Cited by 814Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesSocial Power and Status Dynamics

When Social Outcomes Aren′t Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences

Blount, Sally·1995·Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

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Crossref · 10.1006/obhd.1995.1068

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  • Experiments using the ultimatum game have shown that seemingly subtle variations in procedure that should not matter from a strictly economic point of view, such as the mechanism that determines the roles, whether the game is framed as an offer game or a demand game, and the timing and method of eliciting an offer, all have powerful effects on how people play the game.

    “Experiments using the ultimatum game have shown that seemingly subtle variations in procedure that should not matter from a strictly economic point of view-for example, the mechanism that determines the roles, whether the game is framed as an offer game or a demand game, and the timing and method of eliciting an offerall have powerful effects on how people play the game (Blount, 1995;Hoffman, McC”

    From Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases (1997) · cites this paper as Blount, 1995

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Authors
Blount, S.
Affiliations
University of Chicago (US)
Corresponding author
Blount, Sally
Venue
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1995-08
Volume
63
Issue
2
Pages
131-144
ISSN
0749-5978 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2083187861
Cited by
814
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 44 · 2022: 32 · 2021: 40 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 16 · 2018: 25 · 2017: 34 · 2016: 25 · 2015: 24 · 2014: 39 · 2013: 37 · 2012: 43
FWCI
4.20
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
Keywords
causal attribution, external attribution, social decision-making, fairness, welfare policy, dispute resolution, game theory

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