The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust, and Conflict
Open accessAbstract
The theory bears some testable predictions. First, the probability of future civil wars increases after each conflict episode. Second, a sequence of "accidental" conflicts can lead to the permanent breakdown of trust, plunging a society into a state of recurrent conflicts (a war trap). This situation is irreversible and is characterized by weak cross-community trade links even in peace times. War traps are robust to additional sources of social learning, such as people learning from the direct observation of the history of cross-community trade. The incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers, fostering human capital and targeting beliefs. Coercitive peace policies such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes have instead no persistent effects.
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Citations
Cites
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
FEARON, J. D., & LAITIN, D. D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534 · Cited by 7,366
Rationalist explanations for war
Fearon, J. D. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033324 · Cited by 3,995
Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars
Montalvo, J. G., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201468 · Cited by 1,755
Blattman, C., & Miguel, E. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.3 · Cited by 1,617
Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War
Walter, B. F. (2004) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343304043775 · Cited by 690
The Logic of Political Violence
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr025 · Cited by 450
Seeds of distrust: conflict in Uganda
Rohner, D., Thoenig, M., & Zilibotti, F. (2013) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1007/s10887-013-9093-1 · Cited by 371
Self-citation
Cited by
Trust, growth, and well-being: New evidence and policy implications
Algan, Y., & Cahuc, P. (2014) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53538-2.00002-2 · Cited by 454
Seeds of distrust: conflict in Uganda
Rohner, D., Thoenig, M., & Zilibotti, F. (2013) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1007/s10887-013-9093-1 · Cited by 371
Self-citationLiberation Technology: Mobile Phones and Political Mobilization in Africa
Manacorda, M., & Tesei, A. (2020) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta14392 · Cited by 339
State Capacity and Military Conflict
Gennaioli, N., & Voth, H.-J. (2015) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdv019 · Cited by 330
Legacies of violence: trust and market development
Cassar, A., Grosjean, P., & Whitt, S. (2013) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1007/s10887-013-9091-3 · Cited by 313
Metadata
- Authors
- Rohner, D., Thoenig, M., & Zilibotti, F.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-01-22
- Volume
- 80
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1114-1147
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2124687777
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 46.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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