, 11 (1971), 89-99.
  44. Yanagizawa-Drott, David, "Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129 (2014), 1947-1994. · DOI

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Cantoni, D., Yang, D. Y., Yuchtman, N., & Zhang, Y. J.
Affiliations
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (DE)
  • Harvard University (US)
  • National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
  • Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HK)
Corresponding author
Yuchtman, Noam
ORCID
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2019-01-21
Volume
134
Issue
2
Pages
1021-1077
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
DOI
10.1093/qje/qjz002
OpenAlex
W2913930471
Cited by
209
References
7
Citations by year
2026: 20 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 23 · 2021: 31 · 2020: 43 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 1
FWCI
47.60
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • Rare & Special e-Zone (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) (submittedVersion)
  • UNSWorks (University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Funders
  • European Commission (HORIZON2020)
  • Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
  • Economic and Social Research Council (ES/M010341/1)
  • H2020 European Research Council (716837)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Hong Kong and Taiwan Politics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
Keywords
protest participation, strategic substitutes, Hong Kong protests, social movements, information provision, Bayesian updating

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review