The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Toeholds, Bid Jumps, and Expected Payoffs in Takeovers
Abstract
We estimate sequentially outcome probabilities and expected payoffs associated with first, second, and final bids in a large sample of tender offer contests. Rival bids arrive quickly and produce large bid jumps. Greater bidder toeholds (prebid ownership of target shares) reduce the probability of competition and target resistance and are associated with both lower bid premiums and lower prebid target stock price runups. The expected payoff to target shareholders is increasing in the bid premium and in the probability of competition, but decreasing in the bidder's toehold. The initial bidder's expected payoff is significantly positive in the “rival-bidder-win” outcome, in part reflecting gains from the pending toehold sale. Despite these dramatic toehold effects, only half of the initial bidders acquire toeholds.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity
White, H. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912934 · Cited by 25,861
Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics
Maddala, G. S. (1983) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511810176 · Cited by 13,240
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408 · cited 2×
“The insignificance of the payment method (P1) differs from previous studies such as by Walkling (1985), Asquith (1992), and Jennings and Mazzeo (1993), who find some evidence that use of cash increases the probability of a succsessful bid.”
A sharper Bonferroni procedure for multiple tests of significance
HOCHBERG, Y. (1988) · Biometrika · doi:10.1093/biomet/75.4.800 · Cited by 4,829
Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003400 · Cited by 3,098
An improved Bonferroni procedure for multiple tests of significance
SIMES, R. J. (1986) · Biometrika · doi:10.1093/biomet/73.3.751 · Cited by 2,396
Bradley, M., Desai, A., & Kim, E. H. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90030-x · Cited by 1,701
Markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions
Schwert, G. W. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00865-c · Cited by 811
A Theory for the Choice of Exchange Medium in Mergers and Acquisitions
Hansen, R. G. (1987) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296386 · Cited by 740
Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control
Bradley, M. (1980) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296114 · Cited by 427
A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding
Fishman, M. J. (1988) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555399 · Cited by 367
Gains to Bidder Firms Revisited: Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions in Canada
Eckbo, B. E., & Thorburn, K. S. (2000) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2676236 · Cited by 359
Self-citationAn empirical analysis of the interfirm equity investment process
Mikkelson, W. H., & Ruback, R. S. (1985) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(85)90025-x · Cited by 350
Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance
Walkling, R. A., & Long, M. S. (1984) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003669 · Cited by 325
Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids
Hirshleifer, D., & Titman, S. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261679 · Cited by 263
Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests
BURKART, M. (1995) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05186.x · Cited by 262
Predicting Tender Offer Success: A Logistic Analysis
Walkling, R. A. (1985) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2330762 · Cited by 258
Social Experimentation, Truncated Distributions, and Efficient Estimation
Hausman, J. A., & Wise, D. A. (1977) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912682 · Cited by 229
The Mode of Acquisition in Takeovers: Taxes and Asymmetric Information
Brown, D. T., & Ryngaert, M. D. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb02678.x · Cited by 217
The Distribution of Target Ownership and the Division of Gains in Successful Takeovers
STULZ, R. M., WALKLING, R. A., & SONG, M. H. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05107.x · Cited by 208
Mark-Up Pricing in Mergers and Acquisitions
Schwert, G. W. (1994) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4863 · Cited by 195
Competing Bids, Target Management Resistance, and the Structure of Takeover Bids
Jennings, R. H., & Mazzeo, M. A. (1993) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/6.4.883 · Cited by 175
Takeover Bidding with Toeholds: The Case of the Owner's Curse
Singh, R. (1998) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/11.4.679 · Cited by 166
Toehold strategies, takeover laws and rival bidders
Ravid, S. A., & Spiegel, M. I. (1999) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(99)00003-5 · Cited by 71
The Strategic Role of Debt in Takeover Contests
Chowdhry, B., & Nanda, V. K. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04736.x · Cited by 53
Cited by
What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us? Evidence from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions
Fuller, K., Netter, J., & Stegemoller, M. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00477 · Cited by 1,741
Shareholder investment horizons and the market for corporate control
Gaspar, J.-M., Massa, M., & Matos, P. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.10.002 · Cited by 1,268
What Really Matters in Auction Design
Klemperer, P. (2002) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330027166 · Cited by 977
The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The Impact of Prices on Takeovers
EDMANS, A., GOLDSTEIN, I., & JIANG, W. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01738.x · Cited by 674
Termination fees in mergers and acquisitions
Officer, M. S. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00119-3 · Cited by 547
Metadata
- Authors
- Betton, S., & Eckbo, B. E.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2000-10
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 841-882
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2028590442
- Cited by
- 394
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 31.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.