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Too Many to Fail? Evidence of Regulatory Forbearance When the Banking Sector Is Weak
Open accessAbstract
This article studies bank failures in twenty-one emerging market countries in the 1990s. By using a competing risk hazard model for bank survival, we show that a government is less likely to take over or close a failing bank if the banking system is weak. This Too-Many-to-Fail effect is robust to controlling for macroeconomic factors, financial crises, the Too-Big-to-Fail effect, domestic financial development, and concerns due to systemic risk and information spillovers. The article also shows that the Too-Many-to-Fail effect is stronger for larger banks and when there is a large government budget deficit.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Brown, C. O., & Dinç, I. S.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-05-27
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1378-1405
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2041414737
- Cited by
- 390
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 34.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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