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Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States
Abstract
We construct a comprehensive list of dual-class firms in the United States and use this list to analyze the relationship between insider ownership and firm value. Our data have two useful features. First, since dual-class stock separates cash-flow rights from voting rights, we can separately identify the impact of each. Second, we address endogeneity concerns by using exogenous predictors of dual-class status as instruments. In single-stage regressions, we find strong evidence that firm value is increasing in insiders’ cash-flow rights and decreasing in insider voting rights. In instrumental variable regressions, the point estimates are similar but the significance levels are lower.
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Cites
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
Heckman, J. J. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912352 · Cited by 28,779
Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1993) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(93)90023-5 · Cited by 25,754
On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance
Carhart, M. M. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03808.x · Cited by 17,283
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Self-citationInstrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. (1994) · doi:10.3386/t0151 · Cited by 5,302
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099 · Cited by 2,906
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression
Stock, J., & Yogo, M. (2002) · doi:10.3386/t0284 · Cited by 1,842
The Case against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers
Bebchuk, L. A. (2002) · The University of Chicago Law Review · doi:10.2307/1600639 · Cited by 42
Cited by
The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional investors around the world
Ferreira, M. A., & Matos, P. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.003 · Cited by 1,975
Passive investors, not passive owners
Appel, I. R., Gormley, T. A., & Keim, D. B. (2016) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.03.003 · Cited by 965
Do independent directors cause improvements in firm transparency?
Armstrong, C. S., Core, J. E., & Guay, W. R. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.05.009 · Cited by 470
The State of Corporate Governance Research
Bebchuk, L. A., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp121 · Cited by 435
Board reforms and firm value: worldwide evidence
Fauver, L., Hung, M., Li, X., & Taboada, A. G. (2017) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.04.010 · Cited by 407
Metadata
- Authors
- Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-05-02
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1051-1088
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2163506883
- Cited by
- 670
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 157.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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