The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank Monitoring and Moral Hazard
Abstract
We characterize a credit market equilibrium in which banks coexist with capital markets and firms obtain funding from both sources. An incentive problem exists between the firm’s insiders and outside providers of capital. Banks can provide not only credit but also monitoring services. We show that when banks cannot precommit to a particular level of monitoring, there is a unique credit market equilibrium with firms being financed with a combination of bank credit and external capital. In this equilibrium, a marginal substitution of bank credit for capital market financing would raise the firm’s stock price.
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Citations
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Cited by
Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector
Holmstrom, B., & Tirole, J. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555316 · Cited by 3,889
Covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor
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Capital Structure and Debt Structure
Rauh, J. D., & Sufi, A. (2010) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq095 · Cited by 669
Information and bank credit allocation
Dell'Ariccia, G., & Marquez, R. (2004) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00210-1 · Cited by 653
Metadata
- Authors
- Besanko, D., & Kanatas, G.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1993-01
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 213-232
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2063333733
- Cited by
- 313
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 4.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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