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Cited by 523

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control

Open access
PAGANO, M., VOLPIN, P. F.·2005·The Journal of Finance
DOI 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00748.x
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Abstract

If management has high private benefits and a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies against takeover threats. Two forces are at play. First, managers can transform employees into a “shark repellent” through long‐term labor contracts and thereby reduce the firm's attractiveness to raiders. Second, employees can act as “white squires” for the incumbent managers. To protect their high wages, they resist hostile takeovers by refusing to sell their shares to the raider or by lobbying against the takeover. The model predicts that wages are inversely correlated with the managerial equity stake, and decline after takeovers.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00748.x

Cites

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Citations

Cites

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
PAGANO, M., & VOLPIN, P. F.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2005-03-02
Volume
60
Issue
2
Pages
841-868
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
DOI
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00748.x
OpenAlex
W3122088185
Cited by
523
References
17
FWCI
81.99
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00748.x
The paper
PAGANO, M., & VOLPIN, P. F. (2005). Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00748.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.