The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment
Abstract
We compare a sealed-bid uniform-price auction (the Treasury’s experimental format) with a sealed-bid discriminatory auction (the Treasury’s format heretofore), assuming the good is perfectly divisible. We show that the auction theory that prompted the experiment, which assumes single-unit demands, does not adequately describe the bidding game for Treasury securities. Collusive strategies are self-enforcing in uniform-price divisible-good auctions. In these equilibria, the seller’s expected revenue is lower than in equilibria of discriminatory auctions.
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Citations
Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- Back, K., & Zender, J. F.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1993-10
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 733-764
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2088277553
- Cited by
- 517
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 5.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.