The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Toeholds, Bid Jumps, and Expected Payoffs in Takeovers
Abstract
We estimate sequentially outcome probabilities and expected payoffs associated with first, second, and final bids in a large sample of tender offer contests. Rival bids arrive quickly and produce large bid jumps. Greater bidder toeholds (prebid ownership of target shares) reduce the probability of competition and target resistance and are associated with both lower bid premiums and lower prebid target stock price runups. The expected payoff to target shareholders is increasing in the bid premium and in the probability of competition, but decreasing in the bidder's toehold. The initial bidder's expected payoff is significantly positive in the “rival-bidder-win” outcome, in part reflecting gains from the pending toehold sale. Despite these dramatic toehold effects, only half of the initial bidders acquire toeholds.
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Cites
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“The insignificance of the payment method (P1) differs from previous studies such as by Walkling (1985), Asquith (1992), and Jennings and Mazzeo (1993), who find some evidence that use of cash increases the probability of a succsessful bid.”
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An improved Bonferroni procedure for multiple tests of significance
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Shareholder investment horizons and the market for corporate control
Gaspar, J.-M., Massa, M., & Matos, P. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.10.002 · Cited by 1,268
What Really Matters in Auction Design
Klemperer, P. (2002) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330027166 · Cited by 977
The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The Impact of Prices on Takeovers
EDMANS, A., GOLDSTEIN, I., & JIANG, W. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01738.x · Cited by 674
Termination fees in mergers and acquisitions
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PAGANO, M., & VOLPIN, P. F. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00748.x · Cited by 523
The effect of reference point prices on mergers and acquisitions
Baker, M., Pan, X., & Wurgler, J. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.04.010 · Cited by 412
Gains to Bidder Firms Revisited: Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions in Canada
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Self-citationCauses and consequences of goodwill impairment losses
Li, Z., Shroff, P. K., Venkataraman, R., & Zhang, I. X. (2011) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-011-9167-2 · Cited by 354
Bidding strategies and takeover premiums: A review
Eckbo, B. E. (2009) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.016 · Cited by 306
Self-citationDo tender offers create value? New methods and evidence
Bhagat, S., Dong, M., Hirshleifer, D., & Noah, R. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.05.002 · Cited by 303
Metadata
- Authors
- Betton, S., & Eckbo, B. E.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-10
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 841-882
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2028590442
- Cited by
- 394
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 31.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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