The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility
Open accessAbstract
To fully understand the motives for delegating a decision right, it is important to study responsibility attributions for outcomes of delegated decisions. We conducted laboratory experiments in which subjects could either choose a fair allocation or an unfair allocation or delegate the choice, and we used a punishment option to elicit responsibility attributions. Our results show that, first, responsibility attribution can be effectively shifted and, second, this can constitute a strong motive for the delegation of a decision right. Moreover, we propose a simple measure of responsibility and show that this measure outperforms measures based on inequity aversion or reciprocity in predicting punishment behaviour.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Schelling, T. C. (1960) · Cited by 11,815
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
Fischbacher, U. (2007) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4 · Cited by 9,510
Self-citationERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.166 · Cited by 5,378
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
RABIN, M. (2011) · Advances in Behavioral Economics · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.15 · Cited by 4,705
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193904 · Cited by 3,970
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Rogoff, K. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885679 · Cited by 3,688
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
Aghion, P., & Tirole, J. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262063 · Cited by 3,046
Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.001 · Cited by 2,416
Self-citationFairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments
Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., & Sefton, M. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1021 · Cited by 2,366
A theory of sequential reciprocity
Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003 · Cited by 1,867
Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193913 · Cited by 1,539
Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
Dana, J., Weber, R. A., & Kuang, J. X. (2007) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0153-z · Cited by 1,445 · cited 2×
“See Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007) for a similar result.”
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments
Levine, D. K. (1998) · Review of Economic Dynamics · doi:10.1006/redy.1998.0023 · Cited by 1,408
An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments
Greiner, B. (2004) · Munich Personal RePEc Archive (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) · Cited by 1,233
Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
(2009) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta7384 · Cited by 1,081
Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation Decisions
Konow, J. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.1072 · Cited by 887
When Social Outcomes Aren′t Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences
Blount, S. (1995) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1006/obhd.1995.1068 · Cited by 814
Delegation and the Theory of the Firm
Vickers, J. (1985) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232877 · Cited by 772
Battigalli, P., & Dufwenberg, M. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.2.170 · Cited by 675
What you don’t know won’t hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games
Dana, J., Cain, D. M., & Dawes, R. M. (2006) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.10.001 · Cited by 674
Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship
Hamman, J. R., Loewenstein, G., & Weber, R. A. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.4.1826 · Cited by 385
Legislative choice of regulatory forms: Legal process or administrative process?
Fiorina, M. (1982) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00242147 · Cited by 376
Sorting in Experiments with Application to Social Preferences
Lazear, E. P., Malmendier, U., & Weber, R. A. (2012) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.4.1.136 · Cited by 362
A public choice approach to international organization
Vaubel, R. (1986) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00141684 · Cited by 310
RESPONSIBILITY AND EFFORT IN AN EXPERIMENTAL LABOR MARKET*
(2016) · Cited by 207
Broberg, T., Ellingsen, T., & Johannesson, M. (2007) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.07.006 · Cited by 167
The role of responsibility in strategic risk-taking
Charness, G., & Jackson, M. O. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.006 · Cited by 162
Strategic Delegation: An Experiment
Fershtman, C., & Uri Gneezy, B. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696414 · Cited by 138
Self-signaling and self-control.
Prelec, D., & Bodner, R. (2003) · Cited by 73
A Theory of Responsibility in Organizations
Prendergast, C. J. (1995) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298379 · Cited by 66
Organizational Structure, Communication, and Group Ethics
Ellman, M., & Pezanis‐Christou, P. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.5.2478 · Cited by 59
Have your lawyer call my lawyer
Jones, S. R. (1989) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(89)90011-5 · Cited by 56
Intermediation Reduces Punishment (and Reward)Preprint
Coffman, L. C. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1330669 · Cited by 31
No harm, no foul: The outcome bias in ethical judgmentsPreprint
Gino, F., Moore, D. A., & Bazerman, M. H. (2009) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 26
Self-Interest Through Agency: An Alternative Rationale for the Principal-Agent RelationshipPreprint
Hamman, J. R., Loewenstein, G. F., & Weber, R. A. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1271921 · Cited by 17
Cited by
Battigalli, P., & Dufwenberg, M. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.2.170 · Cited by 675
Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship
Hamman, J. R., Loewenstein, G., & Weber, R. A. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.4.1826 · Cited by 385
4. Other-Regarding Preferences A Selective Survey of Experimental Results
Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2016) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume Two · doi:10.1515/9781400883172-005 · Cited by 360
Looking for Someone to Blame: Delegation, Cognitive Dissonance, and the Disposition Effect
CHANG, T. Y., SOLOMON, D. H., & WESTERFIELD, M. M. (2016) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12311 · Cited by 331
Excusing Selfishness in Charitable Giving: The Role of Risk
Exley, C. L. (2016) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdv051 · Cited by 304
Metadata
- Authors
- Bartling, B., & Fischbacher, U.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-08-08
- Volume
- 79
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 67-87
- ISSN
- 0034-6527
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W3124967486
- Cited by
- 384
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 70.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.