A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We show that concentrating bank regulation on bank capital ratios may be ineffective in controlling risk taking. We propose, instead, a more direct mechanism of influencing bank risk-taking incentives, in which the FDIC insurance premium scheme incorporates incentive features of top-management compensation. With this scheme, we show that bank owners choose an optimal management compensation structure that induces first-best value-maximizing investment choices by a bank's management. We explicitly characterize the parameters of the optimal management compensation structure and the fairly priced FDIC insurance premium in the presence of a single or multiple sources of agency problems.
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Citations
Cites
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“Indeed, not only is management compensation readily observable by regulators, but recent empirical studies by Houston and James (1993) and Saunders, Strock and Travlos (SST) (1990), Evans, Noe, and Thorton (1997), and Knopf and Teall (1996) have found that managerial compensation -- salary and bonus in the case of Hou…”
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Self-citationManagement turnover and financial distress
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Corporate governance and board effectiveness
John, K., & Senbet, L. W. (1998) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00005-3 · Cited by 1,345
Self-citationErkens, D. H., Hung, M., & Matos, P. (2012) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.01.005 · Cited by 1,202
Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies?
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Bank Governance, Regulation, and Risk Taking
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Corporate governance of banks and financial stability
Anginer, D., Demirguc-Kunt, A., Huizinga, H., & Ma, K. (2018) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.06.011 · Cited by 321
Bank, W. (2001) · doi:10.1596/0-1952-1605-9 · Cited by 259
Corporate Governance and Bank Risk‐taking
Srivastav, A., & Hagendorff, J. (2016) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/corg.12133 · Cited by 239
Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?
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Metadata
- Authors
- John, K., Saunders, A., & Senbet, L. W.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-01
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 95-125
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2124539622
- Cited by
- 323
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 16.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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