The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Strategic Ownership Structure and the Cost of Debt
Open accessAbstract
We theoretically and empirically address the endogeneity of corporate ownership structure and the cost of debt, with a novel emphasis on the role of control concentration in post-default firm restructuring. Control concentration raises agency costs of debt, and dominant shareholders trade off private benefits of control against higher borrowing costs in choosing their ownership stakes. Based on our theoretical predictions, and using an international sample of syndicated loans and unique dynamic ownership structure data, we present new evidence on the firm- and macro-level determinants of corporate control concentration and the cost of debt.
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Citations
Cites
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769 · cited 1×
“Hence, we consider neither credit rationing as a screening device for lenders (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) nor the effects of debt renegotiation on investment policy (Nini et al. 2009).”
BackgroundLarge Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408 · cited 1×
“…true cash flows are observable only to insiders, and the dominant shareholder can tunnel by incurring indirect equity and direct personal costs.5 Financial contracting 2 Large shareholders have an incentive to improve firm performance by monitoring deviant management (Shleifer and Vishny 1986).”
BackgroundThe separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. P. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00067-2 · Cited by 5,754
The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, H. P. L. (2000) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.206448 · Cited by 5,754
Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003400 · Cited by 3,098 · cited 1×
“Note that this is quite different from situations where coordination failures can aid dispersed claimants (e.g.,Grossman and Hart 1980). at N ew Y ork U niversity School of L aw on July 25, 2012 http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from and extractfor itself—but not necessarily for the…”
BackgroundManagerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Investor protection and equity markets
Shleifer, A., & Wolfenzon, D. (2002) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00149-6 · Cited by 1,077 · cited 1×
“However, tunneling in public firms imposes direct costs to controlling shareholders (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002).”
BackgroundThe Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience
Zingales, L. (1994) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/7.1.125 · Cited by 970
Cited by
Nguyen, T., Locke, S., & Reddy, K. (2015) · International Review of Financial Analysis · doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2015.06.005 · Cited by 287
Metadata
- Authors
- Aslan, H., & Kumar, P.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2012-04-25
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 2257-2299
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2023841042
- Cited by
- 173
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 47.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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